

Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-036
Friday
22 February 1991

Daily Report
Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-036 *22 February 1991*

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CSCE Forum Discusses Confidence-Building Measures

LD2002155491 Moscow TASS in English 1523 GMT 20 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna February 20 TASS—A number of practical matters of holding negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe were discussed here today at a regular meeting of this forum in which 34 countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) participate. They will exchange information on armed forces and discuss some problems of installing CSCE communications system.

The need to concentrate on working out documents—formats—was emphasised at the meeting. These documents will serve as the basis for the exchange of information on the armed forces. The participating states assumed the commitments to exchanged information on the armed forces by April 15 1991. Speakers noted that it is necessary to coordinate these documents soon as the military agencies will need time to fill in the documents.

The Soviet delegation today set out its views on the document for information exchange. It turned out that the Soviet approach largely coincides with the draft document submitted by the British delegation and with the views expressed by a number of other countries.

The decision to set up a hotline between the capitals of participating countries to transmit reports about agreed-upon confidence-building measures has become one of the tangible achievements of the talks.

It was noted at the meeting that a considerable number of specific steps had been taken by representatives of the Netherlands coordinating the project. At the same time, because of the novelty of questions tackled in the framework of this programme, the countries are a little behind the schedulde. The Soviet delegation believes that it is necessary to resume as soon as possible the functioning of working groups formed at the previous talks. It believes that delays in the solution of this procedural question leads to the loss of time and slows down the negotiations' pace.

Envoy on Need for New Structures at CFE Talks

PM2002115791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Feb 91 Union Edition p 5

[Report by correspondent S. Tosunyan: "Creating a Working Structure; New Round of Vienna Talks"]

[Text] Vienna—A new stage of the CFE talks has begun in Vienna's Hofburg Palace.

As is well known, a treaty prepared by the participants in the Vienna talks—delegations from the 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries—was signed at the summit meeting in Paris 19 November last year. However, a number of issues were not covered by the Paris Treaty—in particular, troop personnel, airborne inspections, and stabilization measures. These were included on the agenda for the current round. Your correspondent asked O.A. Grinevskiy, head of the USSR delegation, to talk about the negotiations which have just started.

"We have resumed our work, relying on the firm foundation of the CFE Treaty signed in Paris," the Soviet diplomat said. "It would be naive to believe that we will face no difficulties or that they will miraculously disappear after the signing of the Paris document. If we thought so there would hardly be any need to set up a joint consultative group. It is intended to resolve any problems that emerge and to relieve the negotiating parties themselves of this duty.

"However, at the first plenary session we found on the negotiating table questions which should have been handled by the joint consultative group. Differing interpretations of one of the treaty's provisions have recently come to light. The Soviet representatives in the group are prepared to constructively seek ways to overcome these difficulties. But exploiting these difficulties with a view to slowing the current talks would mean shouldering a great responsibility. Those who intend to turn the Vienna forum into a source for whipping up tension in Europe should above all think seriously about the consequences of such actions. I am convinced that this does not accord with the interests of any of the participating states. That is why we are proposing that the talks should not be weighed down with unconstructive polemics or groundless linkages.

"During the talks the Soviet delegation intends to strive to adopt measures to restrict armed forces numbers within the limits of their zone of application, and to move toward the elaboration and coordination of a range of effective and verifiable stabilization measures. The coordination of airborne inspection measures will also play an important part in our work. In this respect the question arises of whether these procedures should be seen in close conjunction with the problems of an international 'open skies' conference.

"These are not new issues, considerable work was done on them when the Paris Treaty was being drawn up. During the last round, as is well known, concrete proposals were made—specifically, by the representatives of the United States, Britain, Canada, the FRG, and other states. So we have things to work on. The question now is to create a new working structure. Clearly, it may be a question of three groups, which we are prepared to set up."

In conclusion, O.A. Grinevskiy said: "The Soviet delegation considers that work at the current stage of the talks will be just as constructive as it was at the previous stage. For our part, we will do everything in our power to maintain the Vienna forum's good reputation."

Strong Army Considered Crucial to Stability

PM2002151191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

["Viewpoint" by observer Aleksandr Golts: "Does an Aggressor Threaten Us?"]

[Text] I ask you, esteemed readers, to excuse me in advance for citing a long quotation. But it really is worth taking a look at it. And so...

"The elections to Kharkov City Soviet—the first free elections since 1917—were rather disappointing and at times not devoid of absurd comicality. Six seats on the city soviet were disputed by no less than 22 parties with their own 'programs.' They included the United Monarchist Great-Russian Party, the Party of Ukrainian Separatists, the Peasant Party, the Agricultural Cooperative Party, the Liberal Democratic and Democratic Liberal Parties (there are no differences in their programs, but their leaders are implacable enemies), the Democratic Workers Party, the Syndicalist Workers Party (Anarchists), and the 'avengers of Trotskiy.'

"These were similar to 'political parties' the way we understand this concept. The rest of the 'independent candidates'—eccentrics, religious visionaries, and improvers of the world, who erupted like mushrooms after rain—could be categorized as 'churchmen and others.' In short, Russia is now going through a stormy honeymoon of democracy."

No, do not be in a hurry to look for minor inaccuracies in a report by a foreign correspondent. The point is that this "report" was published exactly 40 years ago, in 1951. In a notorious special edition of COLLIER'S magazine, which was popular in the United States at that time, relating how a nuclear war would proceed between the Soviet Union and the United States. This war, the magazine forecast, would lead to the destruction of Moscow, Leningrad, Boston, and New York and would, of course, end in victory for the United States. The special edition ended with a description of "the honeymoon of democracy in the USSR" under the surveillance of U.S. occupation troops...

I have cited this extract so that the reader can see for himself how similar the COLLIER'S magazine fantasy is to our reality today. Dozens of parties operating in the arena of public life differ from each other only in name and, at the same time, are united in their simultaneous denial of absolutely everything. The present "improvers of the world" are not only holding thousands-strong rallies but also trying to block the fulfillment of laws. It is impossible to reach agreement on any question that is at all serious. People who call themselves politicians reject today what they said yesterday only for the sake of ambition, and tomorrow they will abandon what they are trying to achieve today.

The only difference between the COLLIER'S magazine fantasy and our reality is that all this confusion, which has nothing to do with democracy, is happening in a country which has not yet been conquered by anyone. In a country which is still called a great power. At the same time it has to be noted that the current playing at politics is increasingly affecting questions of the country's security too.

Numerous political trends have joined in the debate on this problem. Although, quite honestly, what is happening is sometimes only remotely similar to what is called debate in a civilized society. But, to get away from undoubted speculation, polemical exaggerations, and personal attacks which go beyond the bounds of decency, in the final analysis it boils down to the question of whether or not an external threat to the USSR exists and what our Armed Forces should be like in that case.

We have here two fundamentally opposite approaches. Some people point to the trust which has arisen between East and West and to the package of treaties in the military sphere which exist already and which are in preparation with those whom only recently we regarded as potential enemies. And so, proceeding from this premise and also from arguments of this sort—"Who will want to subjugate this country, which will have to be fed?"—they try to prove that our state must rid itself of the "military-industrial Moloch." For, free from the external threat, it is ready, according to them, to crush the incipient democracy. They propose as the prescription a sharp unilateral reduction in armed forces and arms.

Others think on quite a different plane. They base their analysis not so much on political statements as on the existing state of the U.S. and NATO military potential. At the same time it is pointed out that the West retains all the possibilities for waging a large-scale war against our country. Consequently, they believe that it is possible and necessary to disarm, but in such a way that military-strategic parity is preserved here.

Although I personally agree with the second viewpoint, let us not be in a hurry to reject the first one too. What is more, it could well be made the basis of state policy, if it were not for the acute economic and political crisis.

Let us begin with the economy. The war in the Persian Gulf seems to have delivered the White House from one rather unpleasant prospect, namely the need to report back to the people on the "peace dividends," i.e. the Americans' growing prosperity which, as President Bush promised, would happen as a result of disarmament. Practice has quite quickly shown that these dividends are something for the future. So far disarmament has been proving quite a costly business even for superrich states, requiring billions upon billions of dollars. For the conversion of the military industry, for the destruction of arms, for the vocational training and employment of discharged servicemen. Much has been spoken and written about this in the United States.

But this is the case there, in America. Here, as is known, everything is different. Some people reckon that the

"peace dividends" have already been received and have even rushed to share the funds saved. Meanwhile, it has to be honestly stated that the disarmament process, even within the framework of the existing accords, cannot fail to be quite a heavy burden on our economy, which cannot be called prosperous. Yes, this burden is inevitable. It is the payment for moving away from the nuclear abyss. But we cannot consent to this burden being made still heavier of our own will. The consequences could be disastrous.

Now about the internal political crisis. I recall a historical movie telling of the ups and downs of the revolution in the United States. In it Thomas Jefferson irritatedly threatened his fellow citizens: "If they do not wish for democracy, we will ram it down their throats." This is what our "democrats" are doing. In the Baltic region, in Karabakh, in South Ossetia... Naturally, it hurts me and shames me, a citizen of the USSR, to see this. But the West—the United States above all—is also very alarmed. Why, you might think, should George Kennan worry—he who in 1947 theoretically elaborated the doctrine of nuclear deterrence of the Soviet Union? For he is now observing what other famous colleagues of his, such as Z. Brzezinski and H. Kissinger, characterize as the disintegration of the Soviet Union. That is, the disintegration of the state for whose deterrence Kennan once called. Only it is not malicious joy but unfeigned alarm that imbues the article by the veteran of U.S. diplomacy, in which he asks the question: Which way is our country moving, and does central power still exist there?

Serious Western politicians are not in the mood for Olympian calm or malicious joy when they analyze the possibilities of the USSR's collapse and the emergence of a good dozen states in Eurasia. States in which there are figures who thirst for power and who aspire to possess nuclear and other most modern weapons. States some of which will be headed by overt nationalists. States whose very emergence will be attended—it cannot be ruled out—by large-scale violence (the events in the Baltic region have demonstrated this). Let us state frankly that in the long term our internal crisis has every possibility of posing a threat to the security of other countries.

But the situation will become many times more dangerous if our feuds take place against the background of a sharp unilateral arms reduction—which, in fact, is what a number of our politicians and commentators are calling for.

Let us picture, on the one hand, the rapidly growing tension and the interethnic conflicts which are flaring up and as a result of which nuclear power stations and other "dangerously explosive" installations, if not nuclear arsenals, could find themselves in the sights of extremists. And, on the other hand, the process of unilateral disarmament is reaching the critical point after which the United States will be able to reckon that it possesses comprehensive superiority.

And so, in one pan of the scales there is the real threat posed by the internal conflicts in the USSR, while this country's former military might is no longer in the other pan. Will this distribution not prompt a decision to impose order in our house for us? For there is no evidence that the West, like us, has come to believe in the priority of pan-human values. U.S. policy was and is based on national interests, precisely in the way that the administration currently in power understands them. And, as the war in the Persian Gulf shows, it is in the name of these interests that the United States is prepared to exceed any mandates that limit the use of force in any way at all. "We should be mindful of the complete uncertainty of the development of events in the Soviet Union in the future," U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney declared in hearings in Congress. "There is a possibility of increasing disturbances and a possibility... even of civil war. This in turn means that the greatest threat will... be posed by the Soviet leadership's inability to control events in the country." And the session of the House of Representatives was discussing funding for U.S. military programs!

So, is aggression against the USSR possible? No, while military-strategic parity exists. Yes, if it is upset and the crisis in the USSR continues. And what happens next will have nothing in common with the almost idyllic picture painted by COLLIER'S magazine.

Thus, however offensive this may be to those who call themselves democrats, the main conditions for our country's secure development at this exceedingly complex time are the preservation of the Soviet Union, the preservation of military-strategic parity with the West, and, consequently, the preservation of strong Armed Forces.

General Denies Arms Pact 'Backtracking' Charges

PM1902131191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel General Bronislav Aleksandrovich Omelichev, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, by observer Colonel M. Ponomarev; place and date not given: ""We Are Following an Honest and Principled Line;' First Deputy Chief of USSR Armed Forces General Staff Answers KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Observer's Questions"]

[Text] [Ponomarev] May I quote you something from THE NEW YORK TIMES, Bronislav Aleksandrovich? The other day this newspaper wrote: "The widely welcomed agreement on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe, which was triumphantly signed by 22 countries in Paris in November, is in jeopardy. The strategic arms talks continue to be bogged down in technical disputes." It is clear from the context of the entire article that the blame for this is being pinned on the USSR. What can you say on this score?

[Omelichev] I am familiar with this and many other, far more scathing reports which shamelessly distort our

policy in the arms limitation sphere. They often contain accusations against the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, which, they allege, is backtracking on decisions made at the political level and enshrined in international treaties and agreements, throwing a wrench in the works of the ongoing talks, and slowing those talks down in every possible way. Unfortunately, fabrications of this sort can be found today not only in the Western media but even in certain publications issued in our country.

The aim of the authors of such articles is quite transparent. They are striving to undermine faith in the possibility of Western cooperation with the Soviet Union on strengthening security. They are trying to drive a wedge into the Soviet political and military leadership and to damage the USSR's state and national interests. Nor is it hard to guess the design of our homegrown experts in abuse who entertain their own political ambitions under the principle of "the worse, the better."

I can state the following quite categorically. The Armed Forces and their leaders have no interest other than the people's interests. These are reflected in the policy of the country's state leadership. This has been shown by our entire history. We are following an honest and principled line. It is aimed at averting the threat of war. And a major role is played in this by international treaties on arms limitation and reduction.

[Ponomarev] Nonetheless, there is quite widespread doubt about this, Bronislav Aleksandrovich. Let's look at the CFE Treaty. You can often hear it said that we are hiding from our partners a huge quantity of weapons that should be covered by it—more than 20,000 tanks, many thousands of armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, and so forth. At the same time, we are being accused of illegally building up our marine force. Yet there are voices of another kind—claiming that fulfillment of the treaty conditions will leave us virtually unarmed whereas the NATO countries' armed forces will not be affected by the cuts.

[Omelichev] Yes, we have been inundated with various accusations against us. It is striking that the question of the Soviet side's concealment of arms is sometimes raised by Western officials who are quite well-informed about the real state of affairs, rather than just irresponsible politickers and press organs. Let's look at the figures. They will paint an objective picture.

A particular fuss has been made about tanks. In mid-November last year we had around 21,000 of them in the European part of the country. Three years after the agreement signed in Paris comes into force it is planned to have 13,150 of them here. Consequently, around 7,500 tanks will have to be cut—and it is planned to convert 750 of them to civil use, while the rest will simply be destroyed.

This seems clear. But we are faced with the following question: The Soviet Union once announced that it had 41,500 tanks in Europe at 1 July 1988. Where have they gone? That is no secret. Under the unilateral armed forces reduction, the transfer of forces to the defensive structure, and the withdrawal of troops from the East European countries, almost 21,000 tanks were withdrawn from service in the European part of the USSR during this period. Of these, 8,000 were sent to the Asian part of the country to reequip and upgrade supplies [doobespecheniye] to the troops, 8,400 were sited at storage bases in Western Siberia and Central Asia, and 4,100 tanks have been written off (broken up for scrap or reequipped). All this was done before the signing of the CFE Treaty, and the other countries' representatives knew this. For instance, U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker was briefed by the Soviet foreign minister in September and October last year. In other words, the United States and its allies knew that the transfer of tanks (and other kinds of arms) beyond the Urals had been implemented outside of the treaty framework, and we were not bound by any treaty obligations in this area.

I will not cite any other figures. I will merely stress that the picture is the same as regards armored combat vehicles, artillery systems, warplanes, and attack helicopters. We were not bound by any treaty obligations regarding these kinds of arms, and therefore we could not break any obligations.

Nor can we accept as justified the claims that the "buildup in Soviet marines" bypasses the treaty. In actual fact there has been no such buildup. Admittedly, the USSR took measures to ensure more reliable protection for its sea lanes in view of the considerable advantage held by the United States and NATO in strike and mobile naval systems. These measures began to be implemented back in 1987. As a result, three divisions of the Ground Forces were reassigned to the Navy as coastal defense (not marine) divisions. They, like all naval forces—and by no means through our doing—were not covered by the Vienna talks and therefore cannot be viewed within the framework of the Paris Treaty.

Finally, there are fears that we will allegedly be left unarmed. This is not so. The USSR is entitled after implementation of the treaty to have 13,150 tanks, 20,000 armored combat vehicles, 13,175 artillery systems, 5,150 warplanes, and 1,500 attack helicopters in Europe. This represents approximately one-third of all such armaments which all participants under the treaty are permitted to hold in Europe. I believe that this accords with the principle of defense sufficiency, although of course we are facing considerable difficulties, particularly given our troop withdrawal from East Europe and the virtual collapse of the Warsaw Pact's military structure.

Major reductions are to be carried out by some of the NATO countries as well. Take Germany, for instance. It will have to cut almost 3,000 of its 7,100 tanks, more than 6,000 of its 9,600 armored combat vehicles, almost 2,000 of its 4,600 artillery pieces, more than 150 of its 1,100 warplanes, and 50 of its 350 helicopters (I am giving these numbers in round figures).

Of course, the fears of a considerable number of Soviet people—and I know that there are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers among them—are understandable. Memories of the last war still haunt our hearts today. But familiarity with the real state of affairs makes it possible to ease those fears.

[Ponomarev] Can we consequently state that the difficulties on the way to ratification of the CFE Treaty are imaginary and that the heated feelings about it are being whipped up by the West on purpose?

[Omelichev] Quite so. It is to somebody's advantage. I can even say whose—those who have no interest in genuine arms cuts and would like to revive the Cold War (and all it entails) against the USSR. Hence the attempts to link ratification of the CFE Treaty with the preparation of an agreement on strategic offensive arms.

[Ponomarev] This is another question which needs elucidation too. Let's look at it.

[Omelichev] Let's. The strategic offensive arms talks have been under way for almost six years and are now in the home stretch. Virtually all fundamental questions have already been resolved. I would recall that it is planned to reduce the strategic offensive forces of each side—the USSR and the United States—to 1,600 launch vehicles and 6,000 nuclear weapons by early 1998. It has also been determined how many of which kinds of launch vehicles each side will have, and complex questions relating to long-range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles have been resolved, as have other issues.

Today there are grounds for stating that all major political problems have been resolved, including such fundamental questions as the relationship between strategic offensive arms cuts and observance of the ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972. We have informed the Americans that the Soviet Union will make a unilateral statement that if one side violates or exceeds the ABM Treaty, the other side will consider its supreme interests threatened and will be able to exercise its right to withdraw from the strategic offensive arms treaty. For its part, the United States is prepared to state that it only has experience of cooperating with Britain in the sphere of arms covered by the treaty's restrictions. Currently this experience includes deliveries to Britain of Trident-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, precluding their transfer to third countries.

However, even today there are unresolved issues. We call them technical, because no special political solutions are needed in this area. But they are important and complex in themselves. I am referring, for instance, to the need to include in the treaty a definition of just what a "new type" of ballistic missile is. Agreement has still not been reached on the elements of this definition. Nor is there any definitive agreement about which mobile ICBM production facilities should be constantly monitored or how to secure access to telemetry information from ballistic missiles—both existing types and new types.

I will not go into the details, they are highly specialized. A few days ago Deputy Foreign Minister A. Obukhov and a group of specialists, including some from the Defense Ministry, left for Geneva, where the talks are under way. U.S. Under Secretary of State R. Bartholomew has also arrived there with a group of experts. Their aim is to find a mutually acceptable compromise.

There is reason to believe that the work is proceeding constructively and could be completed in February. There has never been an agreement which envisaged such a major reduction—by 35 percent—in the most dangerous arms and such a comprehensive verification system.

[Ponomarev] So it turns out, Bronislav Aleksandrovich, that, in the article cited at the start of our conversation, THE NEW YORK TIMES was depicting things in the worst possible light. But this is not an isolated incident. Evans and Novak, THE WASHINGTON POST writers who unceremoniously slandered our General Staff and its attitude to disarmament problems, as well as J. Matlock, U.S. ambassador in Moscow (who was forced to indignantly refute their fabrications), were recently found out. But, you know, the slanderers have not calmed down, they have not learned their lesson. After this they wrote a new article accusing the Soviet General Staff of supplying SS-12 missiles to Iraq and of transferring—allegedly to circumvent the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—SS-23 missiles to a number of East European countries.

[Omelichev] It is not just Evans and Novak in THE WASHINGTON POST but certain other Western newspapers—the London TIMES, for instance—that have been excelling themselves with these fabrications. They are all lies.

As for SS-12 missiles (we call them OTR-22's), I can state hand on heart that the Soviet Union has never supplied these missiles to anyone—either before or after the signing of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. All these are fabrications on the part of people who would like to present Soviet policy in a false light in connection with the war in the Gulf.

Incidentally, I would like to note that fabrications of this sort have been refuted by U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker too. In a recent interview with CBS the secretary of state said that he had no information about the USSR's allegedly shipping arms to Iraq. "This information is based not only on what they tell us," J. Baker continued, "but also on what we know and on what, in our opinion, are accurate information and accurate assessments."

As for the SS-23's—we call them OTR-23's—they are dual-purpose complexes. That is, they can be fitted with conventional or nuclear warheads. Indeed, 24 of these missiles were given to the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria—long before the signing of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. But they have never had and do not have nuclear warheads. The missiles were transferred completely to those countries

and are beyond our control. Otherwise, the 24 OTR-23 missiles and four launch vehicles sited in the GDR would never have fallen into Bonn's hands, as actually happened.

I would note in passing that some people—even in our country—are trying to claim that the General Staff shipped these OTR-23 missiles without authorization and that the Foreign Ministry knew nothing about it. They quote one of E. Shevardnadze's statements. In actual fact, of course, he did know about it. Corresponding documents exist bearing his signature.

In general it should be stated quite definitely—and this will round off our conversation—that the Defense Ministry and the General Staff do not independently make any decision on any question of arms limitation talks or weapons shipments. They do so only in conjunction with the Foreign Ministry and other interested departments. The Soviet Union has set up an interdepartmental organ to smooth the negotiating process, and all decisions are discussed and elaborated in collegial fashion—although, to be truthful, it should be noted that this often happens after stormy and protracted debate. The most important decisions are submitted for examination by the country's top leadership.

There is no substance to any other suggestions, just as there is no substance to all the insinuations about arms limitation problems and observance of the corresponding treaties, which we have discussed today in such detail.

PRAVDA Views Pact Role, NATO 'Persistence'

PM2102114991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 91 Second Edition p 5

["Editorial Office Commentary": "Now Up to NATO"]

[Text] The Warsaw Pact—the military-political alliance of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia—is slipping into history. We are bidding farewell to its military structures. These structures will be eliminated by 1 April. That, according to reports from abroad, is the thrust of M.S. Gorbachev's proposals contained in his message to the leaders of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

The elimination of the Warsaw Pact will elicit different responses. There will be those who will seek to score out this page in our joint history. Black is a fashionable color today. But they won't have the final say. History, like the impartial Greek goddess Themis, will judge everything on its merits.

It was not in our headquarters that plans were drawn up for the nuclear destruction of the USSR and its allies—Charioteer, Trojan, Dropshot, Bravo, Offtackle, and others. And what tenacity was shown in weaving the network of military blocs on the near and distant approaches to our country's borders. In signing the Warsaw Pact on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance on 14 May 1953 we were responding to the West to prevent the cold war from developing into a hot one.

What has the Warsaw Pact given us? In brief, the Warsaw Pact reliably ensured the inviolability of the borders of our country and its allies and the possibility of peaceful labor during the period of tumultuous postwar upheavals, when the world was divided, politicians were still unaccustomed to the new procedures and new borders, and the forces of revanchism were keeping their powder dry and ammunition ready.

Europeans have enjoyed 46 years without war. Impartial analysts cannot fail to see the Warsaw Pact's merits. It has repeatedly initiated constructive ideas on detente, arms limitation, and the development of all-European cooperation.

So the Warsaw Pact is leaving its military structure behind. You automatically wonder whether this does not betoken the collapse of our doctrine and capitulation in the face of pressure from a stronger rival, whether it is not a sign of our weakness. Some people think it is. However, the deep roots of this turning point lie elsewhere—in the defeat of the cold war, in the new conditions prevailing in Europe, in the radical changes in the countries of East Europe, and in the success of new political thinking.

We can foresee readers' questions: "But what about the NATO bloc?" "Are there movements there?" Judging by a statement by John Galvin, NATO supreme allied commander, Europe, there are plans to "appreciably reduce" the military structure, although the general did not give actual figures. But the persistence with which the political leaders of the countries of that bloc try to prove that NATO is the "essential basis of security" in Europe is alarming. Is it necessary to demonstrate that the prevailing "bloc" asymmetry will have a destabilizing effect.

The whole world press is discussing this news. Our allies, judging by the responses received by the editorial office, support the ideas proposed in M.S. Gorbachev's message to the leaders of Czechoslovakia and the other countries. Regrettably we have only learned about the top Soviet leadership's plans and proposals regarding the Warsaw Pact's future from foreign sources. And, unfortunately, this is not the first time that this kind of thing has happened. Is it permitted to ask how long the press and, consequently, readers are going to learn about such important events from "secondary" sources? This makes it difficult for journalists to discharge their professional duty well and is prejudicial to our readers' interests.

TASS Reports Political Committee To Meet 25 Feb

LD2002175291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1727 GMT 20 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, 20 Feb (TASS)—It was reported here today that in accordance with a preliminary agreement an extraordinary conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee member states at the level of foreign and defense ministers will take place in Budapest on 25 February.

Analyst Considers European Security Prospects

LD2002154691 Moscow TASS in English 1423 GMT 20 Feb 91

[By TASS news analyst Albert Balebanov]

[Text] It is known for certain now that the Warsaw Treaty Organisation's military structures will be scrapped before April 1. The organisation has actually been doomed with the start of perestroyka in the USSR and reforms in East European countries. Only one of the two antagonistic military-political organisations—the North Atlantic Alliance—now remains in Europe, although it also underwent some changes.

The Western military political alliance will remain in Europe after the Warsaw Treaty Organisation ceases to exist. The asymmetry thus forming may have a destabilising effect.

This situation runs counter to the principles of the Paris Charter for New Europe which envisages the balance of forces at the lowest possible level and consolidation of existing confidence-and- security building measures and adoption of new such measures.

The charter recognises that the implementation of these principles is indispensible to the consolidation of stability and security in Europe and the construction of new Europe.

In this sense the fact that NATO leaders are in no hurry to admit to NATO East European countries, Warsaw Treaty members, is in keeping with the spirit of times. Admittance to NATO was requested by Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Hastase said last week: "In view of our geopolitical position and in the light of our contacts with Western Europe and the European Community it would be natural to find the formula for our association with NATO".

While not giving up direct ties with Eastern Europe and ever more so their influence on it, NATO leaders point out that their organisation actually has no mechanism for association with third countries. It is certainly not the matter of such a mechanism. It could be created, given the wish. Apparently, NATO leaders are aware of the negative consequences the erosion of the "eastern flank" of the parity between Eastern and Western Europe and the expansion of NATO by its joining by East European countries would have for East-West relations.

Creation of European security structures in the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would be the best solution for Europe in the present situation. This follows logically from the provision of the Paris Charter for New Europe which presupposes the development of Europe's political and economic integration on the basis of cooperation, mutual advantages and confidence.

This integration will hardly be succesful, unless it is accompanied by the setting up of military-political structures open to any European country. These structures which could initially be based on mechanisms formed during the Helsinki process would open an opportunity for Europe's true unification.

Whatever the solution of this important matter, it is clear that the psychology of blocks should be discarded in dealing with this matter. It is necessary to prevent the damage to the security of any country and to be guided by the spirit and letter to the Charter of new Europe.

Soviet-Hungarian Exchanges on Pact Noted

PM2002150991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Borovkov of the Southern Group of Forces: "What Will Replace the Warsaw Pact?"]

[Text] The fact that the full version of the Warsaw Pact no longer exists in practice is hardly a secret to anybody. The Hungarian media have been discussing this issue for some time now. The CSFR and Polish Governments have also stated their intention to leave the Warsaw Pact's military structures. On 15 February it is planned to hold a meeting of the heads of state and government of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in the Hungarian town of Visegrad. During the meeting it is planned to sign an agreement on cooperation between these countries.

A statement by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry press secretary points out that the need to conclude such an agreement and to strengthen trilateral cooperation has been dictated above all by the similarity of domestic tasks and ways of resolving them in these countries. This cooperation will be open and not aimed against anyone. It was also stressed that the participating countries do not intend to set up any bloc structures to replace previous groupings.

It has already been reported that I. Aboimov, Soviet ambassador to Hungary, has passed on to Hungarian Prime Minister J. Antall a message from USSR President M. Gorbachev containing a proposal to hold a session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee at foreign and defense minister level in Budapest this February. The conference will be aimed at adopting decisions to end the activity of the Warsaw Pact's military structures as of 1 April this year.

In an interview with the newspaper NEPSZABADSAG Hungarian Defense Minister L. Fur noted that the forthcoming Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee session will create the conditions for the renewal of Hungarian-Soviet relations in the military sphere. As for the nature of a future bilateral military agreement between Hungary and the Soviet Union, in L. Fur's words it will exert a stabilizing influence on the situation in the East European region and affect the combat readiness of the Hungarian Army, for which the USSR is the main supplier of combat hardware, armaments, and spares.

Gubernatorov Discusses Warsaw Pact Future

LD1302115691 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0400 GMT 13 Feb 91

[Studio interview with commentator Valentin Gubernatorov by announcer Yevgeniy Osipovskiy; from the "World To This Hour" program]

[Text] [Osipovskiy] According to a REUTER report, a regular conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee will take place in Budapest on 25 February. I would like to note that strong passions have flared up recently around this organization. You can hear that this organization, which supposedly played the role of gendarme with regard to the countries of Eastern Europe, should be eliminated as quickly as possible. With me in the studio is our commentator Valentin Gubernatorov, whom I ask to comment on these assertions:

[Gubernatorov] Indeed, the question of the fate of the Warsaw Pact is being raised more and more often among

the members of the organization, and of course, primarily not because it supposedly used to play the role of gendarme. It is simply that the political situation is changing in the countries of Eastern Europe, as, moreover, the entire situation on the European continent is changing. Of course, all of this requires a review of the Warsaw Pact's significance; and incidentally, not only of the Warsaw Pact, but it seems to me, also of the North Atlantic Alliance, NATO.

Our views on the role of the Warsaw Pact have changed, particularly in the last year, the year in which the cold war ended. At the Paris CSCE last fall, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke some very important words, in my view: The states of the Warsaw Pact, he said, will make an important decision before the end of the year on transforming the Warsaw Pact organization and changing its nature. He clearly had in mind starting with the dissolution of its military structures. But last year the trend gained in strength among the countries of eastern Europe to leave the Warsaw Pact entirely, and in January of this year the foreign ministers of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland expressed their intention to dissolve the military organization of the Warsaw Pact before 1 July. And now a new date has appeared: before 1 April; and the total elimination of the Warsaw Pact can, in their view, be carried out before March 1992, that is, before the beginning of the concluding meeting in Helsinki.

[Osipovskiy] Now reports have appeared in the Western press that Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary want to create their own, so to speak, tripartite pact.

[Gubernatorov] You know, it seems to me that these are, nevertheless, just rumors. Although it is possible that they are being put out not without ill intent, primarily to nudge these states toward leaving the Warsaw Pact and to bring it to total collapse—although it should be noted that it is the Warsaw Pact that has until now insured both the political and military balance between East and West. The fact that there can be no question of creating some new structure can be adduced at least from the words of Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel. He said that Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary have no intention of creating a new pact in place of the Warsaw Pact. The meeting between representatives of the three countries, he said, which will be held next week, will be important, and those taking part will adopt a joint declaration which will also cover the question of the future of the Warsaw Pact.

[Osipovskiy] I would note that statements have recently appeared among the new political leaders of East Europe that are often quite contentious.

[Gubernatorov] Yes, indeed. The new Polish Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk said in an interview with the ZYCIE WARSZAWY newspaper that the military alliance with the USSR is a thing of the past, and new priorities in the course of foreign policy envision the development of cooperation with Germany. But it seems to me that in the euphoria generated by the possibility of leaving the Warsaw Pact one detail is being forgotten: The recently signed Paris Charter in no way makes provision for the replacement of the two nmilitary blocs by one, the NATO bloc, and if we are to speak of the dissolution of a bloc, then it is not one but the elimination of all military pacts in general. By the way, the Soviet Union had advanced this idea much earlier. Of course, we advocate the kind of security system which would not only preclude the existence of military blocs, but the policy of force in general.

Petrovskiy on Visits to Paris, United States

LD2102150191 Moscow TASS in English 1119 GMT 21 Feb 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow February 21 TASS—"I am leaving here today for consultations in Paris and Washington on multilateral diplomacy issues", Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy told TASS before departure.

The first leg of his tour will be Paris, where he will meet UNESCO Director-General Federico Mayor.

The Soviet Union is highly interested in guaranteeing UNESCO a worthy place in the system of international organisations and using its input during perestroika processes taking place in the USSR, all the more so as UNESCO's potential, in terms of international experience in education, culture and science, is exceptionally great, Petrovskiy said.

When in Paris he will also have meetings in the French Foreign Ministry where the most topical problems and the settlement of conflicts and crisis situations, especially the Gulf conflict, will be discussed.

Washington will be another venue for consultations, Petrovskiy said. Regular consultations with U.S. undersecretaries of state are held there. At first, there will be consultations on humanitarian cooperation and then on how to raise the effectiveness of U.N. activities.

"The Soviet Union and the United States have recently reached a new level of cooperation over these issues, at which when we not only compare our positions (which is very important in itself) but also jointly look for answers to questions that arise in the activities of international organisations.

"In terms of work at international forums, 1991 will be a year of very intensive work, not to mention that of U.N. agencies that will meet as scheduled," Petrovskiy said.

"A humanitarian conference is to be held in Moscow this year. It is important due to the dialogue on human rights issues and on a broader range of issues pertaining to humanitarian cooperation within the framework of the CSCE process," Petrovskiy said.

"We count on a businesslike and serious dialogue and expect that it will contribute to joint efforts of all U.N. member-nations", he added.

Petrovskiy said that during the concluding phase of the tour, he intends to visit New York and meet the leadership of the U.N. Secretariat, the U.N. secretary-general in particular, to discuss vital problems.

West's 'Unceremonious Interference' Criticized

PM2002134591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences O. Cherkovets under the "Our Commentary" rubric: "Enough, Gentlemen; Some Kind of Help This Is..."]

[Text] The West's unceremonious interference in the USSR's affairs which we have been seeing during the past days in the attempt to indicate to the country's leadership what it can and what it cannot do in the Soviet Baltic republics would have provoked the justified indignation of the self-respecting citizens of the smallest state, let alone of a great world power. The homespun "gentlemen democrats'" hysterical cries and inadmissible pronouncements aimed at the USSR President are accompanied by attempts from abroad to administer the kiss of death. This includes threats to use such means as "cracking the economic whip."

"Aid to the USSR should be halted," many European and U.S. statesmen and public figures are urging after the USSR President and the organs of state power have taken legitimate measures to impose order in their own country. And they are echoed by none other than B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet and USSR people's deputy. In essence, he identified himself with the foreign figures' pronouncements against our leadership. "It is understandable that these countries will simply deny this aid now," he exclaims at a news conference on the findings of his visit to Tallinn. Even if we drop this issue's moral aspect—the undisguised attempt to exploit economic aid to put pressure on us—the following legal question arises. Which favors exactly will they threaten to take away from us?

Not counting the $3 billion which the West German Chancellor H. Kohl granted last summer and which immediately went toward paying for the earlier supply of products by West German firms, our country received for the beginning of 1991: $1.5 billion in credit from Spain, $1 billion each from France and Italy, and $1 billion as credit earmarked for purchasing foodstuffs from the U.S. government (in effect, the credit went to its very own—American—farmers).

After two sessions of the European Council the EEC, in spite of loud declarations about supporting perestroyka in the USSR, effectively restricted itself in October and November 1990 to granting only the current humanitarian aid to the tune of around $1 billion, without having made any further serious contributions to our economy.

By December of last year, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the IMF, the OECD, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development prepared jointly a paper on the USSR's economic position and the timeliness of giving us financial

aid. And what happened? To date there has been no reaction to it. You have to assume that it has been judged untimely...

And yet $4.5 billion dollars have been provided (or $7.5 billion if you count that West German credit last summer). Is this a lot or a little for our country to provide for perestroyka? If you divide this sum out among the total number of our population, each USSR inhabitant will get $26, according to the impartial calculations of the London TIMES. But this will not even buy you one decent meal in a New York restaurant. This sum is almost three times less than the minimum sum, set at $20 billion, which West German Chancellor H. Kohl and French President F. Mitterrand promised our country at the meeting of "big seven" leaders—the heads of state and government of the seven most important Western countries—which took place last July in the American city of Houston. However, it was provided neither then nor six months later.

What is characteristic is this. The main opponents of the idea of coordinated Western aid to our country were the U.S. and British leaders. G. Bush demanded point-blank that we stop supporting Cuba and unilaterally further limit our country's military spending as a precondition for examining the issue of providing large-scale aid to the Soviet Union. British Foreign Secretary D. Hurd in turn declared that it was necessary to stop "dropping money into a pocket with holes in it," meaning that aid should be given after and not before the new economic structures are created.

As for the West's telling the Soviet Union what to do, it has obviously developed a taste for this. Moreover, it looks as though one or two people have begun to forget their own views on giving aid to us. How else can you interpret the pronouncement by the same D. Hurd, reported by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, that the West is likely to refuse to provide the Soviet Union with aid. "I cannot imagine how we would be able to continue to carry out the aid program for the reforms in the Soviet Union... if the Soviet Union turned its back on the West and the ideas of reform," the British foreign policy department head announced.

It seems that Mr. Hurd forgot that you can only stop something which is actually happening, and government aid from the West is such that there is no need to stop it, particularly where Britain is concerned. Private care packages arriving in the Soviet Union are sent by individual citizens and from voluntary funds, and governments have absolutely nothing to do with them. Words and fine wishes are, frankly speaking, not worth much.

'International Review' Program Discusses Gulf

LD1702190391 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 17 Feb 91

["International Review" program presented by Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, All-Union Radio commentator, with Professor Radomir Georgiyevich Bogdanov, doctor of historical sciences, and Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, political observer]

[Text] [Levin] Hello esteemed comrades. Taking part in the International Review program today are Professor Radomir Georgiyevich Bogdanov, doctor of historical sciences; Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin, political observer; and Viktor Nikolayevich Levin, All-Union Radio commentator.

Naturally, the first topic which we want to discuss is the war in the Persian Gulf area and the events connected with it. In the first instance, the diplomatic efforts by various states will be discussed. I think it is justified to begin with those of the Soviet Union aimed at putting an end to the war by the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutons which demand the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait.

The week began, as you will recall, with a very important statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, president of the Soviet Union, which set forth our position, which stressed the need for the implementation of the Security Council resolutions, which expressed alarm over the possibility of the military actions in the Persian Gulf zone exceeding the bounds of the mandate given by the Security Council, and which drew attention to the threat of the use of mass destruction weapons in the Persian Gulf zone and in the Middle East and Near East.

In order to implement the approaches of the Soviet Union which were set forth in the statement of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev—incidentally, the statement of the president also mentioned that Academician Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov, the personal representative of the USSR president, was sent to Baghdad, and in Baghdad he met Saddam Husayn. Running ahead, it may be said that Primakov's talks in Baghdad have already yielded a specific result, which consists in the fact that Tariq 'Aziz, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of Iraq, is to arrive in Moscow this evening, and it is expected that he will meet Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on Monday.

Roland Dumas, French minister of foreign affairs, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Al-Sabah, as well as Velayati, foreign minister of Iran, were in Moscow last week. Naturally, the problem of the Persian Gulf was in the focus of attention at all these meetings.

[Shishlin] But, of course, we must addd to what has already been said the sensational report from Baghdad that the Revolutionary Command Council expressed a readiness to withdraw all Iraqi troops from Kuwait. However, it is true that I use the word sensational with some reservations, since that statement is accompanied by ever new conditions on which Iraqi is ready to withdraw its troops from the occupied country.

But what are these conditions? Once again it entails such conditions as the solution of the Palestinian problem, the writing off of all of Iraq's debts, a global settlement of the

entire Near East problem, and so on and so forth. In any event, to date there is a lot which remains unclear in that statement by Baghdad. Who knows, maybe the forthcoming visit by Tariq 'Aziz to the Soviet Union will clear up a thing or two? Although in this case I admit that I prefer not to be too optimistic. I prefer rather to adhere to realistic points of view.

But even with all of these reservations, nevertheless I think that the diplomatic activity of the Soviet Union and of other countries in favor of a political settlement of that most dangerous and extremely alarming conflict, that in itself—that diplomatic activity—is justified. In this case, this activity is better than passive contemplation of that completely disastrous skirmish.

[Levin] Well, I think that some kind of definite results from this week's diplomatic activity may be summed up on the basis of these events.

[Shishlin] I fear that it is a bit too early all the same, as far as the results of diplomatic activity are concerned, since it seems to me that the position of the anti-Iraq coalition and the position of Baghdad still differ too widely to speak of some ray of hope. I will recall the statement made by Yevgeniy Maksimovich Primakov on his return to Moscow. He spoke of some glimmers of hope. Well, probably it will be more appropriate to return to this topic a bit later once we have become acquainted with the political baggage with which Tariq 'Aziz, the representative of Iraq, comes to Moscow. I realize that such efforts have to be made, be it simply out of considerations of humanity and sympathy, but more serious motives also lie behind these diplomatic efforts. This is because everybody loses out in a war—people lose out in a war, states lose out in a war, regions lose out in a war, and all international relations as such also lose out.

[Bogdanov] It is probably very appropriate to recall the words of that prominent American, Benjamin Franklin, who figures among the fathers, the founders of the modern United States. He is the author of what, in my opinion, is a splendid phrase: There is never a good war and a bad peace. In my opinion that phrase is very significant. [words indistinct as participants all speak at once]

[Levin] Splendid words.

[Bogdanov] Naturally the quetion arises, so to speak, of how much that phrase is professed today by those who head the contemporary United States and who look at the world with the eyes of a great power or superpower. I am a little worried—I don't know what you think about it—but there is a very interesting process under way in the United States today. The war is under way. So far, the war is costing the United States, apart from the colossal material expenditure—according to calculations that is approximately $500 million a day—and if different calculations are made, calculations may be made from the budget; according to the expenditure already set down in the budget—and in actual fact that is up to a thousand million [sentence as heard].

But so far it is very cheap for the United States. Its human losses are so far so little that this is not giving rise to any concern. What is giving rise to concern is that ground battles may begin at any time. In these conditions, when nothing is clear yet as to how that United States will get round that, people are already beginning to weigh things up. Moreover, there is a quite clear wave—how will all of that reflect upon the elections to Congress in 1992? Another question is already being asked: How, let's say, will such protracted bombings of Iraq and the hesitation over using armed forces on the ground, in ground battles, reflect upon the presidential elections. This is explained by the fact that large U.S. losses will mean the defeat of the Republican party in the elections to Congress in 1992 and of course render the President's chances of being elected to a second term of office completely unrealistic.

I want to express a further conviction to you. That this war, no matter what its results are, will entail very substantial changes in the alignment of forces, and some things which are indisputable today will no longer be indisputable. Considerable amendments are being introduced into the entire alignment of forces in the international situation. Therefore, two things are likely. First, the current reaction to events and, in my view, the most important thing, the somewhat forward-looking conduct. But how will that end? Just imagine that Iraq ceased to exist as a state. Theoretically, Kuwait, Kurdistan—I am speaking theoretically—will arise in the place of Iraq. Another part is turned into a small Iraq—the Iraqi Emirates. You realize that all this calls for very serious thought. It now turns out that the participants of the coalition who gave their blessing to this decision in the UN resolution regard all these problems in a somewhat different way. And if Saudi Arabia is brought into the equation, if Egypt and Syria are brought into the equation, then completely incompatible regimes—well, what do they have in common, what, one asks, do they need all of this for?

A very complex, a most complex mosaic takes shape. It is likely, I am convinced of this also, that a whole set of interests, interests which completely do not coincide, lies behind that. But these are the facts. It is a reality of international life, and probably it must be taken into account that it is not just an emotional decision. There were a whole set of interests. Now it is clear that these interests are not balanced. They are very different interests.

[Levin] Well, I think it is very appropriate to add to this what was said by the minister of foreign affairs of Kuwait when he was in Moscow. It goes without saying that he expressed profound gratitude to the Soviet Union for its support toward the Security Council resolution, and for the fact that we are in favor of restoring Kuwait's independence and freedom. But at the same time, the Kuwaiti minister came out in favor of us continuing,

after the war is over, to play an active role in the Middle East region. We do not like that term superpower when it is directed at our country, but the Kuwaiti minister...

[Shishlin, interrupting] I like it less when we are deprived of that term.

[Levin] Yes, I like it even less. Well, the Kuwaiti minister said outright that we very much want the Soviet Union to act as a superpower in the Middle and Near East. Even such a detail was touched upon during the talks that thought must now be given to the restoration of Kuwait. In no way do I want to justify the losses among the peaceful population of Iraq or the destruction of nonmilitary installations, although I fully realize that when a war is on it is very difficult to keep civilian installations safe from nearby military ones. But it should not be forgotten that as a result of the Iraqi aggression, Kuwait has been subjected to universal destruction, pillaging, outrages, and the like. Now, the Kuwaiti minister rightly raises the question life after the war, once Kuwait is free, and he expressed the hope that the world community, the United Nations Organization, will help Kuwait restore its country. He added that they would welcome it greatly if the Soviet Union were also to lend assistance to Kuwait in restoring its economy, having a splendid understanding of the economic problems, and regarding that, in the first instance, as a political factor.

So there are a great many aspects here which indisputably do not fall into line and I do not think, let's say, that the Americans greeted the mission of Academician Primakov to Baghdad with 100 percent approval. Nevertheless, taking account of what you said, Radimir Georgiyevich [Boldanov], I think that the Americans are very much afraid of land battles, since they will entail a great number of losses and will demand a great deal of human blood. I think that if some kind of solution to Iraq leaving Kuwait could be found at this stage, I nevertheless want to believe that the Americans would breath a sigh of relief, too.

[Shishlin] Here are my thoughts in connection with the topic which we are discussing now. I want to express myself quite frankly. I know that this theme is present in our press—and not just in our press but in the foreign press, too—that allegedly the war in the Gulf is leading the United States into first place in world politics, and that, essentially, one superpower remains and that the Soviet Union is losing its role as a superpower. Sometimes, that thesis is supplemented by others—that allegedly the Soviet Union is quite simply following in the wake of what was done in the United Nations Organization and of what was decided in the UN Security Council.

In my opinion, neither the first nor the second idea stands up to serious criticism. In the first place, as far as the role of the Soviet Union is concerned, both the potential role and the future role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East and in the Middle East settlement, in deciding the whole of that Middle East alignment, I think that this role will be considerable and weighty. There is no doing without the Soviet Union here. It is another matter that this calls for, on the part of the Soviet Union, the active interpretation [osmysleniye] and reinterpretation of all our relations with the Near East countries including, of course, the State of Israel. A new look must also be taken at our relations with the countries of the Gulf, at our relations with Egypt, with Syria, Iraq, with literally all states of the Arab world.

Second, I cannot agree with the idea that the Soviet Union does not allegedly have an independent policy in the Near East, and that the Soviet Union is already all but following right behind U.S. policy. In this respect, Radimir Georgiyevich is right to say that there is a rather great spread of interests between the participants in the anti-Iraq coalition, and that there is a rather great spread of interests between those who voted for the 12th resolution of the UN Security Council. Of course the Soviet Union too has its view of the Near East problems, and I think that we can say there is a Soviet policy on the Near East; strictly speaking, what we began our talk today with clearly bears witness to the fact that there is such a policy. The statement by Gorbachev shows that. The mission by Primakov to Baghdad really shows that. The arrival of the prime minister himself and of the foreign minister of Kuwait in the Soviet Union shows that. Our active dialogue with Baghdad shows that. Only, I would like it to produce more results.

[Bogdanov] Nikolay Vladimirovich, of course we have a policy. This might seem like a sick joke, but we are still a state and therefore we have a policy. We have not yet fallen apart. When we do fall apart, the question of whether we then have a policy or not will be another matter. But we are still a state. But I want to pick up your point about reassessing what is happening in the Near East, and I should like to pose this question: What, in fact, was Iraq's reason for embroiling itself in this affair? Why did it need to seize and crush a tiny country like Kuwait? We seem somehow to be completely avoiding this side of the matter, not disclosing the reasons, not disclosing what actually happened. Was it a question of a man who was not properly balanced, not completely normal, who decided on impulse to make a grab for it? Let me simply ask again: What is each person's worth? What actually happened? if...

[Levin, interrupting] Worth, in the literal sense, you mean?

[Bogdanov] Yes, worth in the literal sense. If, for instance, Kuwait remains in Iraq's hands, then that in my view represents control over one-fifth of the world's oil production. That amounts to diktat not only in the Gulf but diktat in fact over a broad range, a spectrum of all states. But what specifically happened? Specifically, this is what happened. Iraq had been waging a lengthy campaign to bring down oil production, because only by reducing output would it be possible to keep oil prices high. Its diktat to OPEC, in particular to Kuwait, which is among the very big oil producing countries, amounted

to the following: reduce oil output and push up prices by $8 a barrel. The OPEC countries came up with a compromise: suggesting not eight but four. This very seriously undermined the source of dollars for Iraq, which had been building up its whole war machine with the help of such dollar revenue.

Incidentally, there is a very interesting issue here. Everybody seems to start from the assumption that it was only the Soviet Union which supplied military hardware—well, perhaps it was like that. But why do they forget that all the bunkers in which the armored and tanks forces, Saddam's infantry, and the Republican Guard are now concealed, and that everything described as high tech [previous two words spoken in English]—high technology—were obtained not from the Soviet Union. Rather some very respected German firms lent a substantial hand in this, as did French firms, which went a long way to creating a nuclear potential for Iraq—a possible nuclear potential, or one that actually exists...

[Levin, interrupting] And the Germans were also involved in this.

[Bogdanov] The Germans were involved. There are many many other things of that sort. So in effect, when Iraq failed to secure the satisfaction of its oil demands, what did the seizure of Kuwait signify? It signified diktat vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia, that they were dictating to Saudi Arabia that it should reduce oil output, and in addition raise oil prices. If you also look at the geography of the area you will see that the pipelines by which oil circulates in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and the matter of who has his hands on those pipelines is something very sensitive. So, as I see it, Saddam had his reason...

[Levin, interrupting] His interests.

[Bogdanov] He had his interests. He had interests for doing what he did. The interests were, let me tell you, not lofty moral interest, they were interests having nothing in common with Muslim morals or with any desire for liberating Kuwait from a monarchical regime. No, it was all about cash, hard cash. And the time of great truth will probably come to bear not just on us all, but on international relations. If one looks at what is happening from the angle of the oil interests involved, then an extraordinary curious picture emerges of who is fighting for what and what is the nature of the involvement of the United States, which, probably for the third time in its entire history, has now produced such a colossal war machine into such a territory—the first time, I would say, was the landing in Europe in 1944, the second time was in Vietnam, and now this is the third time. In other words, very high interests. Probably from the viewpoint of historical truth, from the viewpoint of the actual state of affairs, all of this needs to be taken into account and, indeed you're right, to be reassessed.

[Levin] The issues of the Near East are really so wideranging that all their aspects cannot possibly be tackled in one go. It would be sufficient to add the Palestinian problem to what we have just mentioned. By the way, as far as I know, it was also discussed last week in Moscow, during the talks with the representatives of various states. Again, the Kuwaiti minister has in my opinion demonstrated a very realistic approach to the matter. He said that of course the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Yasir 'Arafat have at the moment taken a rather absurd stand, having supported Iraq, but it is not the position of the Palestinian people as a whole.

The sufferings of the Palestinian people continue and we must bear them in mind, so this must be also taken into consideration. But I would still like to give at least several minutes in today's program to the issues which concern us—the Soviet Union, I would say, at least as strongly and as acutely as the problems of the war in the Persian gulf region. That is, relations with our Eastern European neighbors and the future of the Warsaw Pact Organization. You know that last Monday USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev sent letters to the leaders of the Warsaw Pact Organization member states in which he suggested that a conference should be held in the very near future at the level of ministers of foreign affairs and defense ministers, in order to reach agreement on the abolition of the military structures of the Warsaw Pact by 1 April.

Here I think one of the very strong aspects of our president's political activity has manifested itself—the understanding of the realities and the ability to a certain extent to give a lead to the development of these realities. Indeed, it is no secret that the Warsaw Pact Organization is only just, if at all, alive. In these circumstances—actually, last week, on the 15th, in Budapest—the leaders of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary met, and they were going to give their primary attention to the issues of the future of the Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev's letter removed this question from their agenda. That's what I mean by an understanding of the reality. But at the same time, I would hope that the understanding of this reality is followed by an understanding of another reality on the part of our neighbors: that is that we remain neighbors, and that our future is very closely connected with one another.

[Shishlin] This is a very proper way to put the question. Why? Because it is very obvious that some sort of painful transition period to new relations with our Eastern and Central European neighbors is inevitable. We can see that nothing has stabilized there, nothing is settled. There are all kinds of political fallout, including some of a rather unpleasant sort. In spite of all my sympathies with the changes which are taking place in Czechoslovakia, I am not quite ready to recognize as completely precise and wise the suggestion made by Czechoslovak President Havel that the NATO bloc should become one of the cornerstones of European security. Here is a completely new motif which Prague has been free from in the past. I think that you must really look further ahead—not just one or two moves ahead, but several moves ahead; that is, to think of Europe without any

blocs. As to the future of the Warsaw Pact, I agree that it is decided and it exists only nominally. The thing now is to sign the papers and...

[Levin, interrupting] To do it decently.

[Bogdanov] Here the question certainly arises of the perception by cur public of what has happened. The positive and the negative sided. There are probably many points of view, indeed many, and these points of view are, if you like, linked with certain interests. Behind each point of view is concealed a certain interest. For instance, those for whom it was very easy to deal with the former socialist countries, both in the economy and in politics as well as in the military matters, they may be extremely displeased with what has happened, because for dealing with these countries you need a completely different kind of people. It is a completely different quality of relations and it is quite a natural process. Take for example the economic relations with these countries, which were regulated by the famous protocols on trade exchanges in the framework of all kinds of cema exchanges. While now it is turning into one of the most complicated issues: what the economic and trade relations with these countries should be like. Can you tell me, how soon will such a state as Poland, or Czechoslovakia, or Romania be ready to enter the European economy and the Common Market. I mean to enter as an equal partner, whose products will be competitive and will stand the severest competition. When, will it happen? There are different...

[Shishlin, Interrupting] In about 20 years at best.

[Bogdanov] Well, I have a more conservative opinion on this matter than you. So, where is the market for these countries? Where is their real market? The answer, I think, is clear. I think that this period of political emotions is quite understandable, it is another matter that I do not approve of it. There are things which—and I agree with Nikolay Vladimirovich—are simply unbecoming for a state which calls itself civilized. For example, to destory the graves of the dead, to demolish monuments to the people who are dead—this is just not done. It is uncivilized. But this is a different matter. Everybody behaves in accordance with his own idea of what civilization is all about. But there are interests. That is why I think that the only problem is that the discovery of mutual interests and the building of new relations can be either completed in reasonable time or can be protracted for so long that it finally turns out that the partners do not need each other any longer, and they will find other partners for themselves. Different ones. Obviously there is some historic regularity, and probably each of these countries has national interests of its own which go beyond political interests of the minute.

[Shishlin] Whereas for ourselves the choice is quite clear and the conclusion is quite clear, in that our foreign policy and in our external political activity, the relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with our former allies who remain our neighbors, have always had and still have capital significance. Not even to mention the fact that our countries still have and preserve common political interests which are indivisable and inseparable from common interests with the countries of Western Europe. So, to sum up, the agenda of international politics is more than busy. There is plenty of work here, but work we must.

United States & Canada

'Ambiguous' U.S. Attitude to Gulf Plan Noted

LD2102144691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1300 GMT 21 Feb 91

[By TASS political observer Askold Biryukov]

[Text] Moscow, 21 Feb (TASS)—Will Iraq make use of the last chance afforded by the specific plan of action put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev to ensure that the opportunity for a peaceful settlement of the Persian Gulf conflict becomes a reality? Without exaggeration, it may be said that people are asking themselves this question throughout the world, because the conflict in the Gulf region has touched upon many sensitive chords in the life of the world community.

What kind of answer this will be and whether the Iraqi side is ready to accept the plan proposed to it, which opens the way to switching the conflict into the channel of a political settlement, will probably become known in the next few hours. If it is constructive, then clearly, realistic and positive actions on the part of all those involved in the conflict and interested parties will be required. It is no secret that people from the most varied countries do not want a massive carnage, the consequences of which may affect each and every person, to start in the Gulf region. On the contrary, a peaceful solution would be in the interests not only of the peoples of the Near and Middle East, but of the entire world as well.

A decisive and responsible moment for the entire international community is approaching. And, evidently, it would be irresponsible at such a time to act like some of the mass media. The London TIMES, for example, in an editorial today, called upon President George Bush not to weaken the military pressure and to seek to convince his allies that the Gorbachev plan is unacceptable and is no reason to postpone the ground offensive operations of the multinational forces. Another London newspaper, the DAILY MAIL, echoes this, holding the view that the Soviet plan for a diplomatic settlement is "very bad" for the United States inasmuch as it may force the U.S. President to relinquish what is regarded as "his war".

And in the United States itself, the attitude toward the possibility of a peace settlement in the Gulf is ambiguous. (B. Plant), a CBS correspondent attached to the U.S. State Department, states that "the administration is clearly ready and even wants to start a ground war and put an end to Saddam Husayn." The commander of the multinational forces, General Norman Schwarzkopf, is also urging the administration in this direction, stating that the armed forces of Iraq are on the verge of collapse. According to the Washington correspondent of the Paris daily LE MONDE, "the United States is actually pursuing the goal of liquidating the entire military-industrial potential of Iraq and has moved too far away from the UN resolution on the liberation of Kuwait."

So, one wants to ask these impatient people: Is it not the case that they want to respond to the intervention of Iraq against Kuwait by the intervention of the multinational forces—and first and foremost the U.S. armed forces—against Iraq?

Incidentally, quite sober voices can be heard in the United States claiming that it is still early to say the last word. The view is being expressed in the U.S. congress, not to mention Europe, that if Iraq's departure from Kuwait renders a ground offensive by the multinational forces unnecessary, then it will be possible to save many of the lives of the young men on both sides of the front line. And it is worthwhile for diplomats, and politicians, and us journalists to work in favor of this good aim.

U.S. Cooperation Viewed in Light of Gulf War

PM2102125791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Feb 91 First Edition p 5

["Viewpoint" by Candidate of Economic Sciences Ye. Gudkov: "Are They The Right Guarantees"]

[Text] The war in the Persian Gulf, which broke out at a time when East-West relations were beginning to change for the better, has again raised the question of what form the concept of Soviet security should take today. In this connection, articles have been published of late (the one by Doctor of Economic Sciences S. Blogovolin, recently published in ZA RUBEZHOM, is a typical example), which propose as a recipe "actually talking about military cooperation with the developed countries." In the authors' opinion, such a step is necessary to "switch to a quest for ways of optimizing joint efforts, cooperation, and restructuring forces" to "react quickly to the emergence of possible threats." These threats, in turn, are linked with future regional conflicts and the emergence of new centers of military might.

In short, it is in accordance with these ideas that the developed countries, including the USSR, find ways to unite and use military power to ensure stability in the world. At first glance the suggested scenario is not that bad. But only at first glance.

As far as I can see, the weakness of the proposed scenario for safeguarding security lies primarily in the fact that it is based exclusively on geopolitical principles. No account whatsoever is taken either of the nature of war or of the prospects for the development of the economic situation in the world.

The war in the Persian Gulf has confronted the world community with many questions. Most of them, including the prospects of military cooperation between developed states, can only be answered once it is over. However, one already knows the answer to the question whether the Western states' policy has essentially changed, and, if so, to what extent.

The answer in unequivocal—it has not changed. They will go to any lengths to achieve and assert their own

interests, including the use of military force. This is fully confirmed by the present war. Remove all the extraneous elements and the verbal battles that are inevitable in any conflict, and you find that both sides are using military force in their own interests.

Iraq perpetrated aggression against Kuwait, saying that it had the right to "punish" an obdurate and rich neighbor for its sins in the economic sphere.

The same can be said of the commencement of military action by the multinational force. The majority of UN members who supported the Security Council resolution empowering the multinational force to commence military action voted for it with a somewhat different action scenario in mind by and large. However, the economic interests of the West, first and foremost the United States, proved stronger. It commenced military action almost immediately after the ultimatum expired, and the nature of the action straight away demonstrated that the U.S. aim is not only to liberate Kuwait, but to remove Iraq from the military-economic map and also to take control of the region's oil resources.

Events could develop in the same way in other parts of the world. Particularly in those that are rich in natural resources. Indeed, the West's vital interests are bound up with the exploitation of developing states' resources. And therein lies the main danger of the emergence of conflicts in the future.

In that case military cooperation between the USSR and the United States would be perceived by the developing countries in terms of the two great powers having the same interests. There would be a corresponding reaction. But it is clear that in this sphere the interests of the USSR and the United States by no means coincide. So, as far as we are concerned, to form a "united front" would be to serve U.S. interests, no less. I doubt whether this would guarantee our security.

Belonogov, U.S Ambassador Discuss Gulf Issues

LD2102170891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1556 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, 21 Feb (TASS)—USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Belonogov, today received Jack Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request. Some current issues relating to the situation in the Persian Gulf were discussed.

China

Belonogov, PRC Foreign Minister Discuss Gulf

OW2202081191 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 0100 GMT 22 Feb 91

[Text] During official consultations, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Belonogov and his Chinese counterpart Yang Fuchang emphatically discussed the Gulf situation. The two sides expressed anxieties over the growing danger of the Gulf war. The two foreign ministers reiterated (?faithful adherence to) [zhong shi yu] the U.N. Security Council resolutions in connection with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The two sides advocate using all possibilities to stop the war and substituting political means for force in resolving the issue.

Belonogov informed the Chinese side of the efforts made by the Soviet Union in this regard, and of the contents of the contacts made between the Soviet Union and Iraqi leaders, as well as the contacts between the Soviet Union and other countries. The two sides expressed their satisfaction over the great resemblance in their positions on the issue, pointing out that cooperation between the two countries is of great significance to settlement of the Gulf issue.

Soviet Border Guards Visit Harbin for Talks

PM1302144191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Yuriy Balakirev: "Opening 'Windows' to China"]

[Text] Vladivostok—For the first time a delegation of Far Eastern border guards has visited Harbin—the administrative center of Heilongjiang Province, which borders Maritime Kray. The delegation was headed by Lieutenant General M. Barybin, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy and chief of the USSR KGB's Pacific Border District.

Foreign economic issues were among the problems discussed. The scope of border trade, which has now reached a peak, also depends on the passenger and freight throughput capacity of the crossing points served by the border guards. The busiest crossing is in the region of Grodekovo Station, where the Trans-Siberian Railroad joins the East China Railroad and there are road communications with the PRC. The Chinese side considers it desirable to increase the number of these border "windows" and is offering help in providing them with facilities.

Official Provides Details on Energy Aid for PRC

OW2102185191 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1000 GMT 20 Feb 91

[Text] Following the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries has been very active. Electric power is an important area of cooperation. In this connection, station reporter Chenchiryukov has interviewed (Kuzoryashov), deputy director of the Power Planning and Designing Research Institute.

[Begin (Kuzoryashov) recording in Russian, fading into Mandarin translation] Our energy cooperation with China is based on a five-point agreement: Construction of a heat and power station with two 500-megawatt

generators not far from Beijing. According to the agreement, the Soviet Union will provide China with this type of equipment for the first time. This coal-powered power station will be put into production in 1992. Chinese experts hold that it will greatly alleviate the shortage of power supply in this vast region. [end recording]

(Kuzoryashov) said: Our institute has also completed the design of other heat and power stations. Some of them are under construction, and others will be built in China, for example, the Wumi Heat and Power Station in north China with two 500-megawatt generators and the 600-megawatt Nanjing Heat and Power Station. The Technological Industrial Export Company of the Soviet Union has concluded an agreement with Huaneng, a power development company of China. The Soviet side will provide design assistance and will supply complete sets of equipment. It will also send experts to China.

(Kuzoryashov) mentioned in particular the Suidong Heat and Power Station, with two 800-megawatt generators. This kind of power station has never been built in China before. The station will be built on the coast. Construction of such a large heat and power station is an important and honorable task for us. As we have experience in building many heat and power plants in various countries of the world, we believe that we will be able to successfully complete our mission.

Power supply has always been crucial to industrial development. Chinese comrades have spoken highly of Soviet assistance to help China solve its power shortage problem. According to the agreement, China will provide the Soviet Union with ship repair services and consumer goods in exchange for Soviet technical aid.

Northeast Asia

Japanese Premier Reacts to Gulf Peace Plan

LD2202102191 Moscow TASS in English 0956 GMT 22 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kopnov]

[Text] Tokyo February 22 TASS—Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan said today that the plan for Iraqi troop withdrawal from Kuwait that was elaborated in Moscow needed to be thoroughly studied.

Speaking after the Cabinet meeting, Kaifu emphasised that the true meaning of the eight-point accords needed to be explored. He said Japan abided by the principled position that Iraq should comply with U.N. Security Council Resolutions.

Answering deputies' questions in legislature later, Kaifu noted that the tone of the Moscow accord somewhat differed from Iraqi president Saddam Husayn's previous statement. "This can be regarded as certain movement towards a complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops," he said. "On the whole, however, this does not represent agreement to an unconditional withdrawal. The plan is hedged with many conditions, and they are being discussed now," Kaifu said.

"In consultations with the U.S. and other countries concerned, we want to understand Iraq's true intentions. The government intends to exert efforts to make a peace settlement of the crisis a reality as soon as possible," Kaifu stressed.

Asked to comment on results achieved in the Soviet capital, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama said that "one new change has appeared."

"Several positive elements are obvious. The question is, however, whether any conditions will be attached to them. Therefore, the Japanese Government cannot state with full confidence as yet that it welcomes the accords in Moscow. So far, it is clear only that the Iraqi side is moving towards a ceasefire."

Suspension of North-South Korean Talks Reported

SK2202032991 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 20 Feb 91

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent (Sergey Tikhomerov) in Pyongyang; from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] The DPRK has decided to suspend prime ministerial-level talks with the ROK. Pyongyang has made this decision against the Team Spirit-91 ROK-U.S. joint military exercise to be waged before long.

Pyongyang maintains that Seoul and Washington are to blame for the ruin of dialogue between the Korean sides.

Though the scale of the military exercise is reduced in terms of its period and the number of forces, this is not a concession on the part of the South, but cannot but be regarded as a demonstration of military forces—an abnormal event of today. The Team Spirit exercise only lays an obstacle to the just started North-South dialogue.

The South may be obsessed with the [words indistinct] when the Korean war broke out in 1950. Moscow and Seoul have opened their diplomatic relations, and contacts between China and the ROK are developing. This must be taken into account.

Ignoring the development of the regional situation in a favorable direction is a near-sighted policy. From this aspect, ROK officials' assertion that the presence of the U.S. forces should last in the south of the peninsula arouses suspicion.

According to comparative data, the Armed Forces of the South are said to be able to defeat any aggression without the support of any foreign forces.

According to the view of the Soviet reporter, two things arouse worries.

The first thing is that the moment a war broke out in the Gulf, the Pentagon forces stationed in the south of the

38th parallel line assumed a full combat posture in consideration of an attack from the North side.

The second thing is a worry over the possibility that the Team Spirit can jeopardize the course of normalizing North-South relations. The Team Spirit has already resulted in ruining the prime ministerial-level talks slated for late in February.

Seoul's promise to push ahead with [illegible] peace policy toward Pyongyang early this year can [words indistinct] the course of detente.

North-South Korean UN Membership, Ties Eyed

SK2102123791 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 20 Feb 91

[Commentary by commentator Petrov]

[Text] ROK Prime Minister No Chae-pong issued a statement on the ROK's intention to request for the UN Membership in spite of DPRK protest.

The ROK prime minister issued this statement after Pyongyang announced that it was unilaterally suspending the talks between the heads of the governments of the North and South Korea.

Commentator Petrov writes as follows: The issue of UN membership is an essential question showing differences in principled views between the two states of Korea. The two sides called for simultaneous entry into this authoritative international organization. Pyongyang maintains that Korea should hold a single seat in the United Nations and Seoul is resolutely opposed to this.

At present, both the DPRK and ROK hold positions as observers in the United Nations. I would like to point out that this issue has a long history but had had no precedent significance until a basic change took place in the international situation.

Dialogue and cooperation from confrontation, resolution of problems by means of talks, and normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the ROK are such a change. Accordingly, the significance of each side's mission to the United Nations on equal footing has been enhanced.

As a result, the separate entry of one side to the United Nations can be a great diplomatic achievement ensuring superiority in inter-Korea dialogue. The statement of the ROK prime minister should be evaluated as a countermeasure to the act of suspending the talks by the DPRK.

The motive for such an act is the staging of the U.S.-ROK Team Spirit mobilization exercise. The scale and period of the current mobilization exercise have been reduced to a certain degree. Some time ago, the United States proposed to the DPRK to discuss the issue of the Team Spirit exercise. It appears that prompted by the Persian Gulf situation, the United States will change the shape [pyonhyong] of this mobilization exercise, not entirely giving it up as in Europe.

Regrettably, the U.S. proposal has not been reduced [as heard]. One should point out that freely staging a military event in an area where the two confronting sides have not reached an agreement on peace is dangerous and disputable.

As for the United Nations, the Soviet Union supports its universality. In view of the fact that the unilateral solution of the question on the UN membership may cause a most negative consequence, the issue of resolving this problem in the bilateral talks between the North and the South should be considered.

We hope that Seoul and Pyongyang will demonstrate the spirit of realism and the sense of responsibility lest they advance along the road of aggravating inter-Korea tensions. It is much better for them to sit face to face at the talks table than to aim at each other.

Near East & South Asia

Ignatenko Holds Briefing on 'Aziz's Return Visit

Says Iraq Prepared to Withdraw

LD2202001291 Moscow TASS in English 2356 GMT 21 Feb 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—Iraq is ready for full and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, presidential spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko told a briefing here today.

He was speaking after a meeting between President Mikhail Gorbachev and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz, who arrived here late on Thursday.

Details 8-Point Plan

LD2202061191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0505 GMT 22 Feb 91

[Text] [Announcer] Literally a few minutes after the Gorbachev-'Aziz meeting in the Kremlin ended, Vitaliy Ignatenko, the president's assistant, held a briefing in the press center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Despite the lateness of the hour—it was around 2.30 am [local time], the hall was overflowing. Vitaliy Ignatenko reported that Iraq had announced the complete and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait. Thus the reply to the Gorbachev plan to regulate the crisis in the Persian Gulf was positive. The president's assistant informed the journalists that as a result of the talks by the Soviet head of state with Saddam Husayn's personal representative, eight points had been outlined defining ways out of the crisis situation in the Near East.

[Begin Ignatenko recording] [Words indistinct] in the following ways.

First: Iraq announces the complete and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait.

Second: The withdrawal of troops begins the day after [na sleduyushchiy den] the end of military actions.

Third: The withdrawal of troops will be carried out in fixed time limits.

Four: This means that after the withdrawal of two-thirds of all armed forces from Kuwait, the economic sanctions envisaged by the UN will cease to operate.

Five: After the withdrawal of troops from Kuwait, the reasons for which the Security Council resolutions were adopted thereby will be exhausted, and therefore these resolutions will cease to operate.

Six: Immediately after the ceasefire, all POW's will be released.

Seven: On the instructions of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization, the withdrawal of troops will be observed by countries not participating in the conflict.

And last: The work to elaborate the formulae and the concrete details is continuing.

The final results of that work will be reported today, 22 February, to the members of the Security Council, to Security Council member-states, and the secretary general of the United Nations Organization. [end recording]

[Announcer] In conclusion, the USSR President's assistant reported that Mikhail Gorbachev had reported the first results of the talks by telephone to U.S. President George Bush.

Reports Note 'Aziz's Return Visit, Official Talks

Stops in Tehran

LD2102162991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1606 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] Tehran, 21 Feb (TASS)—Tariq 'Aziz, Iraq deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, arrived in Tehran today on his way to Moscow.

Arrives 21 Feb, Met By Belonogov

LD2102210591 Moscow TASS in English 2059 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow February 21 TASS—Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz arrived in Moscow tonight.

'Aziz held consultations in Baghdad with the Iraqi Revolution Command Council in connection with the plan for a political settlement in the Gulf, conveyed to him by President Mikhail Gorbachev on Monday.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Belonogov met 'Aziz at Moscow's airport. 'Aziz did not speak to reporters at the airport.

The Iraqi foreign minister is expected to meet President Gorbachev tonight.

Meets With Gorbachev 22 Feb

LD2102215391 Moscow TASS in English 2145 GMT 21 Feb 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Lyudmila Shevtsova]

[Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev today met Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz.

The meeting began several minutes after midnight Moscow time, immediately after Saddam Husayn's personal envoy arrived to the Kremlin from Moscow's airport.

Presidential spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko is expected to hold a news conference after the meeting.

Holds Talks With Bessmertnykh

LD2202092691 Moscow TASS in English 0903 GMT 22 Feb 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Sergey Postanogov and Georgiy Shmelyov]

[Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz began talks here this morning on certain aspects of the "Gorbachev plan" for a peace settlement of the Gulf conflict.

'Aziz arrived here late on Thursday from Baghdad, where he had consultations with President Saddam Husayn on the new Soviet peace initiatives. He met President Gorbachev shortly after his arrival.

Head of the presidential press service Ignatenko told a briefing here, arranged after Gorbachev's talk with 'Aziz, that the Iraqi side had agreed to withdraw its troops from Kuwait.

Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, the Soviet president's special envoy, who had talks in Baghdad, told TASS before the negotations at ministerial level, that "some aspects of the 'Gorbachev plan' are now being 'polished up'".

One more meeting between President Gorbachev and Iraqi foreign minister is expected here today.

Primakov Interviewed

LD2202100391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 22 Feb 91

[Interview with academician Yevgeniy Primakov by international affairs journalist Tomas Kolesnichenko, in Moscow on 22 February; from the "Television news service" program—recorded]

[Text] [Kolesnichenko] Yevgeniy Maksimovich, I know that last night was a turbulent, dramatic one. You spent it all here. Can you tell us about the details of what happened in the Kremlin last night?

[Primakov] It was indeed dramatic. Tariq 'Aziz only arrived in Moscow at midnight. He was taken straight to the Kremlin for the meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Let me say first that, naturally, the USSR president, as well as everyone else, worked all night. The conversation with Tariq 'Aziz lasted three hours. The structure of the plan for a peaceful settlement which, with qualfications—no, not even with qualifications—can be called the Gorbachev Plan, was discussed in principle during that conversation. The fact is that Iraq accepted the Soviet proposal, accepted President Gorbachev's proposal, that it will withdraw its troops from Kuwait unconditionally and fully. That is the most important thing.

[Kolesnichenko] Is there a guarantee that the land war will not be started now?

[Primakov] You know, nobody can give you any guarantee on anything. But now, if that war begins today, it will begin and the whole world will see that it began in conditions where the Soviet Union has truly gained an enormous achievement in its attempts to find a political settlement. It is emerging in real and clear terms, and if it is wrecked by a war at this moment, then those who begin that war will bear the responsibility.

Churkin Outlines Discussion

LD2202084891 Moscow TASS in English 0837 GMT 22 Feb 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow February 22 TASS—Talks between President Mikhail Gorbachev and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz, held late on Thursday, "were conducted on the basis of Gorbachev's plan, which is known to the United States and other countries in the anti-Iraqi coalition," Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vitaly Churkin told journalists this morning, before a meeting between the Soviet and Iraqi foreign ministers.

Churkin said the sides succeeded in reaching agreement on the eight points of the plan, which define the Iraqi side's position.

"We are holding talks on the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and have made progress here," Churkin stressed.

Responding to journalists' questions, Churkin said that "there has been no exact timetable for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops as yet."

On the withdrawal of the coalition forces, Churkin said "the eight points did not deal with the withdrawal of the multinational force."

He noted in conclusion that several more provisions needed to be discussed during today's talks.

Belonogov Terms Talks 'Positive'

LD2202004891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0001 GMT 22 Feb 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Lyudmila Shvedova from the Kremlin]

[Text] Moscow, 22 Feb (TASS)— "There are grounds for hoping that a really genuine breakthrough to peace can be made." That was the comment of Aleksandr Belonogov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, on the results of the meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Tariq 'Aziz which has just ended in the Kremlin.

Commenting at the TASS correspondent's request on the results of the meeting, which lasted over two hours, he said that Saddam Husayn's reply to Gorbachev's peace proposals, which was brought to Moscow by his personal representative, is "positive on the whole."

"The conversation was detailed. There was a comparison of viewpoints. In the final analysis, definite outlines are becoming discernible, which make it possible, we hope, to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict. The work is not yet complete. It will continue in the morning," Belonogov said.

Gremitskikh Predicts Outcome

LD2102165791 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] Gremitskikh, first deputy head of the USSR Foreign Ministry information directorate, has told a TASS correspondent that judging by reports from Baghdad, 'Aziz will bring here a reply to the Soviet proposal on a political settlement of the crisis in the Persian Gulf region. The proposal was put forward by USSR President Gorbachev at the meeting with official representatives of the Iraqi leadership in Moscow on 18 February. It has not been ruled out that 'Aziz will be received by the USSR president today.

In answer to a question from the TASS correspondent on whether it can be expected that in connection with the intensification of efforts for a political settlement of the crisis, the command of the multinational armed forces will hold back from starting a land operation against Iraq, Gremitskykh said that it seems that all countries involved in the crisis should now concentrate maximum efforts to stop the bloodshed in which soldiers of the multinational forces and soldiers and the peaceful inhabitants of Iraq are dying. Huge material wealth is also being destroyed. They should do everything to settle the crisis by political means.

Bessmertnykh Holds New Conference on Peace Plan

LD2102183691 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 1800 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] The Soviet foreign minister is in Spain, and after his meeting with Felipe Gonzalez this afternoon he went to the Foreign Ministry to meet Minister Fernandez Ordonez, who has announced a news conference, possibly a joint one. Good evening Alfonso Sanchez in the radio car. Has the news conference taken place, and is there any reaction to Saddam Husayn's message?

[Minguez] Good evening, this is Aurora Minguez. Yes, there has been a response, and initially the Soviet foreign minister said that he does not have total confidence in the success of Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal to end the war in the Gulf peacefully, but that in spite of everything faith is the last thing one loses. Bessmertnykh emphasized at this news conference, which has just ended, that he did not know the full content of Saddam Husayn's message, but that tomorrow in Moscow, the Soviet authorities want to hear a clear reply from Saddam Husayn, and in this case from his Foreign Minister, Tariq 'Aziz, about whether or not Iraq is prepared to withdraw from Kuwait immediately. That is what the Moscow authorities are waiting for, and afterward the forms of the withdrawal, and the future of Saddam Husayn will be another question, Bessmertnykh said, to be discussed subsequently in the framework of the Security Council.

Saddam 21 Feb Speech on Gulf Aims Noted

Denounces U.S.

LD2102192691 Moscow TASS in English 1832 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] Nicosia February 21 TASS—In a 35-minute radio address today, President Saddam Husayn of Iraq denounced the United States for rejecting the Iraqi initiative put forward by the Revolutionary Command Council on 15 February and vowed to fight to the end.

"The mother of all battles will be our battle for victory and martyrdom," Saddam said.

Iraq wants peace in the Gulf that will open the door for an all-round settlement of all problems of the region, primarily the Palestinian question.

Official Views 'Kamikaze Message'

LD2102220291 Hamburg DPA in German 2059 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Excerpt] Moscow (DPA)—The head of the evaluation and planning administration of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Sergey Tarasenko, has described the address by Iraqi President Saddam Husayn as a "kamikaze message from someone who intends to destroy his own people." The Iraqi president has made his choice "in favor of war," Tarasenko told the INTERFAX news agency this evening. He saw no point in the renewed visit to Moscow by Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz, who is expected in the Soviet capital this evening.

According to INTERFAX, Tarasenko said he regrets the fact that those who condemned the destruction of Iraq did not understand that a "totalitarian regime can only be liquidated if its totalitarian dictatorship is prostrated." In his opinion, the Iraqis are suffering like all people under a dictatorship. If anything has been destroyed in Iraq it is not the country but "the fascist dictatorship," Tarasenko concluded. [passage omitted]

Commentaries Continue Assessing Gulf Events

'Amateurish' Approaches Criticized

PM1502161391 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Feb 91 p 3

[Report by special correspondents S. Zavorotnyy and I. Chernyak: "...And Oil Washes Away All Traces"]

[Excerpt] Abu Dhabi, Moscow—[passage omitted] When in 1979 the army of extremist-communist Vietnam occupied sovereign Cambodia, the West also became indignant. Perhaps no less than today. But the United States did not intervene then—the economy was not threatened. Now the situation is more difficult. It is clear that "building a collective security system in which everyone knows that aggression will be punished," "eliminating the despotic Iraqi regime which belongs on the garbage heap of history," "liberating the innocent victim Kuwait and restoring justice," and "protecting Americans abroad" are by no means what is most important. The paramount motive is the insanely desperate fight for oil. A fight in which the industrialized world needs victory at any price.

To some people the words of the well-known expert Carl Solberg may seem absurd, but long before the war he wrote: "Western democracy is totally dependent on oil. Without oil there is no free enterprise."

Is it any wonder that Bush, when he learned of Iraq's seizure of Kuwait, drew the "almost immediate" conclusion, as he subsequently recalled, that the United States must intervene.

So the Americans and their allies are intransigent and implacable. They know what they are fighting for. The inhabitants of the Arab countries who are demonstrating their condemnation of the American invasion also know what they want.

But does the Soviet Union know what it wants in the Near East?

It seems that only now, at the end of the fourth week of the hostilities in the Persian Gulf, have we seriously considered the consequences. One after another peace initiatives are being hatched in Moscow and the USSR President's personal envoy is being sent to Baghdad.... Is it not somewhat late to think of this when you feel the

conflagration of war close to your border and when you are face to face with the threat of environmental catastrophe? Was it really impossible to predict the consequences of the "use of force" which we hastily voted for in the Security Council? Recall how France tried to delay the start of hostilities, how China resisted America's persuasion.... But we, a great power, "bust a gut trying to keep up with the Americans."

But what is done is done—the war machine has been set in motion. We are hardly capable of stopping it singlehandedly. The only thing left to do is to sound the alarm. This can and must be done, of course. But will that actually change anything? After all, no matter which way you turn, the Soviet Union with its policy has been left on the sidelines....

"That is not quite right," a high-ranking Foreign Ministry diplomat told us. "Our Near East policy has generally speaking been sound and balanced. We have not lost any friends in the East, furthermore we have established relations with countries that wield influence in the region—Saudi Arabia, for example. The USSR's principled position toward the occupation of Kuwait has earned us prestige in the Arab world. They still take note of us."

V. Naumkin, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies, takes a different view:

"We are wandering in the dark right now as far as the Near East is concerned," he told us. We are renouncing our old policy (whether it was good or bad is beside the point) but have not elaborated a new one yet. No one has gotten around to it yet. They were on the verge of creating a group of international affairs experts attached to the USSR Supreme Soviet, but they did not even invite us specialists to legislature. Hence the inept and often amateurish decisions. Is it really not clear that the UN vote "for" the use of force against Iraq will not dispose Arab public opinion in our favor? As for the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee's conclusion that the treaty with Iraq should be torn up—well, what is that if not absurd? There has been appalling vacillation in the selection of partners. Take our relations with Israel. Perhaps we were in too much of a hurry when we broke off diplomatic relations with it. Why rush to restore relations with Tel Aviv just when the whole of Europe is quietly cutting back cooperation there? Now a raiding party of our academicians led by Marchuk is already heading in that direction. Gorbachev himself has received Ilya Zemtsov, who dogs Israeli ministers and who is considered a criminal even in Tel Aviv. Before that the President had four times refused to receive Yasir 'Arafat. The Arabs are forming the opinion that we have turned our backs on the Palestinians by taking Israel's side....

"The Persian Gulf crisis will be resolved sooner or later," Vitaliy Vyacheslavovich went on. "But what then? In my opinion, few people here are thinking about that. Even the Foreign Ministry's Evaluation and Planning Department is not considering the possible options...."

Why does the Soviet Union need the Near East today?

Our question stung the professor to the quick. He fervently began trying to convince us that the country cannot live without the Arabs. It is a market where they are prepared to buy our machinery which, to be blunt, is not of high quality, and they have the money that we need so badly. No one is arguing here—that is all plain.

There is one confusing feature here. For many years our foreign policy was exported to the Near East in tanks, armored personnel carriers, and air defense facilities. Were it not for weapons, the USSR would not have become friends with many of the Arab countries. We did not break new ground in our policy but merely did the opposite of whatever the Americans did. They "gambled" on Israel, we "gambled" on Egypt, they chose Iran, we chose Syria, for them it was Saudi Arabia, for us—Iraq.... The sole difference being that after the weapons supplies the Americans gave their allies capital and technology. This "triad" was and remains a reliable buttress of U.S. policy in the Near East. Our diplomacy in this region, however, has been shod from its infancy in fake leather boots.

People may object: What about the Aswan and Euphrates dams, the plants and combines in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria? Yes, these things exist. But does the volume of economic cooperation with those countries compare with the volume of military supplies? Our projects are not the most important thing in their economy because the importance of the latter has long been determined by the level of technology, but the former "wards" need them just as much as the Soviet Union.

Our reputation has become increasingly "tarnished" recently. Take just one "construction project of the century"—the building of a heat and electric power station in South Yemen. We have been tinkering with that for over 10 years now. Construction costs meant that one kilowatt of electricity is almost more expensive than gold. The project of the sixties has become hopelessly obsolete. The Yemenis are in confusion: Whether to "tear up" the contract or else grit their teeth and continue accepting this "fraternal assistance." No one knows how long all this will go on. Our departments by all accounts are not much worried by the situation—people are receiving foreign currency and making trips abroad....

So what will we offer the Near East? Automobiles, food, and consumer goods? We are "under strain" there ourselves. The competition here is fierce: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China, not to mention the industrially developed countries, have divided up the market down to the last store shelf—just try to find a way in. We would like to be able to disagree with this scathing remark by a Soviet diplomat: "At the moment it is better for us not to butt into this part of the world with our goods. Otherwise

we will lose the only thing that we have left—a pure and untarnished image as a developed industrial power...."

There is one card left to play, by no means a trump card: military deliveries. Are we to ride into the Arab home on a militarized goat again? Is that the right way?

Time has shown that it is dangerous when the political key to any region is in a single pocket—be it a military pocket or a foreign ministry one. The war in the Gulf will not go on forever. We must ensure that we are not left without partners or friends there when it is all over.

Iraq Blamed for Civilian Victims

LD1602121691 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0730 GMT 16 Feb 91

[Studio interview with commentator Igor Surguchev by Yuriy Isayev—live or recorded]

[Text] [Isayev] The report that Iraq had put forward peace initiatives has pushed another event, which occurred three days ago, into the background. The death of hundreds of peaceful citizens in the Iraqi capital as the result of a direct hit by two bombs on a building which, as the Iraqi authorities assert, served as a bomb shelter has caused a broad and mixed response in the world. It is reported that the number of victims is approaching 300.

Shock, horror, and deep regret, according to REUTER, is felt by the public and the governments of the Western countries in connection with this tragic incident. At the same time, a number of Arab countries have officially and in very sharp terms condemned the bombing of the Baghdad bomb shelter. Algeria has called it the deliberate murder of totally innocent peaceful citizens. Jordan has issued a statement in approximately the same tone. Libya describes the death of hundreds of Iraqis as a repulsive and unforgivable crime committed by the United States. Cuban leader Fidel Castro has used even harsher terms, stating that this is genocide and a display of cynicism on the part of the imperialists.

I shall ask my colleague Igor Surguchev to give his assessment of these events.

[Surguchev] Before giving an assessment of the statements you have quoted, I think it is necessary to take a rather deeper look at the bombing itself. It is not easy to do this, however, as there are various views as to what sort of target was bombed and who is responsible for the death of hundreds of people.

Iraq asserts that this was a bomb shelter intended for the civilian population, but the United States and the command of the anti-Iraq coalition forces insist that according to their intelligence data this was a staff command point of the Iraqi Army. I will not undertake to say who is right. But the very fact that the allies considered that this building was a military target, it seems to me, does not permit them to be accused of the deliberate murder of peaceful Iraqi citizens.

Personally, I cannot at all believe that the coalition which is conducting the war on the behalf of the United Nations is striving to destroy the peaceful population of Iraq. There is, it is true, an opinion that the United States has trampled on the coalition allies and is conducting the war as it wishes. I have no grounds to agree with such an opinion, but even it were so I am not inclined to consider the Americans some sort of bloodthirsty barbarians craving to annihilate as many Iraqis as possible.

[Isayev] Moreover, you know that right from the start of the war the U.S. leaders have frequently stressed that it is being waged not against the Iraqi people or Iraq as a state, but against the regime of Saddam Husayn which carried out blatant aggression against Kuwait. In connection with the death of these people, representatives of the allied command expressed sincere and deep regret, while noting that they did not know how so many civilians had come to be in a military installation.

[Surguchev] Moreover, allied circles have expressed the supposition that the Iraqi authorities deliberately provided this installation as a bomb shelter in order to provoke bloodshed and to lay responsibility for it on the United States and the anti-Iraq coalition as a whole. Having a good idea of the nature of the current Baghdad regime, I do not rule out the possibility that it could do this. By the way, French Prime Minister Rocard recalled that Saddam Husayn had virtually publicly announced that Iraqi civilians would be located at or near military installations.

[Isayev] It would seem that this thesis that a command and staff point was used as a bomb shelter is rather dubious, is it not?

[Surguchev] I agree with you, but nonetheless I would not totally reject it.

[Isayev] Well, now please tell us your opinion of the reaction from Algeria, Jordan, Libya, and Cuba to all of this regrettable and still not totally clarified event.

[Surguchehv] Well, as you have probably realized, my opinion is this: Their reaction is not objective or balanced, and is too emotional. It seems to be dictated primarily by the anti-American moods which predominate in those countries.

Yes, a tragedy has occurred which cost many human lives and this, of course, causes feelings of bitterness, pain, and deep regret.

[Isayev] But this is war and, alas, there are no wars without victims, including victims amongst the civilian population.

[Surguchev] That is very true. It is necessary to look at things realistically and, with this approach, in my opinion, there is no genocide there, no deliberate killing of peaceful inhabitants and the United States did not commit any crime.

Those who are making all these accusations against the forces of the anti-Iraqi coalition should recall that not so long ago they did not utter a single word of condemnation of the Iraqi rulers when the latter, in violation of international agreements and the principles of humanity, used chemical weapons against the Kurdish rebels and in the war against Iran. The fate of Kuwait, which was trampled under the boots of the Iraqi military, and its unfortunate people is also of little concern to these humanists. None of them has called Iraq to account for the murder and torture of peaceful Kuwaitis.

So, the leaders of some Arab countries and Fidel Castro are clearly lacking in objectivity, honesty and—the main thing—a sense of balance, in criticizing the war in the Gulf and the actions of the anti-Iraqi coalition.

[Isayev] In general, there would be no need for the war and for all these victims and the sufferings of the Iraqi people if Saddam left Kuwait.

[Surguchev] Precisely. So, all the victims and all the destruction—not only in Iraq and Kuwait but also in Israel and Saudi Arabia—are on the conscience of the Iraqi president.

Saddam 'Must Answer' For Actions

PM2102132091 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 5, 5-11 Feb 91 p 20

[Commentary by Galina Sidorova, NEW TIMES political analyst: "A Chance for Saddam]

[Text] Saddam does have a superweapon and it is not top secret. This weapon is humanity, or rather playing on the sense of aversion to war and killing, on humanistic principles advocated by all normal people and politicians in democratic societies, all people who, unlike Saddam, cannot stand the sight of their own compatriots and Iraqis being killed.

This may easily be a reason behind Iraq's "phony war" in the early weeks of combat operations in the Gulf. Saddam has been unhurriedly firing Scuds on Tel Aviv, hoping that Israel would join the war, and made virtually no response to massive air raids by the allied air force. As if inviting the allies to bomb more of the Iraqi territory, Saddam manoeuvered dummy tanks and launchers, and even real tanks and launchers of which he has a lot. Saddam Husayn watches the reaction to his actions from his superbunker and waits: either the Americans start a ground offensive and too many victims will generate massive anti-war protests in U.S. society, or the world community softens its resolve to punish Iraq when it sees thousands of Iraqis killed during the air raids. It seems that the hopes Saddam pins on the latter factor are not at all groundless. Some leaders are already insisting on a cease-fire, feverishly probing for compromises to offer Saddam, who will benefit from any move the international community makes to meet him. Saddam hopes that once the combat operations are stopped, he may be able to keep Kuwait and avoid responsibility for the aggression. The evil has found a way to make fun of the good.

A curtain of fire and abstract humanity has already fell over the root causes of the conflict: it was Iraq that annexed the sovereign Arab state, Kuwait, and committed genocide against the people of Kuwait. The Americans are being accused of using excessive force under the pretext of destroying the Iraqi military potential; it is claimed that the coalition's actions exceed the framework of U.S. Security Council Resolution 678. It must be recalled, however, that Resolution 678 mandated all member states of the Security Council cooperating with Kuwait to use all means to liberate Kuwait after January 15 and gave Saddam a month to withdraw from that country thus avoiding war.

In the early days of the war some of my Moscow interlocutors said Iraq would prove too big for the U.S. to swallow. A colleague from an Arab newspaper asked me; "Why do you want to be involved in this? It is the Americans' business, the Americans' problem and the Americans' interest: let the Americans fight if they want to...."

Developments in the Persian Gulf, the Iraqi leader's acts of ecological and other terrorism demonstrate that the world can no longer be seen as divided on religious, geographic or national grounds: there are no exclusively Muslim problems, or Christian problems, or internal Arab matters or purely European interests.

Iraq's close neighbour, the Soviet Union is even more interested in stopping the aggressor before he obtained advanced devastating weapons than the United States. Contrary to the assertions of isolationists, the war in the Gulf is also our war. American, British, Saudi, Canadian, Polish, Czech troops, representatives of 28 states whose forces are arrayed in the Gulf, are fighting not only for the interests of their countries, but also for our own peace and wellbeing.

The Soviet Union is largely responsible for what is happening in the region. This country was instrumental in building the Iraqi military machine. Moscow's political and economic support encouraged the Iraqi regime's transformation into the monster it is today. Actually, inflatable dummy tanks made in Turkey and Italy have proved to be more useful for Saddam than Soviet-built Scud missiles, but this is a poor consolation. Other countries may now be more reluctant to buy Soviet-made weapons and this will hopefully reduce the appetites of the Soviet miltiary-industrial complex. Commercial profit derived from arms exports is no price for the instability the exported weapons create across the world. By the way, Saddam Husayn will cost the world approximately $200 billion (counting in the cost of the military operations in the Gulf, the damage inflicted on Kuwait, the losses suffered by the countries which import oil from the region, the means spent by the Iraqi regime and the consequences of the ecological disaster).

Some Moscow-based Saddam sympathizers are also trying to play on humanity: those who from the outset have resisted the official Soviet policy in the crisis and tried to talk this country's leadership into offering concessions to Baghdad. These attempts have failed, but have not gone unnoticed in Iraq. Confused signals from Moscow which might have given some hope for Saddam that Kuwaiti interests could be sacrificed, have played their role. Until the very last moment the Iraqi leader hoped that the international coalition would not go to war and stubbornly refused to leave Kuwait alone. The impression is that some of those who advocate the reconciliatory approach to Saddam are longing for a dictatorship at home. They are trying to send new signals to Saddam and this may aggravate the situation further.

Saddam's irrational acts—the discharge of oil into the Gulf, using captured pilots as a living shield to protect Iraqi military installations, terrorist attacks in varous countries—have demonstrated that the world community chose the only correct way to fight the aggressor and the criminal: complete irreconcilability. Unfortunately, this option will entail losses. But if resolute measures are not taken today, tomorrow the losses may be much greater.

Now that Iraq has unleashed an unprecedented ecological warfare, the Security Council should revise the problem in a broader context. It would be insufficient to liberate Kuwait now. Saddam Husayn must answer for what he has done at a world tribunal, and the Security Council should start working out a mechanism of international control to be exercised over the post-Saddam Iraq for some time, something like the allies' control over Germany after WW2.

End to Allied Bombing Urged

LD1602220491 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Arabic 1400 GMT 16 Feb 91

[Nikolay Zenin commentary]

[Text] Baghdad wore black in mourning for the victims of the air raid carried out recently by U.S. aircraft on one of the civilian shelters, and which resulted in the death of hundreds of citizens.

Our Radio correspondent Nikolay Zenin wrote:

We understand the extent of the sorrow felt by the families of the victims of this war, and we share their sorrows. We also sincerely sympathize with the disasters inflicted on the innocent civilians. However sad the situation, the fierce war machine does not distinguish between the innocent and the guilty. [passage omitted]

The human race should utilize all its resources, even the smallest chances, to solve all conflicts by political means and nothing else.

Our radio commentator believes that, unfortunately, the international community in general, and the United States and the USSR in particular, did not do all they could have for this purpose when Iraq commited its aggression against Kuwait. They neither exploited all the opportunities nor used all the peaceful means for this purpose. In the end everybody failed, and peace was not achieved.

After launching the war, the United States is now exposed to increasing criticism, not only from the Arab and Islamic countries, but also from international quarters. Our country's position became to some extent suspect in the light of the coalition forces exceeding the framework of the UN resolutions.

Some of the measures adopted by Saddam Husayn threaten the human race with disastrous ecological repercussions. At the same time, Saddam Husayn himself became to some extent removed from the image of the international criminal because of the inhuman operations carried out by the other side. Saddam Husayn started to acquire, undeservedly, the features of an anti-imperialist struggler and other attractive descriptions.

In the end, it is natural that the sufferings of the Iraqi people have greatly increased, as they are wrongly paying the price for the Iraqi ruler's adventure.

Our commentator believes that now is the time for the coalition forces to stop flexing their military muscles at the expense of the tormented Iraqi inhabitants, and also to stop the bombing and air raids and to go back to attempts to solve the Kuwaiti problem politically. [passage omitted]

Reports Note Reactions to Allied Bombings

Psychological Impact Noted

PM2202101391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 91 Second Edition p 1

[Report by special correspondents A. Lopukhin and V. Snegirev: "Persian Gulf: Anxious Night"]

[Text] Baghdad—Late in the evening of 18 February we Soviet journalists found ourselves the center of attention of the entire journalistic and photographic corps accredited in Baghdad. We were literally implored to report just any details of the meeting which our president had had that day with the Iraqi foreign minister. Everyone was impatient to learn how the peace settlement plan proposed by the Soviet Union would be greeted by the Iraqi leadership and how the Americans and their allies would respond to it.

As regards the latter, their response was not long in coming. One hour before midnight downtown Baghdad was hit by the hardest missile and bombing strike since the start of the war. It is hard to say as yet what targets the aircraft of the multinational force were intending to hit, but many people here believe that one aim is

obvious: to have a psychological impact on the enemy and confirm the policy of continuing military operations.

Some 20 of the biggest explosions thundered out in the immediate vicinity of the Al Rashid Hotel. Fires broke out. The entire sky was obscured by black smoke. Triple-A fire, explosions which shook walls and blew out windows, the wailing of sirens—this mad cacophony, with brief intervals, lasted several hours. For the first time in several nights the hotel's bomb shelter, which is used by residents of nearby districts as well as by guests and personnel, was crowded.

According to preliminary data, the civil airport located almost in the center of the capital suffered worst of all. The number of casualties is not yet known, but, to all appearances, there are quite a few.

So, what was this? An ordinary "planned" strike, as certain colleagues maintain, citing radio broadcasts from Saudi Arabia which they have heard? Or an attempt to cause shock on the eve of a ground offensive? Would they in fact prefer to decide the outcome of the war on the battlefield instead of at the negotiating table?

Resistance Still Anticipated

PM2102132391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Feb 91 Second Edition pp 1,5

[Report by PRAVDA special correspondents A. Lopukhin and V. Snegirev: "Will the Schedule Remain As Before?"]

[Text] Baghdad—It is a question of the flight schedule. Only not the schedule for flights that people meet with flowers at airports. On the contrary, people on the ground try to find a safer place of refuge in the shelters at the sound of these jet engines, because the aircraft bring tonnes of bombs and missiles targeted somewhere in a far-off headquarters. Who knows who could be the target of the terrifying load this time.

The first raid generally occurs between 1900 and 2000 hours. For two hours the sirens once again alarm people with their terrible wailing. The next air raid warning should be expected between 0200 and 0300 hours. Finally, there is the last "run" toward morning. That is the last flight for now, citizens. Anyone who has survived can sleep peacefully.

Of course here, too, as with any schedule, there are holdups, but by and large the multinational air force does not keep us waiting long. Yesterday, for instance, we were just about to have supper when the explosions began. Baghdad suburbs were being bombed. The glow from huge fires could be seen. The number of casualties among the peaceful population is rising. AL-JUMHURIYAH reports that yesterday there were 179 raids on military facilities and 65 on civilian installations.

It has become known that the command of the multinational forces in the Persian Gulf has told President Bush that all units and subunits are ready for a ground offensive. According to Soviet military attache V. Patsalyuk, small but regular clashes are currently taking place on the front and firing, including artillery fire, has become more frequent. The multinational forces are displaying marked activeness in clearing mine fields and are transferring their reserves to forward positions. Units of the multinational forces have already occupied the staging areas in preparation for taking the offensive. They are awaiting the U.S. President's decision.

The military attache also noted that despite the bombings the Iraqi troops' morale and state of mind is still high and they may put up fierce resistance to the enemy.

In short, the "rush hour" has arrived in the war schedule. Only important, constructive, political decisions can change the fateful course of events. How can we fail to use the old newspaper cliche: All eyes are now turned on Moscow. It is the unanimous opinion of the press that the Kremlin's recent peace initiatives offer a chance to escape from the bloody deadlock. We are continually being asked the question: What news from Moscow?

Yesterday morning the Ministry of Information and Culture organized a trip for journalists to Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, 400km to the north of the capital. The city greeted us with a road pitted with craters and the ruins of apartment blocks, the electric power station, and the post office. The walls of many buildings bear black banners of mourning. These families have recently buried relatives.

According to the governor of the province, the schedule for the raids is roughly the same here, too—disaster from the skies can be expected three or four times a day.

"Roughly 1,000 people have been killed or died of their wounds during the month of bombing," Dr. Iyad al-Ramadani said. "Some 30-40 percent of the wounded die for want of medicine."

Yet life still goes on. The bazaar bustles alongside the ruins and the tea houses are in operation. Admittedly the prices.... So drivers are demanding up to $1,000 for the return journey from Baghdad to Mosul.

Late in the evening, on our return to the capital, we once again saw antiaircraft guns dueling with invisible aircraft in the darkness. Everything went according to schedule.

From the Editorial Office: This report was conveyed via our correspondent in London since there were no telephone communications with Baghdad yesterday evening.

'Madness' Must Be Halted

PM2102135591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Feb 91 First Edition p 5

[Interview with journalist Sergey Ozhigin by correspondent N. Bulavintsev in Vologda; date not given: "There Is Nothing More Terrible Than War; Journalist Sergey Ozhigin, Who Returned from Iraq Recently, Is Firmly Convinced of That"]

[Excerpts] Vologda—[passage omitted] A few months ago, at the time when anti-Iraqi hysteria was mounting, S. Ozhigin, executive secretary of the newspaper VOLOGDSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, ventured to voice in his newspaper an opinion somewhat different from that propagated by the radical press. He wrote that we must seek to achieve a settlement of the conflict in the Persian Gulf by peaceful means, whatever the cost. War, he wrote, is madness. There will be no winners in it.

MEGAPOLIS-EKSPRESS responded unexpectedly to this item, publishing an item entitled "Hold Out, Husayn! Vologda Will Help You." That was how the Iraqi Embassy in the USSR learned of the journalist from Vologda. A few days later an official invitation for S. Ozhigin to visit Iraq arrived in the North Russian city. [passage omitted]

[Ozhigin] Each day of the war has convinced us that there will be no winners in it. The Iraqi people are enduring with rare staunchness and courage all the burdens and hardships which have befallen them.

Well, and the yankees have proved loyal to their principles. Those countries which do not want to follow in the wake of U.S. policy are subjected to aggression: You only have to remember Grenada and Panama. Now Iraq. So that our politicians, who are surrendering one position after another for the sake of some mythical "priority of general human values," should have a good think about where all this could lead. Surely the UN Security Council, which followed the United States' lead for the umpteenth time, could not really believe that the Americans would not destroy Iraq's civilian population? We visited Iraq's central hospital and saw dying children. Their number is growing with every passing day. That is terrible, unendurably terrible. They are dying from exhaustion and the acute lack of medicines. The veritable destruction of the people is under way in Iraq. Within hours the U.S. Tomahawks destroyed a very large plant for the production of dried milk for children. What was it, a strategic target too? Powerful air strikes are constantly being delivered against civilian regions and bomb shelters. Just recently laser charges hit a "strategy" bomb shelter, killing and maiming hundreds of people. The U.S. generals cynically say that the Iraqis themselves were to blame by hiding military chemical plants under ground. On the U.S. pilots' maps many civilian establishments figure as military strategic ones. I think that any commentary here is superfluous. Every sane person should draw his own conclusions. Iraq today is in flames. Every day of the war means hundreds of new tragedies. That is why this madness must be halted come what may. [passage omitted]

Shelter Builders Interviewed

PM1902153791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Report by IAN correspondent V. Ilyashevich written specially for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA: "It Was a Civilian Installation"]

[Text] Helsinki—Following White House representative M. Fitzwater, U.S. officials are stubbornly insisting that the air raid shelter in the capital of Iraq that was destroyed by the U.S. Air Force had a military purpose. The air strike led to the deaths of over 400 people—children, women, old men. Finnish builders working in Baghdad identified the shattered structure as the one they erected with their own hands.

Over 200 Finnish specialists were involved over the last 10 years in the construction of civilian installations in Baghdad, including the huge Conference Palace. In 1984-1985 they built 10 shelters similar to the one destroyed by the U.S. Air Force, which were intended purely for the peaceful population. Many Finnish construction workers identified the building by studying film sequences in which components that are used only by Finnish designers could be seen.

The Iraqis used the ground section of a two-story building with a total area of 3,000 square meters for libraries, sports halls or school classrooms. The underground story was the air raid shelter proper for the civilian population—protected by reinforced concrete walls and ceilings two meters thick. The sheet steel-clad which were supposed to protect people from the consequences of a nuclear strike, could not protect them from a direct hit.

As the newspaper UUSI SUOMI alleges, the shelter, which was built and equipped by the Perusyhtoma, Westo, Onnikainen, and Temet firms, conforms to the normal standards used in similar buildings in Finland. Twenty-four shelters similar to the Finnish shelters were built in Baghdad by Swedish firms. They are all located in residential districts.

'Acceptable Way Out' Sought

PM1902142791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Feb 91 Second Edition p 5

[Report by correspondents A. Lopukhin and V. Snegirev: "At War in the Usual Way"]

[Text] Baghdad, 18 Feb—We headed our first reportage from the Near East, filed from Jordan, "Alongside the War." How do people live not alongside the war but actually in it? After all today Iraq has essentially become one big target for bomb and missile attacks.

It cannot be said that all Baghdad has been reduced to ruins. At first glance the fairy-tale white stone city with its population of 4 million is as elegant as before. Luxurious palaces framed with palm groves, the blue domes of the mosques, the blocks of modern high-rise apartment blocks, the imposing roads and intersections meeting the very highest standards.... But the war makes itself felt at every step and not only with the air raid sirens.

For instance, there are very few vehicles on the roads. Gasoline is virtually inaccessible to the owners of personal transport means. Among the passers by you often meet with people, even youths, armed with submachine guns—they are members of the home guard and civil defense fighters. There is no curfew but with the advent of dusk the streets become empty and the entire city is plunged into darkness: The country has been without electricity since the first days of the war.

The oriental bazaar has reacted instantly to the changed life. The most popular goods now are kerosine lamps, flashlights, small batteries, and wicks.... Prices for food have increased fivefold or tenfold at the bazaar—and strict punishments right up to long prison terms are envisaged for speculation. Long lines have formed outside state stores.

The month of war has destroyed many vitally important city structures. A particularly alarming situation has formed with regard to drinking water. Inasmuch as the water supply system is not operating because of the lack of energy, people have been obliged to use the hygienically dubious source that is the river Tigris, which divides the capital into two parts. Many people are digging wells for underground water in their back yards, but in an enormous city that too is not entirely safe for the health. With the arrival of the spring warmth mass disease and epidemics are not ruled out. How to resolve the problem of storing food, if refrigerators are not working?

It is still too early to calculate the loss from the hostilities, but it is clear that it is already great. Incidentally, economic establishments constructed with our country's aid and the Soviet specialists' residential townships have been bombed.

As in all other wars it is of course the civilian population which is suffering most. They have no cause to expect help but have to rely, at any rate in the immediate future, exclusively on their own efforts. It is true that the United Nations is rendering the country humanitarian support. Yesterday 12 trucks arrived in the capital delivering 54 tonnes of medical equipment and medicines for Iraqi children and women. According to Richard Rid [surname as transliterated], the regional UNICEF director, that will be enough to satisfy the most essential needs of 2 million people for three months.

All diplomatic life in the Iraqi capital has been reduced to virtually nil. A dozen embassies remain and even in them the personnel has been reduced to one to two people. We have 13 diplomats here and they now have to share the same deprivations and dangers on an equal footing with ordinary Baghdad inhabitants. It is hard to imagine how the diplomatic mission has been able to function for over a month without electricity, a telephone, fuel, and water... But they are living and working and not complaining. The customary framework of rank has been eroded and life under war conditions sometimes obliges driver and ambassador to do the same work.

A 12-meter pipe with a diameter of slightly over two meters dug into the ground has been adapted as a bomb shelter. Of course, it cannot save people from a direct hit but it offers entirely reliable protection against shrapnel.

The reader may possibly ask: But why risk people's lives and health? Ambassador V. Posuvalyuk answered this question:

"Of course, we have not stayed behind to become participants in a survival experiment. Our task is to promote with all our strength the search for an acceptable way out of the crisis situation. For Iraq the door to peace should not remain tightly closed. The Soviet leadership's recent initiatives and the arrival in Baghdad of Ye. Primakov, the USSR president's personal representative, and now Iraqi Foreign Minister T. Aziz' visit to Moscow—these are all links in a single chain."

We ourselves have repeatedly had occasion to be convinced that the Iraqis link with Moscow considerable hopes for a speedy way out of the war.

Groups, Officials Support Gulf Cease-Fire

Chemical Troops Commander Speaks

LD2102151391 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] In his recent statement on the Persian Gulf President Gorbachev pointed out that the character of hostilities in the region threatened to go beyond the mandate authorized by the UN resolutions. We asked the commander of the Soviet chemical troops, Col Gen Stanislav Petrov to express his point of view on this issue:

[Begin recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] I think that the war has already gone beyond the borders determined by the UN resolution authorizing the use of force in order to restore peace and justice in the region. [end recording]

Col Gen Petrov calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities without any preliminary conditions. Military means have drained off, and the further use of force can only escalate the tragedy and bring in more casualties.

[Begin recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] In fact, in spite of the heaviest air attacks on Iraqi military and administrative centers its Army is still capable of fighting back. The Pentagon specialists also

acknowledge the fact. My opinion is that the means used in this war go beyond the level which is necessary to achieve the goal. This is a war for the complete destruction of the Iraqi military and economic potential. The consequence of the war is still difficult to forecast therefore. [end recording]

Arab Roundtable Want Political End

LD1902210291 Moscow TASS in English 1826 GMT 19 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondents Anatoliy Golovastov and Sergey Postanogov]

[Text] Moscow February 19 TASS—A round-table meeting dealing with the problems of settling the situation in the Gulf took place at the Palestinian Cultural Centre here today. The meeting was attended by representatives of the public and by Soviet and Arab journalists.

Participants in the round-table meeting called for an immediate end to military operations in the Gulf. They expressed concern over numerous casualties among the civilian population of Iraq, the destruction of the country's economic potential and its cultural and historical valuables as a result of air raids by the multinational forces.

Nabil 'Amr, the ambassador of the State of Palestine in Moscow, highly appreciated the Soviet Union's diplomatic activity aimed at settling the conflict by political means.

"We hope that the plan which Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev handed over to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz on Monday will promote an end to the bloodshed and help resolve the crisis situation in the region," Nabil 'Amr said.

The latest developments indicate that the Soviet Union continues to play an active role in the search for specific steps to end the armed confrontation, he added.

Participants in the meeting voiced an idea about the need for the Arab countries' joint actions in the search for a solution to Middle Eastern problems and in the strengthening of Arab solidarity. Bringing Iraqi troops to Kuwait was not the best way to strengthen Arab unity and to fight for the rights of the Palestinian people, said Iraqi journalist Rashid Rushdi.

A statement by the Committee for the Protection of the Iraqi People was read out at the meeting. The committee was set up on Monday. "The Gulf war has approached an extremely dangerous limit when hundreds of innocent people—children, old men and women are being killed," the statement emphasises.

The committee is expected to unite members of the Soviet public concerned over the escalation of military operations in the Gulf. "The purposes of our organisation are to coordinate activities in support of the people of Iraq, to give humanitarian aid to them and enlist the efforts of the general public for the earliest end to the Gulf war," Committee Chairman Professor of Theology Stanislav Korolev, dr. of science (history), told TASS.

Radio Defends Shevardnadze Persian Gulf Stand

LD1602235391 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 16 Feb 91

[Commentary by Radio Rossii commentator Nikolay Agayants]

[Text] The announcement by the Iraqi Revolution Command Council on their readiness to withdraw from occupied Kuwait, which was initially presented as a sensation by the media in many countries, including this country, has obviously proved in fact to be nothing more than a propaganda maneuver by Baghdad. Here is Radio Rossii's commentator Nikolay Agayants.

[Agayants] [passage omitted] SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA today published a letter from one of its readers, Borisov, censuring the actions of former USSR foreign minister Shevardnadze, and almost saying that he had betrayed the friendly nation of Iraq and had supported the imperialists. This is not only engaging in disinformation against the public in our country, but is also attempting to shift the blame for the unleashing of the war in that explosive region from the guilty party to the innocent one, to substitute one notion for another, and to present Saddam Husayn—the aggressor—as the victim.

Such are the lengths to which you can be led by an unquenched passion for stereotypes.

Ground War Scenario Includes Chemical Mines

91UM0378A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 91 Second Edition p 4

[Article by PRAVDA special correspondent V. Belyakov, Riyadh: "Relying on Infantry? A Scenario for the Ground Operation"]

[Text] Riyadh—**The life of a journalist in the Saudi capital does not sparkle with diversity. Every day there are the briefings of command representatives of the multinational forces in the Hyatt Regency Hotel—as similar to one another as twins. In recent days so many aircraft sorties have been flown, you get a casualty assessment—ours and theirs, sometimes data on naval activity and line-crossers from the Iraqi Army.**

Military operations are static. For four weeks coalition air assets have been pounding Iraqi facilities and positions with an average intensity of one bombing per minute. It would seem the enemy should long since have been crushed, as was the prediction of Western military experts at the very outset of the war. But nothing of the kind is taking place.

American analysts have varying appraisals of the effect of the bombing. According to the weekly magazine

NEWSWEEK, the loss of the combat fighting ability of the elite Iraqi Republican Guard units is estimated to be 25 percent; of other units—just five percent.

Western officers in Riyadh are stating with ever increasing conviction that the war will not be won by air power alone and that a ground operation is inevitable. Its initial scenario looks rather simple. One grouping of coalition forces enters Kuwait from the south. Another envelops it from the north through Iraqi territory. A marine amphibious assault simultaneously lands on the Kuwaiti shore. This leaves the half-million-strong Iraqi Army in Kuwait in a pocket.

This scenario can be accomplished, however, only with great personnel losses. The Iraqi forces are well defended. Approaches to their positions are mined, and in the opinion of certain American officers some of the mines contain poison gas. In addition to the minefields, the Iraqis have placed barbed wire obstacles and have dug anti-tank ditches, filling them with oil which can be set ablaze. They have erected sand ramparts. Their tactics, tested during the recent eight-year war with Iran, have been termed "aggressive defense." The U.S. Army has a complex system for calculating the effectiveness of the armed forces of other states. In the mid-1980's, Iraqi armor units were evaluated according to this system as being more effective than Israeli, British, or even Soviet units.

The coalition is also expecting the use of tactical chemical weapons by Iraq. Iraqi artillery includes the South African 155 mm howitzer, considered today the best in the world. At a range of 40 kilometers these howitzers are distinguished by a high degree of accuracy. They can also carry a chemical charge. Tactical missiles may also be used for this purpose.

At present American public opinion is almost united in supporting the war. But it is well known from previous experience that Americans' opinion of the war will begin to change just as soon as the flow of body bags with corpses of soldiers begins to stream back to the homeland. The cost of the presumed victory may be too high.

At the same time, dragging out the war also has its negative aspects. The longer it continues, the greater is the likelihood the anti-Iraq coalition will weaken—at least politically.

PLO Said To Order Second Front Against Allies

LD1902225791 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2133 GMT 19 Feb 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] This report was filmed at a Palestinian combat position not far from the town of Saida, southern Lebanon. It seems that it is too early to write off the Katyushas as obsolete. Today they still remain a powerful weapon in the hands of Palestinians in south Lebanon.

[Begin unidentified speaker in Arabic with superimposed Russian translation recording] We received quite an unequivocal instruction from our leaders from the PLO to open a second front. Our goal is to help the Iraqi people and its Army to counter the barbaric imperialist aggression led by the United States in the Persian Gulf zone. We think that these black forces are pursuing selfish interests and striving to lay their hands on the wealth of the Arab nation. [end recording]

Although the destructive force and the range of the Palestinian Katyushas is far shorter than those of Husayn's Iraqi missiles, they have the same targets. The majority of the Palestinians are on Saddam Husayn's side.

Diplomat, Arabist Interviewed on Soviet Gulf Policy

PM1902103191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Feb 91 p 5

["KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Investigation" by A. Vasilyev: "Who Determined the Soviet Union's Position in the Conflict Between Iraq and Kuwait and How"]

[Text] In order to collect material for this article, I needed to talk with people who directly influence the process of shaping the Soviet foreign policy line and take part in formulating the USSR's policy in the Persian Gulf. To ensure that our conversations were frank, I had to promise that they would not be named in the newspaper. So I decided to call my interlocutors as follows: the diplomat—a USSR Foreign Ministry staffer who was a member of E.A. Shevardnadze's immediate entourage; and the Arabist, a politician and specialist in the Near East. Each of them has his own view on events in the Persian Gulf, and the position of each influenced the position of the Soviet Union as a whole in considerable measure.

Irkutsk to Vnukovo-2

On 2 August of last year the talks between USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker in Irkutsk were proceeding as usual: There were six people in the room—Shevardnadze, Baker, two interpreters, and two so-called "note-takers" (ranking State Department staffer Dennis Ross on the U.S. side, and the diplomat on our side). Margaret Tutwiler suddenly entered the room and handed a note to Baker. The secretary of state read it and said: "Gentlemen, the U.S. State Department communications center has received a report that Iraq has crossed the border of Kuwait. The Kuwaiti ambassador in Washington believes the situation is normal and U.S. assistance is not required, however." The conversation resumed.

According to the diplomat, neither the Russians nor the Americans took this report seriously:

"Familiarity had bred contempt. In the past Iraq had repeatedly crossed the border and gone a couple of kilometers into Kuwait, put forward some demands, and

then returned to its own territory. We were not even worried. Of course, this was a failure: We did not expect such effrontery from Saddam Husayn."

It has to be noted that during our conversation the diplomat used by no means diplomatic language about the president of the Republic of Iraq. To some extent this indicates the yardsticks with which the USSR Foreign Ministry approached the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict.

The Soviet-U.S. meeting in Irkutsk ended that same day: J. Baker flew off to Mongolia, and D. Ross and the diplomat departed for Moscow. They had previously arranged that they would spend a couple of days at "Meshcherino," a Foreign Ministry dacha outside Moscow—they were simply going to talk in the fresh air.

In Moscow the diplomat went home, dumped his stuff, changed his clothes, and drove to the U.S. Embassy to pick up Ross. While they were waiting for him, the driver switched on the radio. That was how the diplomat learned that the Iraqis had already occupied the capital of Kuwait.

Ross came out of the embassy—he knew everything and had already managed to get in touch with Ulaanbaatar. It had been decided that J. Baker would return to Washington via Moscow and would pick up Ross on the way. All the same, D. Ross felt bad: There was war in the Persian Gulf, his boss was in Mongolia, but he was in Moscow. They had to forget about "Meshcherino"—they went to Smolenskaya Square, to the Foreign Ministry. Once they arrived, they turned on CNN. At the same time, the diplomat began to make calls on the secure line—to find out the situation in Moscow.

In the morning of 3 August the "little collegium," or, as it is known in the ministry, the "little Sovnarkom" [Council of People's Commissars]—deputy ministers and chiefs of leading administrations, about 20-25 people in all—assembled in E.A. Shevardnadze's office. Viktor Posuvalyuk, the USSR's ambassador to the Republic of Iraq, who had been urgently summoned from Baghdad, was also present.

They discussed the USSR's position and, in particular, the joint Soviet-American statement that J. Baker had suggested issuing. The main question was this: What will become of our people in Iraq if we join the Americans in condemning Saddam Husayn? Who will be held responsible if they are taken hostage or if anyone suffers?

"The statement was written in blood," the diplomat recalls. "Its supporters realized that they bore the entire responsibility for the fate of the Soviet citizens in Iraq. Had anything happened, I would have quit the Foreign Ministry. But our argument was this: We are dealing with a man with whom you can only talk tough. Of course, Saddam might have ordered an attack on a bus carrying our specialists. But there is no policy without risk. I am deeply convinced that situations where, though you know that nine or even 9,000 people may die, you have to take the risk in order to prevent something worse later are permissible. If we did not stop Husayn now, in a few years he would be threatening us with nuclear weapons and taking the part of our Muslims."

The "little collegium" decided to join the Americans in condemning Saddam Husayn. As soon as J. Baker's plane touched down at Vnukovo-2, a conversation took place between him and E.A. Shevardnadze, and then the joint Soviet-American statement on the Persian Gulf which linked together the policies of Moscow and Washington in the region was read out.

The UN Speech

On 26 September E.A. Shevardnadze spoke at the UN General Assembly session. At the time I was in Saudi Arabia, near the positions of the forces of the anti-Iraqi coalition, and I can testify: The speech made a tremendous impression. Who then could have thought that certain tenets of it would be held against Shevardnadze. But critics of his course responded to all Eduard Amvrosiyevich's assurances that the Soviet leadership had no intention of sending troops to the Persian Gulf by quoting from his same speech: "In the Soviet delegation's opinion, the Security Council must take the necessary organizational steps so that it can act in precise accordance with the provisions of the Charter. First of all it must initiate steps to activate the work of the Military Staff Committee and study practical aspects of placing national troop contingents at the disposal of the Security Council. The Soviet Union is prepared to conclude an appropriate agreement with the Security Council." And later: "At the recommendation of the Military Staff Committee the Security Council may deem it necessary to form 'rapid response' units formed on a contract basis from special units from various countries, including the five permanent members of the Security Council."

"Eduard Amvrosiyevich could not act otherwise," the diplomat believes. "His speech was in the context of 'new thinking' ideas and tenets. It could not have been isolated from everything we had said over the previous five years.

"As for the Military Staff Committee, Shevardnadze said nothing new. All this is laid down in the UN Charter, and the minister simply reminded the world how we ought to act in accordance with the Charter. If we are a member of the United Nations and its Security Council, and moreover a permanent member of the Security Council, we had to act in precisely that way.

"Those who accuse Eduard Amvrosiyevich of wanting to plunge us into a new Afghanistan forget that it was he who withdrew our troops from Afghanistan. Those who are kicking up a fuss about the annihilation of the 'fraternal Iraqi people' themselves bear responsibility for 'carpet bombings' in Afghanistan and for the use there of vacuum bombs, each of which destroys an entire village."

Course of War

The White House's position regarding the Persian Gulf crisis did not take shape immediately. In August and September it gave preference to economic sanctions. In October Washington began to incline toward the view that, unless Saddam Husayn left Kuwait in the very near future, it would be necessary to start combat operations. The Foreign Ministry's top leadership subscribed to the same opinion.

By the time of the 10-11 December meeting between E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker in Houston both the Foreign Ministry and the State Department realized that war would not be confined solely to the territory of Kuwait. On 17 December IZVESTIYA's diplomatic correspondent, who was present at the Houston meeting, wrote: "Either Iraq will withdraw its troops from all Kuwaiti territory without any preconditions, or the U.S. Army will go onto the offensive with the aim of not only liberating the emirate but also overthrowing Saddam Husayn."

"The Security Council resolutions about which there is currently so much talk impose no limits on military operations," the diplomat believes. "They say: 'take all necessary measures.' You have to be very cynical to tell American guys in conditions where Soviet troops are taking no part in the conflict: You have no right to embark on a flanking movement, you have the right only to crawl toward the machine guns. It is Husayn who is killing peaceful Iraqi citizens. The Iraqi people would still have a tragic end if Husayn were not stopped."

"Parochial Policy"

When you look at the Persian Gulf crisis from Moscow you see one thing, but when you are in the Arab countries and talk with Soviet diplomats working there you see something completely different.

Trips to the Near East and long conversations with representatives of the Arabist clan have given me the impression that specialists on the region had no hand in shaping the USSR's position on the Iraq-Kuwait crisis and that the same team that conducted the talks with the Americans on arms reductions, bilateral relations, and the "German question," out of the inertia of Irkutsk, also dealt with Kuwait. According to the Arabist, top-class specialists are now working as the USSR's ambassadors to the key Arab countries, but the information they sent to Moscow was not taken into account. According to information from another source, even staffers of the USSR Foreign Ministry Near and Middle East Administration took no part in preparing the November meeting in Moscow between Shevardnadze and Baker and were not briefed on the content of the discussions, although the Persian Gulf was the main topic.

The diplomat denied these reports, but said:

"There is parochial policy and there are parochial interests. Our embassies in the Near East and the Foreign Ministry Near East Administration have them. The diplomats who work there do not think in terms of big-time politics—and this is natural."

The diplomat regards himself as a Near East specialist, citing the fact that back at the dawn of his diplomatic career he worked in Egypt and then for six years dealt with Near East problems at the USSR Embassy in Washington. But the Arabists deny that the diplomat has the right to describe himself as an Arabist.

They are very cautious in their criticism of the Foreign Ministry's line at the very start of the conflict. First, disagreement with the Americans could have given Saddam Husayn the impression that he would be able to play on contradictions between the USSR and the United States. Second, if the Soviet Union remained committed to "new thinking"—and the Arabist has nothing against it—it was necessary to counter the aggression together. Nevertheless....

The Primakov Factor

In early October the Foreign Ministry sensed that another "player" had appeared on the "pitch." This was Presidential Council Member academician Ye.M. Primakov, whom the USSR president sent to Baghdad to hold talks with Saddam Husayn (for more detail about this trip see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA for 15 January 1991).

"We were convinced that Primakov should not have been sent to Baghdad," the diplomat says. "In such cases intriguers like Husayn begin to realize that there are possible options. Solving the problem in the 'Arab framework' is total rubbish. Why can we not intervene if Arabs are killing Arabs? If someone has killed somebody in the apartment next door, what are you supposed to do—not call the militia? Let them sort it out themselves?"

According to the Arabist, Ye.M. Primakov argued as follows: The anti-Iraqi coalition has two political options—to force Husayn to leave Kuwait or to "break him" altogether. A peaceful way out for Saddam was possible on the basis of the "Primakov package": In conversation with the USSR president's personal representative the Iraqi leader had said that he realized the inevitability of withdrawing his troops.

With this news Yevgeniy Maksimovich travelled to the capitals of Western and certain Arab states to communicate it to their leaders and find out their position on the peaceful option. Ye.M. Primakov reported on the results when he returned to Moscow. According to information from the Arabist, on 20 October Primakov sent the USSR president a note saying that the Western states, above all the United States and Britain, and also certain Arab countries were firmly set on war and that war would inevitably go beyond the borders of Kuwait.

During his trip Ye.M. Primakov visited New York to receive the George Kennan prize. Asked by journalists

what he thought about the possibility of the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution sanctioning the use of force against Husayn, Primakov replied: "I am against such a resolution." A scandal erupted.

Ye.M. Primakov's position was this: If the adoption of a resolution on the use of force was not followed by practical actions, Husayn would be reinforced in the belief that the world community was simply bluffing; and if the start of combat operations was really envisaged, Primakov was against this. In his view, the possibility of the adoption of such a resolution should hang over Saddam like the sword of Damocles, and the longer the better.

When the USSR president's representative issued this statement, stressing, incidentally, that it reflected only his personal opinion, J. Baker was in Geneva. Asked by journalists what he thought about this remark, the U.S. secretary of state replied: Primakov does not matter, I have reached agreement with Shevardnadze about all this.

According to the Arabist, if Near East specialists had taken a direct part in formulating Soviet policy on the Persian Gulf from the outset, its course would have been on the whole the same. While agreeing to cooperation with the Americans in this sphere, we should have linked our consent to each step with certain steps by the United States: the acceptance of "secret packages," and so forth. But in fact, the Arabist believes, the upshot was that the Americans carried us along in their footsteps until a certain moment, and then abandoned us as not wanted. Washington should have been forced to use the six weeks between the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 678 and the start of combat operations for active diplomatic talks with Iraq. But we watched from the sidelines the inaction of the White House and the way it merely built up its forces in Saudi Arabia.

Volte-Face?

Recently people in Moscow have actively begun to say that the anti-Iraq coalition is overstepping the bounds of the UN Security Council resolution and that the world community did not give its consent to the killing of peaceful Iraqi citizens. For the first time such statements have been heard from A.A. Bessmertnykh, the USSR's new foreign minister.

Of course, it would be interesting to know A.A. Bessmertnykh's personal opinion about the Persian Gulf. On the one hand, he is, indeed, not a free agent, and on the other public opinion regards him as the continuer of E.A. Shevardnadze's policy. I have learned that back when he was USSR ambassador to the United States Bessmertnykh ventured to disagree with Shevardnadze's line on the Persian Gulf and to criticize the Foreign Ministry's actions in the Near East.

Newspaper Receives Iraqi Letter of Appeal

91P50101A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Letter to the editorial staff of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA from the Committee for the Defense of Iraq; "Dangerous Limit"]

[Text] A letter from the Committee for the Defense of Iraq arrived for the editorial staff; in it the committee appeals to Soviet citizens and all honorable inhabitants of the earth. In particular, the following statements are made in the letter.

"The war in the Gulf has approached an extremely dangerous limit, that limit where no great efforts could compensate for the losses to the established world order. It is necessary to quickly suppress and extinguish this ever more strongly flaming fire of war; otherwise it could increasingly engulf new regions of the globe." The American generals, the creators of electronic warfare with the good will of the "oil kings," have committed the usual totally unjustified act of vandalism. A bomb shelter in the al-'Amiriyah area of Baghdad was bombarded. Hundreds of innocent people perished—children, old men, women—emphasizes the letter.

Today not only the war in the Persian Gulf is going on. Today the new world order, the epoch of the new thinking, is on trial. With deep bitterness we have to state also that the UN, summoned to become the instrument for peaceful resolution of conflicts, in essence has turned into an instrument of war, an instrument for the destruction of an individual state. Indeed the multinational forces, in which the American generals play the leading role, are virtually operating under the UN flag. This is an unprecedented case!

We, the letter states further, call upon the committees for the defense of peace of all countries, the Soviet legislature, all the honorable people of the world, and all those to whom the matter of peace is dear, to prevent the further conduct of war in the Persian Gulf.

West Europe

Reports Continue on Bessmertnykh's Madrid Talks

Meets With King, Premier

LD2102222291 Moscow TASS in English 2210 GMT 21 Feb 91

[By Robert Serebrennikov]

[Text] Madrid February 22 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh met Spanish leaders here on Thursday.

Bessmertnykh was received by King Juan Carlos I. He also had a substantive talk with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, forwarding him a message by President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Gorbachev's visit to Spain in the autumn of 1990 contributed to the development of relations between the two countries, the sides said.

Bessmertnykh and Gonzalez discussed key international and European issues and bilateral cooperation.

Talks with Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Ordonez focussed on work on a fundamental long-term Soviet-Spanish treaty.

Concrete assignments were given to a working group formulating the treaty. The sides are expected to sign the treaty during Gonzalez's visit to the Soviet Union this year.

The ministers reviewed agreements on various spheres of soviet- Spanish cooperation which are currently in the works and the implementation of agreements signed during the recent summit.

They agreed on a schedule of consultations between the Soviet and Spanish foreign ministers.

Talks in Madrid were held in a warm, friendly atmosphere and confirmed the stable, reliable character of bilateral relations.

Addresses Council of Europe

LD2102221891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1324 GMT 21 Feb 91

["Text" of speech by USSR Foreign Affairs Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh at a session of the Council of Europe Ministerial Committee; date not given]

[Text] Madrid, 21 Feb (TASS)— It is a great honor for me to address the Ministerial Committee of the Council of Europe—an influential international organization that is gradually acquiring pan-European contours. I use this opportunity to congratulate Czechoslovakia, whose entry has broadened the geographical framework of the Council.

Europe is going through a time of responsibility, committing it to many things, but most of all to complete trust and absolute frankness. The Council of Europe is an authoritative organization with its own basic principles and traditions, known for its intellectual and political openness. This is why I like to take the opportunity offered to me and share some thoughts on those events in Europe that inspire us as well as those that alarm us.

In his address in Strasbourg in July 1989, USSR President M.S. Gorbachev said that the Europeans can only meet the challenges of the next century by pooling their efforts. The whole course of European events confirms this conclusion. By working together, we were able to achieve the new, higher level of interaction, to lay the foundations of the new European order, and to get rid of many things that stood in the way of overcoming the division in our continent. The achieved potential offers an excellent opportunity for further development of the Helsinki process, for progress toward building the common European home. The idea of a single Europe sharing solidarity and with common spaces, with a collective security structure, and with new qualitative levels of interstate and interpersonal relations lies at its basis.

All this is encouraging and fills one with optimism. At the same time, the processes that are going on have not yet gained full strength and still have the fragility of an incipient organism.

There are many reasons for this, and I will name only some of them.

It seems as if the relative smoothness of a whole number of historic transformations that changed the political face of Europe caused the circulation of artificially straightforward views on the dynamic of these processes. The democratic renewal in Eastern Europe, the peaceful unification of Germany, and as a natural result, the overcoming of the division of Europe. [sentence as received] The declaration of 22 states, the Paris charter for a new Europe, a treaty on armed forces limitation; the urgent consolidation of the global consensus on the basis of rejecting the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait; these facts allow one to hope that not only has the period of confrontation been left behind but that confrontational relations have outlived themselves, at least in Europe.

In this connection, I cannot fail to agree with Catherine Lalumiere, secretary general of the Council of Europe, that the unidimensional Europe, where good and evil were absolute, has been left behind, and no one should regret this.

There are, of course, the objective prerequisites for further development in this direction; however, a subjective factor has entered the matter. Lack of firmness and depth in political thinking is beginning to appear in some places, and this is against the background of a galaxy of leaders with a broad vision of historical perspectives who are active in Europe. As a result, there are indications of a rising wave of negativism and prejudice that is clouding this perspective.

The meaning of perestroyka in the USSR as a generator of common global changes has been universally acknowledged. We respect and value the interests of other states in its success, and feel the measures of responsibility which we bear; however, our attitude toward perestroyka is now being tested against the touchstone of difficulties that it has encountered. There are many who have shown understanding. Regrettably, however, stereotyped approaches have demonstrated their longevity.

We could be reproached for many things. We know our mistakes in carrying out the reforms better than anyone,

and we are paying for them in full. But through all the twists of perestroyka, we did not hide the difficulties, either from our people or from the outside world. This is why the suspicions and accusations against us, along with practical steps in putting the brakes on cooperation, have caused a feeling of bewilderment in Soviet society.

One should stop and think, before it is too late, where such a turn of events will take us. The principal foundations of the new European order, our common strategic aims stated in the Paris charter, and other very important documents could be jeopardized.

The line of certain European capitals on the so-called Baltic problem brings up many questions.

Here one can recall the clauses in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter on the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of states. One can also point to the classic juridical norm, according to which the resolving of the question of secession from a state is in no way connected with the circumstances of joining it. There is no alternative to the constitutional road.

Another thing is worryisome: The demon of nationalism and extremism in Europe has not died. It is alive. It is enough for us to let it show itself even in one link in the European system, be it the situation in the Baltics or in any of the republics or provinces of another state, and the nightmare of nationalism will explode Europe.

The Soviet Union is profoundly interested in a nonviolent, peaceful, evolutionary, and democratic unfolding of changes on the European continent, because we regard stability in the European situation and its orientation toward dialogue and interaction as one of the key conditions for the success of perestroyka; however, the opposite is equally indisputable: The construction of a new Europe is unthinkable outside the context of the success of reforms in the USSR. Europe needs a united, stable, economically healthy, and politically self-confident Soviet Union no less than the Soviet Union needs a strong and united Europe. That is why I do not like to doubt our partners' assurances regarding their interest in the USSR remaining a major, influential factor in international life.

Europe has already been through a turbulent, bloody phase of militant separatism and fanatical extremism, through the exaltation of violence and through legal nihilism. Europe must not be subjected to a repeated test of the ability of reason and culture to survive. The Soviet Union advocates a different course. Our choice is in favor of building a new, democratic Europe through the joint efforts of all countries participating in the CSCE. The main contours of our vision of the Europe of the future were drawn in the speech of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev at the Paris summit, in which he spoke about a European space, in a juridical framework, in the fields of security, human rights, the economy, ecology, and information, and of the prospect of a zone of cooperation embracing the whole northern hemisphere.

Ultimately, it is not so important what the project for a Europe that is an integral whole is called: a "European home", a "European confederation", or a "European peace order." They all proceed from a single premise, from the conviction that the countries and peoples of Europe have a common destiny. The main thing today is to embark on practical work, in the process of which agreement will gradually crystallize regarding the most expedient routes for advancing toward the planned goals. It is important not to stop. I am certain that the most active possible inclusion of other cooperation mechanisms—including, of course, the Council of Europe, with which the Soviet Union desires to actively continue to establish bilateral ties—in the infrastructure of the CSCE process will help to ensure the continuity and progressive stability of the processes of European construction. Here in Madrid, we are taking new steps: We are signing one of the basic documents of the Council of Europe, the European cultural convention. So, we are going to work together.

Holds News Conference

LD2202032991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0232 GMT 22 Feb 91

[By Robert Serebrennikov]

[Text] Madrid, 22 Feb (TASS)—"Relations between Spain and the Soviet Union are splendid," stated spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez at a news conference that was held here on Thursday with USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh.

He noted that it is now a question of preparation for a Soviet- Spanish treaty that will lay qualitatively new foundations for bilateral relations. Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez will visit the USSR this year.

Fernandez-Ordonez pointed out that Spain evaluates highly the Soviet plan for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, which has its legitimate foundations in the UN resolutions, and he hopes that it will be crowned with success.

After the recent visit to Spain by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet-Spanish relations have risen to a very high level, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh stated. Our task, he said, is not only to preserve it, but also to supplement it with a content of new quality, the Soviet minister stressed.

Speaks With European Officials

LD2102185791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1655 GMT 21 Feb 91

[By Robert Serebrennikov]

[Text] Madrid, 21 February (TASS)—USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh, who is in Madrid for the special session of the committee of ministers of the Council of Europe, has been holding meetings with counterparts from a number of countries.

At a conversation with FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, both sides emphasized the importance of Soviet-German relations and the fact that, if these do not develop in a stable way, the stability of the European and world structures is impossible. It was noted that the CSCE process and the Paris Charter for a new Europe represent the basis that should permit Europe to make the difficult transition from the confrontation of the past to political cooperation.

In exchanging views about the situation in the Persian Gulf, Genscher highly evaluated the Soviet Union's peacemaking efforts, which he thought were wholly justified, even if in the end they do not meet with the due response on the part of the Iraqi leadership.

A closeness of approach emerged regarding the problem of post-crisis arrangements in the Persian Gulf, where the leading role ought to be played by the states of the region, with the assistance of the United Nations, the USSR, the U.S., the European states, and other interested members of the international community.

In the conversation which Bessmertnykh held with SFRY Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Budimir Loncar, a considerable place was occupied by an exchange of information on the largely similar internal problems that the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have found themselves facing. It was stated that the Soviet leadership intends to devote special attention to putting right certain negative points that have recently arisen in the USSR's relations with Eastern European countries in the process of their transition to a qualitatively new condition. The importance for the USSR of dialogue with Yugoslavia is also determined by that country's eminent role in the Nonaligned Movement, the potential of that role in world politics being extremely high. This has been demonstrated in recent times by the Nonaligned Movement's active position regarding the Persian Gulf.

A conversation with Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis was largely devoted to the situation in the Persian Gulf. Emphasis was placed on the necessity of making use of even the slightest chance to halt the bloodshed. Approaches to the post-crisis development in the Persian Gulf zone were also discussed.

During the conversation between Bessmertnykh and Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Sture Andersson, note was made of the mutual interest in the development of bilateral cooperation between the USSR and Sweden and also of joint activity, particularly economic and ecological, among the countries of the Baltic basin. The Swedish minister's attention was drawn to the need for objective analysis of the processes taking place in the Soviet Baltic republics.

A conversation took place between Bessmertnykh and Lord Caithness, British minister of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs. Certain questions concerning a settlement of the Persian Gulf situation were touched upon, as were plans for Soviet-British political contacts.

Meets Cuban Counterpart

LD2202000291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2315 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] Madrid, 22 Feb (TASS)—On Thursday evening a conversation took place here between USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh and Cuban Foreign Minister I. Malmierca.

A thorough exchange of opinions on the situation around the Persian Gulf and the efforts of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the Nonaligned Movement in a search for ways of ceasing military actions took place.

Returns to Moscow

LD2102231491 Moscow TASS in English 2259 GMT 21 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Robert Serebrennikov]

[Text] Madrid February 22 TASS—Visiting Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh has left for Moscow.

Bessmertnykh attended a special session of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers. He met Spanish leaders and discussed the development of Soviet-Spanish relations. The foreign minister also held talks with several countries' foreign ministers.

Bessmertnykh has conveyed a document on the Soviet Union joining the European Cultural Convention.

Latin America & Caribbean

Deputy Minister Views Cooperation With Cuba

Part 1

PY1802180091 Moscow in Spanish to Cuba 0130 GMT 16 Feb 91

[Report on the first part of an interview with Aleksandr Ivanovich Kachanov, USSR first deputy minister of foreign economic relations, by unidentified Radio Moscow reporter; place and date not given—Kachanov remarks are recorded in Russian with superimposed translation into Spanish]

[Text] [Announcer] Mr. Aleksandr Ivanovich, can you make a brief evaluation of Soviet-Cuban economic and commercial cooperation in 1990?

[Kachanov] The economic difficulties that the two countries experienced last year have affected our relations. These difficulties were caused by the fact that the two countries registered a shortage of exportable quantities of some products which were essential for the proper fulfillment of bilateral accords. This is the reason why—among other things—Cuba was not supplied with Soviet hydrocarbons and the USSR was not supplied with Cuban sugar as scheduled.

The provision of other products was also discontinued. The organizational difficulties caused by the reform of foreign economic relations under way in the USSR and the adoption of the market economy system in the USSR have played a negative role. Despite the 10-percent reduction of bilateral exchange as compared with 1989, Cuba ranked among the USSR's six largest commercial partners. For its part, the USSR remains the main commercial partner of the Island of Freedom.

It should be noted that bilateral economic cooperation has continued with Soviet technical cooperation for the construction and reconstruction of projects in the Cuban economy. The two countries concentrated their efforts on the construction of major projects, including the Juragua nuclear power plant in Cienfuegos, the nickel factory in (Tamariocas), the Cienfuegos oil refinery, and the reconstruction of the Jose Marti iron and steel plant.

More than 20 construction projects were completed last year, including the Santa Clara automobile repair and mechanical plant, a repair shop in Moa, a soap factory in Havana, and others.

[Announcer] You said there have been difficulties. Has the transition to new cooperation conditions posed any difficulties now that accounts are based on convertible currency at current prices? Some mass media have cast doubts on the feasibility and efficiency of Soviet-Cuban cooperation under the new conditions.

[Kachanov] It is no secret that, along with the positive results of our cooperation, our relations have had problems which must be properly solved. With the implementation of the economic reform in the USSR, the majority of Soviet producers gained their autonomy. Among other things, this situation raised the problem of how to keep them interested in complying with the commitments assumed by the state to supply products to Cuba and to provide technical assistance.

This problem was analyzed on 29 December 1990 during the signing of bilateral governmental and departmental documents providing for new cooperation mechanisms and for the use of current world market prices and convertible currency.

This year is considered a transition year. It should be noticed that, unfortunately, the majority of the critical reports from some mass media are not professionally written; they are ill-intentioned and based on very specific cases. We are not against criticism, but it should be constructive and impartial.

[Announcer] Mr. Kachanov, please outline the characteristics of Soviet-Cuban commercial and economic relations that played a major role in the documents signed at the end of 1990.

[Kachanov] As for the main guidelines for those documents, it should be noted that they generally maintain the structure and scope of bilateral cooperation. At the same time, the documents reflect the new economic situations in our countries. As of 1 January 1991, the calculation and payment of bills in our economic and commercial relations will be made in convertible currency, at current prices for goods and services.

The last point to be emphasized is that the documents reflect the two countries' political will and determination to maintain and strengthen economic and commercial Cuban-Soviet relations, increasing their efficiency.

Part 2

PY1802215891 Moscow in Spanish to Cuba 0130 GMT 17 Feb 91

[Report on the "second and last part" of an interview with Aleksandr Ivanovich Kachanov, USSR first deputy minister for foreign economic relations, by unidentified Radio Moscow reporter; place and date not given—Kachanov's remarks are in Russian with superimposed translation into Spanish]

[Text] [Announcer] We invite you to listen to the second and last part of the interview with Aleksandr Ivanovich Kachanov, USSR first deputy minister for foreign economic relations.

During the first part of this interview our distinguished interlocutors stated the results of economic and commercial cooperation with Cuba in 1990. Aleksandr Kachanov told us that the economic difficulties the two countries are experiencing have had an effect on this cooperation.

The vice minister said that current problems were examined toward the end of 1990 prior to the signing of government-to-government agreements for Soviet-Cuban cooperation in 1991. These agreements paid special attention to the transition toward a settling of accounts and payment in convertible currencies at international market prices for all economic and commercial transactions between the two countries. Aleksandr Kachanov emphasized that the existing cooperation mechanisms will be maintained.

Tell me, Aleksandr Ivanovich, is there any change in cooperation priorities now that the Soviet Union and Cuba have switched to the settling of accounts in strong currency and a trade based on international market prices?

[Kachanov] The main objective of our cooperation is still an exchange of merchandise. We must point out that despite our current economic difficulties, the trade volume projected for 1991 is close to the traditional average. The amount of money involved, however, has been somewhat reduced because of the switch to international market prices, which are usually lower than the prices that had been established for Soviet-Cuban trade.

[Announcer] What specific items will the USSR supply to Cuba and vice versa?

[Kachanov] According to the agreements that have been signed, the USSR will continue supplying Cuba with fuel, laminated metals, fertilizer, wood products, machinery, equipment, and a wide range of mass consumption goods and certain foodstuffs.

Meanwhile, throughout 1991 Cuba will continue supplying the USSR with its traditional export products, especially sugar, nickel, and citrus. The supply of sugar will remain at the average for the last five years. The supply of cobalitic nickel to the USSR and of a number of Soviet export products to Cuba will be established shortly. Imports of citrus will be increased by 50 percent.

One new item in the area of Cuban exports to the USSR this year will be medical industry products, including high technology equipment and medicine to cure various strains of meningitis and hepatitis. Cooperation in this field has good prospects. I want to point out that Cuban scientific research and discoveries in medicine, immunology, and biotechnology have had a global impact.

[Announcer] The Soviet supply of petroleum and petroleum by-products to Cuba is currently the target of a great deal of attention. We would like you to explain the issue further.

[Kachanov] The interest this issue has awakened is not accidental. First, because petroleum by-products are the USSR's main export item to Cuba. Second, because at some point last year Cuba experienced shortages of these products.

We could draw a parallel between oil and sugar, which is Cuba's main export item to the USSR. In order to establish the volume of these products for mutual export in 1991, we and our Cuban partners took into account the real amounts of petroleum and sugar available in the two countries and the need to keep supply at a level no lower than last year's actual level. It was decided that the USSR will import sugar at the average level of the last five years and that it will supply petroleum by-products at the level of actual shipments in 1990.

[Announcer] Could you say a few words about technical cooperation?

[Kachanov] Technical assistance for the construction and refurbishing of key industrial plants, power plants, metalworking industries, oil refineries, chemical plants, machine building industries, agriculture, and transport will continue. Altogether there are 800 projects, the most important of which are the Juragua nuclear power plant, the Havana thermal power plant, the building and rebuilding of nickel-processing plants, the maintenance of the Jose Marti metalworking complex, and others.

We jointly decided not to begin any new building projects in 1991 and to direct all our efforts toward concluding the current projects.

[Announcer] One last question. What is the agenda for the main targets of Soviet-Cuban cooperation?

[Kachanov] Among the main tasks for 1991 I would like to emphasize the following: The stabilization and strengthening of existing economic and commercial ties through a quest for truly complementary economies. We will also seek to gradually improve the mechanisms for renegotiation of the agreements we have signed and to find new ways and means for expanding cooperation to include nontraditional items and new products.

Once again, I would like to stress that our organizations are doing everything necessary to further develop and improve economic and commercial cooperation between the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Cuban Legislative Head Visits for Bilateral Talks

Meets With Yanayev

FL2002215091 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 2030 GMT 20 Feb 91

[Text] Soviet Vice President Gennadiy Yanayev expressed today to the president of the Cuban legislature, Juan Escalona, the interest of his country in continuing to expand bilateral relations in the new international situation. In the meeting, considered positive by Cuban and Soviet sources, the two sides agreed on the necessity of searching for more efficient and mutually beneficial forms of cooperation.

Yanayev explained to Escalona and the Cuban ambassador in Moscow, J. R. Balaguer, different aspects of the situation concerning the reforms in his country and particularly the referendums concerning the future of the federal state.

Escalona, who arrived in Moscow at the head of an official delegation from the National Assembly, also met with (Ivan Laptev), president of the Supreme Soviet, as well as Valentin Falin, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Visit Seen as 'Positive'

PY2102121891 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 20 Feb 91

[Statement by Juan Escalona Reguera, president of the Cuban National Assembly of the People's Government, to reporter Viktor Kuzmin in Moscow; date not given—recorded]

[Text] I can tell you that on our first day of activities in the USSR, our experiences surpassed our expectations. We held important meetings with Comrades Falin and Yanayev, and with (?Laptev). We got a real picture of the situation in the USSR, and now we can improve our knowledge of this country, to which (?we came) so many years ago, and we can understand the current situation in the USSR.

I have seen with great satisfaction that those Soviet leaders hold Soviet-Cuban relations (?in high regard). This has allowed us to feel reassured and to realize that

30 years of fraternal relations have not been lost, and that the complexities of the current situation have not made us forget such fraternal ties.

I believe that this visit will be very positive, especially for our objective, which is to gain experience in the situations that the USSR is undergoing in order to properly use such experience in our country, despite the distance between both countries and their difference in the size.

We have once again found understanding, support, and magnificent friendly relations in the USSR.

Meets With Lukyanov

PY2202114291 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Report by Viktor Kuzmin on second day's activities of the delegation of the Cuban National Assembly of the People's Government, which is paying an official visit to the USSR]

[Text] Like they did yesterday, Juan Escalona Reguera and his entourage today held several meetings. I believe that one of the most important meetings was the one with Supreme Soviet chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov. The two leaders exchanged views on the most important aspects of the processes underway in the USSR and in Cuba. They also analyzed the current problems of, and prospects for, Cuban-Soviet relations. The two sides expressed their willingness to strengthen those relations and the spirit of friendship and cooperation. The leaders noted their interest in improving the entire set of current economic and commercial ties between the USSR and Cuba by improving the efficiency and mutual advantages of such relations.

Today the Cuban delegation met with the committee of international affairs of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Aleksandr Dzasokhov, who is the committee chairman and a member of the CPSU politburo, greeted the Cuban delegation by saying that in the USSR when we consider the Cuban policy, we always think of Cuba as a reliable and permanent ally.

At the current transition period of our relations—which affects the form but not the political substance of such relations—we appreciate Cuba's understanding of our problems, Dzasokhov said.

I now invite you to listen to a passage of an interview that Juan Escalona Reguera granted to me, in which he gives his opinion on the relations between our two countries.

[Begin Escalona Reguera recording] Well, our relations are more than 30 years old. They have very sound foundations in the commercial and political areas, and in the field of technical assistance. These foundations have remained unchanged in the agreements that were recently signed by the Cuban and Soviet Governments. We hope that the difficulties that the Soviet people are now confronting will not prevent these agreements from being fully implemented. [end recording]

U.S.'s 'Anachronistic' Cuban Policy Criticized

PY0802173591 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Studio discussion between Leonid Levchenko and unidentified station announcer]

[Text] [Announcer] Earlier during this broadcast, we noted that the U.S. Administration imposed a full economic blockade on Cuba 29 years ago. Leonid Levchenko has joined us in our studios to comment on this topic.

[Levchenko] Good evening, friends. One cannot draw conclusions on yesterday's historic events based on today's prevailing conditions. There are exceptions, however, and one of them deals with U.S.-Cuban relations. The level of animosity continues to rise as a result of the cold war atmosphere that still prevails between the two neighboring countries despite the fact that there has been a remarkable easing of tensions worldwide. It is very easy to make things look wrong in politics, but today one must analyze everything within the context of the qualitative changes that have taken place on the international arena.

This is why it is unforgivable, in my opinion, to maintain today a policy that is anachronistic and that was formulated nearly 30 years ago, especially by a country that seeks to become the world leader.

[Announcer] One moment, Leonid, one may also ask if the United States has achieved the goals sought by the blockade.

[Levchenko] The objective was not achieved. Cuba has not capitulated; rather it has made new friends in the world. Of course it has not been easy for Cuba to withstand for nearly 30 years. Cuba has endured some hardships, but it has not relinquished its principles.

Even today the situation is not easy for Cuba. As a result of the opening of several countries of East Europe last year, Havana lost major economic and trade partners. The Soviet Union does not have unlimited economic

resources either. Our country is in no position to guarantee the supply of many export commodities needed by Cuba. Washington apparently took this fact into account when last year it decided to reinforce the blockade against Cuba by prohibiting foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from negotiating with Cuba.

[Announcer] I believe this measure provoked negative reactions in Canada, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil.

[Levchenko] I believe we could add other countries to this list. Besides, since early this year Cuba has signed mutually advantageous agreements on economic and trade cooperation with major countries like China, India, and (?Iraq).

It should be noted that Cuba's isolation from the Latin American continent has long been broken and Cuba has normalized its relations with many Latin American partners. In sum, we are approaching the end of the bipolar world system. A new political thinking is now gaining strength in the world. Washington could give up its policy of confrontation and could normalize its relations with Cuba as a tangible demonstration of its endorsement of the new approach to solving problems in international relations among states.

Supreme Soviet

Commissions Examines Draft Law on Cabinet

LD2102101491 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Report by legislative correspondent Marina Novitskaya from the USSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow—live]

[Text] Good morning. As you know, today deputies of the Supreme Soviet decided to cancel a joint sitting of the chambers and to discuss in detail the draft law on the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. It was presented earlier by Prime Minister Pavlov, who explained the proposed structure of the government in detail. The Committee for Economic Reform, which I visited, has done thorough preparation work for this discussion. It minutely checks the future law against our Constitution, the main directions toward stabilizing the economy, the law on the foundations of economic relations betwen the union and subjects of the federation, and the main thing, the draft union treaty approved at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

The commission for issues of labor, prices, and social policy has concentrated on other aspects—primarily, on reliable social protection for the population. For example, the following questions were asked of Pokrovskiy, doctor of economic sciences, one of the authors of the new law, who was present here: How will the Cabinet of Ministers and what department within it, monitor a correlation betwen prices and revenues? Should an interdepartamental supreme council for prices and revenues be established to monitor their correlation? Will the number of ministries and committees increase? Will their apparatus be reduced? The following answer was given: The number of members of the Cabinet of Ministers should be reduced to 55 from 68. The apparatus will be reduced, too, in accordance with the budget approved by the Supreme Soviet. There, if you remember, expenses for state administrations should be reduced by 30 percent.

Deputies Amanova and Samarin expressed the view that the principles of the draft Union treaty had not been sufficiently taken into account in the draft law. Yet another article causes concern among legislators. It reads: The USSR Cabinet of Minsiters is entitled to adopt provisional decision on the issues of managing the national economy and social and cultural construction within the Supreme Soviet's competence when an immediate solution should be found to them. Could this not lead to a situation, deputies asked, when the Supreme Soviet completely losses the levers of influencing the economy? An answer seems to be written in the article itself. The Supreme Soviet will be immediately informed about such decisions which will be signed by the USSR president and will be in force until the Supreme soviet adopts corresponding legislative acts. And what else worries deputies? They think that one would like to have more structures which deal with analyzing and forecasting situations instead of immediately controlling them. The committees and commissions are continuing work now. They are to get together and bring their conclusions at 1400, and later, perhaps, we will be able to tell our listeners about the results of their activity. For the time being, I end this report.

PRAVDA Carries Appeal on Ending Gulf War

PM2102164391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Feb 91 Second Edition p 1

[Appeal signed by the USSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow on 19 February: "To All Countries' Legislatures; USSR Supreme Soviet Appeal in Connection With the Military Conflict in the Gulf"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet expresses serious alarm in connection with the dramatic events in the Persian Gulf. The flames of war are still raging there. Hostilities are becoming increasingly widespread and destructive with each passing day. Totally innocent people are being killed and immense material damage is being done. There is a real threat of catastrophic consequences for the environment, the economy, and cultural monuments. The possibility that weapons of mass destruction might be used is extremely worrying.

The USSR Supreme Soviet believes that the slide toward an abyss of irreparable consequences for the peoples of the region and the world as a whole must be halted as quickly as possible. The logic of peace and the primacy of nonviolent political methods for settling the conflict should prevail over the logic of war.

Soviet legislators are convinced that a peaceful resolution of the crisis is possible—it is the only sensible option. To this end it is necessary above all to remove the prime cause of this highly acute international situation, that is, to implement an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and to restore the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country, as demanded by the UN Security Council resolutions.

The USSR Supreme Soviet supports the Soviet state leadership's vigorous political and diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the Persian Gulf conflict and believes that these efforts should be boosted, consistently moving toward the speediest end to the war and the restoration of peace.

Overcoming the current crisis will pave the way to a settlement of other acute problems in the Near East—above all, the Arab-Israeli conflict—and to the creation, with an active UN role, of a lasting regional security system in the Persian Gulf region and in the Near and Middle East as a whole. All peoples and all countries in the world have a direct interest in this.

The Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet have repeatedly and firmly expressed

the view that a way out of the crisis should be sought on the political plane rather than along the paths of war. Now that the war is already into its second month and is becoming more destructive, the USSR Supreme Soviet reaffirms its resolve to strive for an immediate end to the war in the Persian Gulf region and appeals to all parliaments, legislators, politicians, statesmen, and people of good will to promote this as far as possible, making use of all the opportunities at their disposal.

Let us pool our efforts to achieve these goals.

[Signed] USSR Supreme Soviet.
[Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin. 19 February 1991.

PRAVDA Carries Resolution on Yeltsin Remarks

PM2102160991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Resolution signed by A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in Moscow on 20 February: "USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution: On the Speech Delivered by B.N. Yeltsin, Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, on Central Television 19 February 1991"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To point out that the ideas and calls voiced in the speech delivered by B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, on Central Television 19 February 1991 and pursuing the replacement of the country's legally elected supreme organs of power and the immediate resignation of the USSR president contravene the USSR Constitution and create an emergency situation in the country.

2. To ask the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, the Council of the Federation, and the USSR president to determine their attitude to the aforementioned speech by B.N. Yeltsin.

3. The USSR Supreme Soviet addresses the peoples of the USSR, the republics' supreme soviets, local soviets of peoples' deputies at all levels, and all political parties and public movements to consolidate their efforts to stabilize the political and economic situation throughout the country's territory, to strengthen democratic principles in the reconstruction of Soviet society, and to render utmost support to the legally elected supreme organs of power and the USSR president.

[Signed] A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
[Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin, 20 February 1991.

IZVESTIYA Carries Resolution on Georgia

PM2102155391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Feb 91 Union Edition p 4

[Resolution signed by A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in Moscow on 20 February: "USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution: On the Situation in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast and Measures To Stabilize the Situation in the Region"]

[Text] 1. Having heard and discussed a briefing by the USSR people's deputies who visited the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], South Ossetia Autonomous Oblast, and the North Ossetia ASSR [Autonomous SSR], the USSR Supreme Soviet notes that the measures envisaged by the USSR president's decree "On Certain Legislative Acts Adopted in the Georgian SSR in December 1990" dated 7 January 1991 have still not been implemented. This has led to further deterioration of the situation in and around South Ossetia. The casualties of the conflict are increasing, and the flow of both Ossetian and Georgian refugees continues. The city of Tskhinvali has been blockaded by illegal armed formations and deprived of electricity and heat. The population of the city and the autonomous oblast is experiencing a severe shortage of foodstuffs and prime necessities. Property belonging to citizens, several state institutions, social organizations, and the oblast theater has been burned and looted. Outrages have been committed against historical and cultural monuments.

Events in South Ossetia are a blatant violation of the Constitutions of the USSR and the Georgian SSR and of international norms on human rights.

2. The Georgian Supreme Soviet is instructed to examine within three days the question of extending the state of emergency to the entire territory of South Ossetia with the participation of USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Troops to ensure the withdrawal and disbandment of all illegal armed formations; to end the illegal production, storage, and distribution of weapons over the republic's entire territory; and to put an immediate stop to the blockade of the city of Tskhinvali and adjoining areas. Emergency measures are to be taken to end the bloodshed and to guarantee supplies of electricity, fuel, food, and medicines for the population of the oblast center and the oblast's rayons.

3. Recognizing the Georgian SSR's sovereign rights to its territorial integrity, the Georgian Supreme Soviet and Government are instructed to immediately begin talks with South Ossetian representatives, through the mediation of the USSR Supreme Soviet, on restoring the structures of state power which functioned in the oblast until 9 December 1990, to normalize the political situation, and to safeguard the population's security.

4. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers is instructed to take measures to safeguard the lives [po zhizneobespecheniyu] of the South Ossetian population and to provide assistance to the North Ossetia ASSR and the Georgian SSR in housing the refugees.

[Signed] A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
[Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin, 20 February 1991.

IZVESTIYA Reports 'Stormy' 18 Feb Sitting

PM2102124591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Feb 91 Union Edition pp 1, 2

[IZVESTIYA legislative correspondents A. Stepovoy and S. Chugayev Kremlin report: "Session Discusses Work Plan"]

[Text] According to established tradition, the first 10 minutes of the morning sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet session were devoted to brief speeches by deputies on procedural questions. However, this deputies' "warm-up" lasted almost an hour at the 19 February sitting. This was in many respects due to a question from Deputy Yu. Koltsov, which he read out from the session platform. The question was addressed to the USSR Justice Ministry and was connected with the Law on Public Organizations now beginning to operate in the country.

In the questioner's opinion, many mass media articles of late have given evidence that several leading CPSU officials, including Politburo members, are involved in actions designed to overthrow the constitutional system in the Union republics. M. Burokevicius and A. Rubiks, members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, were specifically named. The speaker said that an interview given by USSR People's Deputy Alksnis—which he subsequently confirmed—points out that the national salvation committees were set up on the initiative of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. What is more, in Yu. Koltsov's opinion, the existence of political organs within the Armed Forces, for which the CPSU Statutes make provision, incites the Army to anticonstitutional actions. In connection with all this, the deputy suggested that the USSR Justice Ministry's opinion on the lawfulness of registering the CPSU be heard.

Chairman A. Lukyanov instructed the sitting's participants to decide whether this question should be sent in. The proposal did not gain the requisite majority (172 persons voted "for," 170 voted "against," and there were 70 abstentions).

Certain deputies did not agree with the chairman. Deputies K. Ryabchenko and A. Sobchak indicated in their speeches that the Standing Orders for the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the country's Supreme Soviet make no provision for a deputy's question to be put to the vote. However, A. Lukyanov cited the procedure that has become established in the course of the session's work. The upshot being that the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation has been instructed to answer the question of whether or not deputies' questions should be put to a vote.

Despite the fact that deputies turned down the question, Deputy V. Ivashko, stressing that the question was political and had, nonetheless, been made public even if it was rejected, said that the questioner should prove all the charges he had leveled at the CPSU. Otherwise, he said, we reserve the right to take the appropriate action.

The next debate proved equally trenchant. It concerned a letter from Deputy S. Akhromeyev which has been circulated at the session, or, more correctly, not the deputy's actual letter, but the enclosed letter from Savichev, resident of Ivanovo City. This enclosure contains outright abuse of B. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. In this connection, Deputy V. Shapovalenko demanded that Deputy S. Akhromeyev apologize in public to both B. Yeltsin and to him personally as Russia's representative.

In his response, Deputy S. Akhromeyev refused to apologize, saying that his letter contained no abuse. As for the enclosed letter, S. Akhromeyev thinks that this is nothing compared to what you can read in the mass media today. The Supreme Soviet Ethics Committee is to investigate the conflict and answer the questions voiced in the course of the debate as to how one deputy has been given the right to circulate his material. According to established practice, only groups of deputies are accorded this right.

After a heated warm-up, the session continued its discussion of the list of questions submitted for it to examine.

I. Laptev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union, told deputies that another 100 questions or so have been submitted in the period since the list of 48 questions was discussed. It is quite obvious that the session will be simply unable to cope with this number of questions despite the fact that each of the proposals is, undoubtedly, important and topical. Some of them may be handed over to the legiskatuire's committees and commissions to examine, and some may be postponed for consideration at the next Supreme Soviet session.

I. Laptev acquainted the sitting's participants with the proposals that have been received and deputies then set about discussing the questions on which they are to work over the next four months.

I. Laptev proposed including another five questions on the list in addition to those that have already been approved: the question of implementing the USSR Law on Banks and the Banking System; the question of the basic principles of labor in the USSR; the progress made in implementing the Supreme Soviet Resolution "On Introducing the Law on Ownership"; the question of abrogating legislative acts in respect of peoples subjected to repression; and the question of enforced migration (refugees).

Some deputies pressed for questions relating to events in the Baltics and Dubossary and the "case of the 140 billion rubles" to be included on the agenda. I. Laptev reminded them that it would not be quite right to include these questions on the list while the investigation is still under way and the Prosecutor's Office is working on this.

We will be entitled to begin examining these questions when the investigation is over.

Deputy V. Alksnis asked I. Laptev to give his opinion as regards his proposal at the 18 February sitting that the question of the newspaper IZVESTIYA be included on the agenda. The Soviet of the Union chairman replied that the Supreme Soviet chairman can put examination of the question of the newspaper IZVESTIYA at the session to the vote. Then, citing the Press Law, I. Laptev explained that no one can force an editorial office, no matter to whom the newspaper belongs, to publish an article that the editorial office has turned down. What about examining the question of the newspaper at all? For starters, the newspaper's work and all its policies and positions should be analyzed and one should then ascertain what the newspaper fights for and what aims it upholds.

At the end of a stormy and somewhat chaotic sitting deputies voted in favor of incorporating I. Laptev's five proposed questions on the agenda.

...The debate on the agenda of the fifth session was opened 18 February by B. Oleynik, deputy chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities. He shared the opinion of those deputies who adhere to the principle that selectivity is inadmissible in the sphere of defending human rights. We unambiguously reject, B. Oleynik said, and categorically condemn the use of force in the Baltics, in the Caucasus, and in any other region to resolve political questions. We grieve for the victims of interethnic clashes. At this moment hundreds or maybe even thousands of peaceful inhabitants of Iraq, Israel, and Saudi Arabia are perishing in the bombings.

Having unequivocally condemned the aggression and confirmed the international community's determination to liberate Kuwait, we must with equal determination, B. Oleynik stressed, advocate the immediate cessation of the bloody slaughter of people who are paying for the sins of their leaders. He drew deputies' attention to the fact that war is rumbling near the USSR's borders. Our alarm is also intensified by the fact that proposals have been heard at the U.S. Congress for tactical nuclear weapons to be used. That would mean World War III, were Saddam Husayn to carry out his threat to retaliate with tactical chemical weapons.

B. Oleynik proposed adopting on behalf of the Supreme Soviet an appeal to the combatant sides, the entire world community, and the UN secretary general to immediately cease military operations in the Persian Gulf and begin unraveling the knot of problems by political means.

This stance was shared by many deputies who proposed including a question about the Gulf situation on the session's agenda.

The subject of freedom of the press in our country was also broached at the 18 February sitting. The debate was opened by Deputy E. Yusupov, rector of Tashkent State University. He said that the Press Law operates in a one-sided manner. Journalists believe that they are demonstrating their independence from the CPSU. At the same time they have become totally dependent on the destructive forces that want to complicate the situation. While fighting against dictatorship by one ideology, they are imposing dictatorship by another. The following conclusion stems from this: There can be no question of any pluralism in these conditions. Deputy E. Yusupov also predicted that interethnic relations in our country will deteriorate still further if the press continues to act in the same way.

Then the speaker accused the press of bias. He based his accusations on the press' attitude toward such a well known figure as Rashidov. Why are we being singled out?, E. Yusupov asked the audience. And he answered his own question: This is a problem of our entire political system. And if this system exists, there will always be people like Rashidov. First of all it is necessary to condemn the system which produces dictators and transgressors of the law. But the press "hypes up" that system without publishing other views.

In this regard, Deputy E. Yusupov mentioned our newspaper. He said: An article was published in IZVESTIYA, and the overwhelming majority of scientists from the republic's Academy of Sciences wrote another article which was not published because it did not correspond with the newspaper's stance. Then the deputy gave a detailed explanation of the story why Rashidov has been singled out nowadays. In his opinion, it is because he fell into disfavor with Ligachev when the latter "became the country's boss and took his revenge on Uzbekistan." The weakness of this version is clear even if only from the fact that Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan, that nationally famous "friend" of Yegor Kuzmich, was mentioned in the same breath as Ligachev...

Assessments of the work of the press, and of IZVESTIYA in particular, did not end there. E. Yusupov handed over to Deputy V. Alksnis, the colonel from Riga. The section of his speech relating to our newspaper is being published together with a commentary on it.

Ukrainian Deputy S. Ryabchenko, who was mandated to speak by the Interregional Deputies' Group, insisted that the following questions should be added to the session's agenda: On decisions adopted and on measures planned by the Cabinet of Ministers in the sphere of the economy, finance, prices, and price formation linked to the population's social protection and the preservation of labor savings.

S. Ryabchenko's second major question, which has touched a raw nerve in our society, was the compliance of certain USSR presidential decrees with existing law. The third question which members of the Interregional Deputies' Group thought deserved examination at the present session is that of the hearings on the January events in the Baltic republics.

On the instruction of the Communist deputies' group, V. Lisitskiy initially submitted a proposal to examine the question of the reform of price formation at the 18 February sitting itself and then, as cochairman of the deputies' group "For Constructive Cooperation," he submitted another proposal: On progress in fulfilling USSR Supreme Soviet resolutions.

Kim Yen Un, also speaking on behalf of the Communist deputies' group, submitted a further two proposals for inclusion on the agenda of the session: A parliamentary investigation into the "case of the 140 billion rubles," and a week's recess in the Supreme Soviet's work before the 17 March referendum.

Many other proposals were submitted. For example, on the need to include on the fifth session's agenda questions on the USSR Supreme Soviet standing orders, on the need for a report on the situation in the country from the vice-president or prime minister at the beginning of each session, on the repeal of all acts which were used during the years of the Stalin regime to carry out the forcible resettlement of many peoples, on the cadre composition of the USSR Prosecutor's Office Collegium, and on the need to change the wording of the question for the forthcoming nationwide referendum.

Once again two influential deputies' groups—the Interregional Deputies' Group and "Soyuz"—showed solidarity. This time they formed a bloc on the need for the urgent examination of the situation in South Ossetia with the aim of averting bloodshed in that region.

Three proposals cropped up most often: Namely, that the Supreme Soviet must return to the theme of the military conflict in the Persian Gulf and must hear a report on the Cabinet of Ministers and on the preparation for the 17 March all-Union referendum. These three questions, plus the other 45 presented by the country's Supreme Soviet Presidium, have been included in the fifth session's agenda.

There was a slight delay before the session participants were due to discuss the question of examining the South Ossetian situation that same day. Deputy V. Zubkov drew his colleagues' attention to the fact that there were no Georgian deputies in the hall and that in such a situation it is impossible to examine this question. Chairman Lukyanov explained: This is no coincidence because a statement has been received that the Georgian deputies do not want to take part in examining this question.

By 292 votes to 55, with 39 abstentions, deputies voted to discuss this question that same day.

Opening the evening sitting of the first day of work of the fifth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, chairman Lukyanov reminded deputies that 15 February marked the second anniversary of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The international servicemen's committee and the Supreme Soviet Presidium, A. Lukyanov said, propose a minute's silence in honor of all who performed their internationalist duty in full. Deputies stood up...

Then, as agreed at the morning sitting, the session switched to an examination of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers' report on measures aimed at stabilizing the consumer market, pursuing a price policy, and ensuring the social protection of the population (Prime Minister V. Pavlov's speech is being published in today's IZVESTIYA).

It is natural that a speech on V. Pavlov's opening theme as prime minister at the session of the country's legislature was bound to generate a host of questions. As A. Lukyanov told deputies, the presidium of the sitting received so many notes during the report that answers to them would take up all the remaining time at least. He proposed that all written questions be passed to the speaker so that he could analyze them and answer them at the next sitting. The proposal was adopted.

The discussion of the situation in South Ossetia was the next item on the agenda of the fifth session. Before the report on the situation in this region was given, A. Lukyanov informed the sitting participants that several deputies had visited South Ossetia on the instructions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. They included among others Deputies L. Gorshkov, Ts. Nimbuyev, V. Shekhovtsov, B. Oleynik, V. Klibik, O. Vostrukhov, and others. On their behalf a proposal was submitted to examine the question on the situation in South Ossetia at a closed sitting of the session. The proposal was supported.

PRAVDA Carries Pavlov Speech on Government

PM2102113091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Feb 91 Second Edition p 3

[Speech by Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov at the USSR Supreme Soviet in moscow on 20 February: "On the Structure and Basic Guidelines of the Activity of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers; Speech by V.S. Pavlov at the Fifth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] Esteemed comrade deputies!

The problem of improving economic management is acquiring particular significance and acuteness in the conditions of the profound crisis that has gripped the country and the buildup of destructive processes, and therefore the approaches to resolving this problem demand a most profound analysis. The multifaceted and wide-ranging nature of the forthcoming perestroyka of the management organization, along with its political and socioeconomic aspects, are clearly visible today.

A series of consultations and discussions have been held at all levels in the course of the work on the new management structure and on the draft Law on the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. We met leaders of enterprises, unions, and associations, political scientists, and

sociologists, and worked creatively and successfully with USSR deputies. We kept in mind that simple maneuvers with management organs, changing signs, and "cadre reshuffles" would not advance us by a single step.

Today everyone is unanimously of the opinion that a flexible democratic system with a tremendous durability potential is what is needed. Yet durability is only possible on the basis of public consensus. That is the platform, the foundation on which we have rested.

I will single out three main topics in my speech in order to answer the questions why we chose precisely this path and why we need various powers: The ideology behind our approaches to the new organization of management, the powers of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, and the main guidelines of government activity.

I. The Ideology Behind the Restructuring of Management

The first point on which our proposals to restructure management were based was an analysis of the prevailing situation. The country's present position is well known. The reasons for the crisis—both objective and subjective—were thoroughly examined at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies last December. That is why there is hardly any point in dwelling on this once again in detail. I will just remind you in brief of the main conclusions relating to the question under discussion today.

First. The old economic mechanism was not replaced in a timely fashion by a new mechanism founded on predominantly economic methods. The imperfections of the structure and methods of management became increasingly obvious. A vacuum began to form within the management system. Some structures ceased to take responsibility for business, others had not yet begun to operate, and yet others had no intention of even starting to operate.

Second. The crisis is intensifying as a result of the ongoing confrontation between organs of power at various levels. The process of severing economic ties and putting barriers in the way of movement of goods, and also in the way of building a single all-Union market, began. Confrontation of laws emerged. At first this heralded a crisis of power and today it is the main reason for it.

Third. On plausible pretexts we clearly put the cart before the horse by proclaiming large-scale social programs without squaring these with society's real financial and resources potential. These decisions discredited themselves since they lacked economic backing. We approached the critical point.

Attempts to eliminate these causes and escape from the crisis on our own failed to and could not live up to expectations. They simply lack prospects. That is why, without joint coordinated actions, we cannot move on to a new effective system of economic management that ensures worthy living conditions for the people. Everyone understands and recognizes this, yet there have been no real improvements. The country has a worse life today than it could have.

That is why, when formulating our approaches to shaping the ideology behind the new organization of management, we depended above all on conclusions and decisions that consolidate and mobilize social forces for constructive action. In particular, we relied on the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies resolutions "On the General Concept of and the Procedure for Concluding the New Union Treaty" and "On Preserving the USSR As a Renewed Federation of Equal Sovereign Republics"; on the USSR laws that define the economic environment in which the country's economy will function in market conditions and the Basic Guidelines for the Transition to the Market approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet; on the republics' declarations of their sovereign rights; and on the USSR Law "On Amendments and Additions to the USSR Constitution in Connection With the Improvement of the State Management System."

The aims and tasks of presidential rule, which was introduced with the approval of the majority of deputies, are of fundamental importance in shaping our approaches. The USSR president is vested with broad powers and functions of executive power. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers is subordinate to him. This fundamentally changes the traditional forms and methods of management and we took this into consideration. Our adopted course of accelerating the transition to a socially oriented market economy is a crucial element.

Our constant oencern should be to actively regulate and synchronize the main processes in the country's transition to the market, to create economic and legal conditions enabling free commodity producers to operate in a single all-Union market, and to assist in the formation of a market infrastructure. A system of all-Union regulators for market relations is to be organized as the main instrument for implementing the policy of progressive structural change and the economy's destatization and demonopolization. These are new and very important areas of our work.

A rigorous pursuit of our chosen course compels us to revise not only the management organs' functions but also their structure. This is the area where the optimum dividing line [gran] between administrative and economic forms of management runs, and this line is something that we must discern. It is "floating" and that is why it is important to consider the situation, our degree of readiness, and the special features of the transitional period.

It is only as the system of market instruments is set up that the old structures should be displaced and replaced by new structures suitable for market relations. What does this actually mean? An analysis of the prevailing situation shows that the current phase of perestroyka

harbors two real threats. On the one hand, our tendency to put the cart before the horse, our desire to destroy the existing system of management organs. On the other hand, there is the threat of merely duplicating the former central bureaucratic structure in a number of republics. These are extremely dangerous tendencies and must not be underestimated.

That is why, in trying to attain unity and strengthen interregional ties and in putting the task of restructuring our relations with the republics on the front burner, we are proceeding from the premise that a period of constructive dialogue and creative businesslike pooling of efforts on the part of union and republic organs of state power and management has replaced supercentralism. This is an indispensable condition, a pledge that the negative processes in the economic, social, interethnic, and other spheres of our society's life will be overcome most speedily, it is a fundamental demand on the activity of the new government.

In broad terms I would say that together we must create a system of state territorial regulation from scratch. This system could be based on interrepublic treaties, economic agreements, all-Union and interregional programs, and mutual assistance.

It is of paramount importance to formulate agreed principles of state building and socioeconomic policy to ensure close collaboration between the Union Government and the republics. Life insistently demands that the work of delineating Union and republic spheres of activity and powers be completed most speedily. Thorough discussion of this question at a recent Council of the Federation sitting showed that there is a good basis for adopting acceptable decisions.

It can be assumed that the practical fine tuning of collaboration in spheres under the joint jurisdiction of the Union and the republics may generate some difficulties. By way of a first step, even before the Union Treaty is signed, it is important to agree on two possible approaches. The first approach involves reciprocal delegation of powers and transfer of functions on the basis of an accord between the parties involved. Then whoever is assigned these functions will naturally make the decisions. The second approach is for decisions to be made only jointly in those areas where an accord has not yet been secured.

In those spheres where management functions are the exclusive province of the Union, decisions are made by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. We can argue about the boundaries of these spheres, but if they have already been sketched out the cabinet simply has no right to evade resolving issues, and all other management organs cannot call its decisions into question. Otherwise there can be no question of effective management. It is well known that a Union treaty is under preparation which may introduce its own amendments too. The Cabinet of Ministers is obliged to take them into account. I think that if we take this approach and show good will we will be able to resolve any problems, even the most complex.

In implementing all this work, we proceed on the basis of the need for definite phases in the reconstruction of our society and the modernization of the national economic management system. This is also required by the scale of the economy and its crisis condition. We must look at the processes now under way from a realistic standpoint and try not to get ahead of ourselves. Such problems cannot be solved at a stroke.

That is why the new organizational management structure has been formed on the basis of the first phase—the 1991-1992 period. Clearly, life will subsequently require certain changes, but it cannot be ruled out that this structure may continue to function for some time even after this period is over.

These are the general outlines of the ideology of approaches to the problem of improving management and building a new structure. As you can see, the main emphasis has been placed on pooling efforts, coordinating actions, and ensuring collegiality as regards decisionmaking.

II. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers. Its Role and Powers. Composition of State Management Organs

The presidential form of rule is contingent on the organic combination of lawmaking and executive powers. At first sight the Cabinet of Ministers seems to have a dual role in this management system. On the one hand, the cabinet is a disciplined and strictly subordinate executor of laws. It observes their spirit and letter and is empowered to resolve all issues solely on the basis and in execution of laws and other decisions passed by the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, and USSR presidential decrees.

On the other hand, the Cabinet of Ministers, which deals daily and hourly with the country's specific economic problems, cannot be an outside observer of processes or the dogmatic executor of acts of legislation. Therefore, the cabinet should be given the necessary powers, including the right to promulgate decisions of a normative and binding nature for all organs, organizations, officials, and citizens on the country's entire territory.

There is one other aspect to the problem of legality. It is important for legislators to create the necessary conditions enabling the Cabinet of Ministers to exercise its powers. Interference by any state organs, social organizations, officials, or other persons in the cabinet's prerogatives is impermissible. Otherwise we will keep on returning to the problem of the paralysis of power and management. I ask USSR Supreme Soviet members to devote the most serious attention to this.

We should not, however, assess this statement as a desire to isolate ourselves or erect barriers to criticism. On the contrary, we are proceeding on the basis that it is only by acting on the principle of glasnost and relying on the

general public that we can achieve the effective implementation of economic and social reforms. We intend to strictly implement this demand.

It is quite obvious that these principles will work if the cabinet has a clear-cut position and the courage to defend it, conducting a direct and possibly tough dialogue.

The Cabinet's main powers are defined in Article 132 of the USSR Constitution and are reproduced in the draft law on the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, which also accords with the draft Union treaty approved by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. All this has been meaningfully worked out by the corps of deputies and, clearly, needs no additional explanation.

The other powers stipulated in the draft stem from the constitutional norm that the USSR Cabinet of Ministers is empowered to resolve all questions of state management under USSR jurisdiction, since such questions do not fall within the province of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet, or the Council of the Federation. This is briefly set out in the draft law under consideration, but I would like to highlight two provisions.

First, the management of all-Union property. The scale of this property and its composition may change. A definite range has now been legislatively outlined, tomorrow it may be either expanded in the Union Treaty or reduced. But the main point is that we need to be definite. I want to stress that in our proposals we have taken our cue from decisions that have already been adopted on this issue.

Second, we should particularly specify [ogovorit] the proposal to give the Cabinet of Ministers the right to adopt temporary resolutions on issues of leadership of the national economy which are within the competence of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This means issues which require urgent and efficient resolution. In particular, the powers of the Supreme Soviet envisaged by Paragraphs 7 and 10 of Article 113 of the USSR Constitution (on the regulation of the organization of national economic management, management of sociocultural building, the budget and financial system, labor remuneration and price formation, environmental protection, the use of natural resources, and the introduction when necessary of changes to the plan and budget). It would hardly be justifiable for us to resort to presidential decrees on each of these issues. This would only hinder matters.

The final division between the legislature and the executive has not yet taken place in our country. National economic problems are now very dynamic, and various situations may emerge during legislative recesses. The Supreme Soviet itself, which is immediately informed about an adopted decision and is able to revoke it if it deems it incorrect, is the guarantee that the Cabinet will not abuse this right. The same powers are held by the USSR president as the guarantor of the observance of Soviet citizens' rights and freedoms, the USSR Constitution, and Soviet laws. The Constitutional Oversight Committee can also stay the implementation of such an act.

Quite obviously, the powers of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers are not restricted to this. It is hardly possible to compile a complete [zakrytyy] list of them. One can take virtually any law or USSR Supreme Soviet resolution on its implementation, and these acts will contain either norms on certain issues falling under the jurisdiction of the government or corresponding instructions for it.

Structure of State Management Organs

The organization of the executive and the structure of national economic management organs in the transitional period should ensure the resolution of a twofold task—efficient economic management and the accelerated formation of market relations. The artificial distinction between these avenues and the lack of coordination of the decisions made on them run the risk of creating new contradictions. We have been striving to ensure a comprehensive approach when defining the functions and structure of the executive.

Clearly, it would be better to discuss everything relating to the merger, division, and closure of ministries and their removal from cabinet jurisdiction [za chertu kabineta] at USSR Supreme Soviet committees and commissions following my report. Nonetheless, these are details. Today we need to determine the main point—the management system. In this connection, I would like to draw your attention to the initial fundamental provisions.

First. Can we now let ourselves embark on the complete elimination of sectorial organs of management, as some comrades who consider themselves radicals are proposing? I am convinced that we cannot. The main reason is that this makes no sense. There is no equivalent of the complete absence of state structures of economic management in foreign countries either.

Where do we take a firm stand on the position of preserving ministries? Only where it is a question of a special regime for the functioning of enterprises, where the centralization and redistribution of material and financial resources are technologically necessary, and where a kind of traffic control [dispetcherizatsiya] is needed. This is a sphere where state ownership must prevail and where we shall delay privatization for a while.

This applies to the Ministry of Power and Electrification and the Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry with a self-contained system of electric power lines, the Ministry of Railways with its network of railroads, the Ministry of Communications with its continuous communication system, the Ministries of Transport and Special Construction with their transterritorial work, and the bloc of defense industry ministries viewed as a whole. In addition to the traditional enhanced

demands on the functions of management, the latter also need to conduct a broad conversion program.

As you can see, the sphere of the USSR's management is clearly visible here and is outlined in decisions already adopted.

Such an approach meets the wishes of a number of republics. In particular, V. Kebich, chairman of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, directly raises the question of preserving the all-Union ministries in this very sphere of management.

Second. In all the remaining instances it is proposed to create a small number of state committees based on consolidated groups of sectors. This is not a change of name but the transformation of the standing organs of the former Council of Ministers and many ministries, to integrate them and to give state management new content.

These organs must become more democratic, if I may put it that way. They will not intervene in the economic activity of enterprises and are not endowed with the functions of the direct leadership of production. Horizontal links are more strongly developed here. The committees are to a greater extent coordinating organs which promote the efficient functioning of enterprises. They are closer in spirit to market structures of an analytical and informational character.

To corroborate the democratic character of the new committees' activity I would like to express the following idea. In a number of cases we want to implement a qualitatively new approach to the formation of structures and embark on the creation of organs with a state and social status. There are spheres of activity where it is particularly important to combine professionalism with public opinion and support, and where the advice of the broad masses and the active participation of trade unions and other progressive movements are needed. In our proposals we include such an approach to and demands on the organization of the activity of committees on youth affairs and sport and on questions of women, the family, and others.

The new committees, as a rule, embrace the sphere of joint control of the USSR and the union republics.

Third. The directions of the activity and the functions of general economic organs must be substantially revised. Our firm position is that both at union and republic level they must not run production and distributive functions in the sphere of material and technical supply by the edict method. They must be firmly relieved of that work. The needs of enterprises and organizations for material resources must be satisfied on the principles of market relations with the help of intermediary organizations as well as the development of direct economic ties. Meeting statewide and interrepublic needs is to be entrusted to the Ministry of Wholesale Trade and Contracts that is being created.

Fourth. In the organization of the work of market institutions, a crucial role is assigned to the State Council on the Economic Reform that is being created. I have no criticism of the USSR Council of Ministers commission which worked under the leadership of Academician L. Abalkin. It may be criticized, but both the commission and its chairman did much that was very useful. At the same time the commission was divorced from the republics and social structures. Thus we consider it necessary to emphasize the intensification of collaboration with them.

It is planned to include in the State Council responsible representatives of the supreme organs of management of Union republics with the right to vote. Leaders of central economic organs and market institutions will be ex officio members of the council. Its work must be based on close collaboration with associations, unions, and social amalgamations. This meets the republics' needs. Admittedly, Moldova's Prime Minister M. Druk advocates the creation of an interrepublican economic committee but I do not think that the title is at issue here.

The purpose of the State Council is to ensure that the economic reform is comprehensive, coordinated, and synchronized, which is extremely important. For that purpose the council must have both the powers and the authority. Its status must be enhanced considerably. It is envisaged that the State Council will be headed by the prime minister. And it will be right if the president appoints a first deputy chairman of the council. In terms of position it should be equal to deputy prime minister. In my view, that is justified.

Proposals on the new structures have been formulated in the light of the provisions and principles already set out. In the new structure one can clearly see large blocs, both sectorial and functional, which may be divided notionally into four groups.

Group one—socioeconomic. Our new market structures fit in here.

Group two—organs which ensure scientific and technical progress and ecological safety.

Group three—a bloc of sectorial ministries and committees. I am not going to list them, they are all mentioned in the draft law. I shall merely note that they represent complexes of homogeneous sectors or groups united by a common purpose. They are the defense ministries, and the machine building, power industry, transport, and agro-industrial complexes.

Finally, group four. They are the organs which ensure the protection of the state and the protection of the rights and freedoms of the country's citizens: the Ministry of Defense, the Foreign Ministry, the KGB, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They will be "tended" by the Security Council. At the same time their leaders are members of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. These

questions cannot be omitted from the government's purview and the government for its part will make the corresponding decisions.

Such are the general outlines of the structure of the organs of state management of the Union. A number of existing departments remain outside their boundaries, mainly those with control functions such as the State Committee for Supervision of Safe Working Practices in Industry and the Atomic Power Industry, the State Commission for Oversight of Aircraft Safety, and the State Committee for Standards.

In addition to them, it is proposed to create new organs which are needed because of the transition to the market economy. They include, among others, state inspectorates for stocks and shares and for the monitoring of prices, the State Patent Agency, and the State Insurance Supervision.

The USSR State Property Fund and the antimonopoly committee are of special significance at the present stage of the reform. We have worked long and hard on the question of the place of these leading market institutions in the overall system of management. We came to the conclusion that they must be given maximum independence and freedom of action. That is why there is a proposal not to include the leaders of these organs in the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.

I know that some deputies still adhere to a position which essentially states that the fund and the antimonopoly committee should be subordinate to the USSR Supreme Soviet. We do not share that view and are absolutely sure that if a course has been set toward separating legislative and executive power, it must be seen through to the end. Legislative activity must not be replaced by day to day economic decisionmaking. The logical chain of market institutions operating in the closest linkage with all other organs of management cannot be broken.

There is another fundamental question. I am obliged to ask you to introduce an additional post of deputy prime minister, in other words to increase them to eight (I will remind you that there were 13 deputies in the old Council of Ministers).

The Supreme Soviet has currently approved four deputy premiers, including two first deputies. Earlier a general accord had been reached that we would place a representative from the Ukraine at the helm of agricultural matters, and that Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics would delegate one of the deputies. Today the Ukraine, by agreement with Belorussia, has already named its candidate on agricultural questions, which was examined and supported in the Council of the Federation.

We must now determine the distribution of forces in the leadership of the Cabinet of Ministers in the socioeconomic area, foreign economic ties, and fuel and energy questions. As you see, it is quite a complex matter to consolidate areas and blocs without damaging the interests of the cause. Therefore the need has emerged to add one more deputy prime minister. I ask you to support my request.

Thus, it turns out that the Cabinet of Ministers will have 55 leaders instead of the 68 in the USSR Council of Ministers. I will also remind you that, in accordance with the Constitution, republic heads of government may participate in the work of the cabinet with the right to a casting vote. We count on their constant and active participation.

Finally, one last point on which I would like to dwell. It is a question of the principles for reducing the size of the apparatus. Of course this is not an issue for the law, but you will agree that it is a painful matter and your advice is needed.

We propose to be guided by the approved budget expenditure for 1991 for the maintenance of the apparatus. This expenditure, as is known, was reduced by 30 percent. I believe that we must keep to this target, while naturally ensuring a differentiated approach in specific situations. If this way of formulating the question is supported, the Cabinet of Ministers will ensure its resolution.

To conclude this topic I wish to emphasize that the new structure of management was built for specific purposes and tasks, for the areas where our efforts must be concentrated. I am profoundly convinced that we must not adapt ourselves to fit the scheme of management, for it is secondary. Therefore, possible attempts to preserve a particular ministry represent, in our view, a profoundly mistaken, departmental position.

The leaders of Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia have expressed a special opinion on the question under consideration. What is its essence? It is proposed not to examine the draft law and not to begin forming the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers until the Union Treaty has been signed. Thus, it is proposed to plunge the country's national economy indefinitely into an abyss of anarchy. One prime minister, even with 10 deputies, will never take the place of the Cabinet of Ministers. Management organs and leaders must work and not wait for whatever else the leaders of certain republics will propose.

It is necessary, above all, to think about the cause! The Union Treaty is undoubtedly a very important document. But there were and there will remain constitutional demands for the economy's efficient management both before and after it is signed.

If they want, under this convenient pretext, to offer us some completely self-managing system, then this is an unprofessional approach, to say the least, and an obviously artificial delaying tactic which merely intensifies the crisis in the national economy.

The opinion of other republics was more constructive, and it has been taken into account.

III. On the Basic Guidelines of the USSR Government's Activity

On the strategic plane, the government's program of activity has to a certain extent been predetermined by the basic guidelines for stabilizing the national economy and switching to a market economy, approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet. They received logical additions at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies. I am not inclined to consider those decisions as dogma. I think you will agree that life can and will make its own amendments. I will briefly expound my view of the Cabinet's upcoming activity.

What is the main point now? Only progress! From these positions I believe that we need to implement two programs—strategic and current.

Among the urgent measures, we need to accelerate the shaping of a new economic system to ensure the people's worthy living conditions. For this it is necessary to create economic and legal conditions for the efficient functioning of free commodity producers. To create equal conditions for the development of and competition among all forms of ownership. Without this the market cannot be built.

Consequently, it is necessary to ensure the legislative base as quickly as possible. The Cabinet of Ministers has prepared draft laws on enterprise, reduction of state control, and privatization and on the fight against monopolism. These are top-priority laws which will become the basis for elaborating measures connected with the switch to the market and for implementing them under the control of society.

Here I wish to emphasize once again that the switch to the market is not an end in itself but a tool for achieving the end. It creates a medium for accelerating the resolution of a package of tasks in the interests of the overwhelming majority of people. Economic reform must gain the population's broad support. Only in this case will the powerful levers and incentives inherent in market relations start working for the good of the whole people.

We must complete more quickly the creation of an integral and interlinked system of economic, social, legal, and organizational conditions and guarantees ensuring a worthy standard and quality of life for man. This must be a universal system embracing all citizens without exception, regardless of their type of activity, sex, age, nationality, and place of residence.

Real steps have already been taken. The USSR Supreme Soviet has adopted a package of very important laws. We have begun implementing in earnest measures in the sphere of the population's effective employment, the further development and improvement of pension provision, and increased social protection for indigent sections. All-union targeted programs are being implemented to improve the living conditions of elderly and disabled people and to protect the family, mothers, and children. A state youth policy is being implemented, and measures are being taken to resolve the problems of ensuring rights and guarantees for individual groups of the population which have been forced to leave their places of permanent residence.

The country's president has adopted a package of decisions to intensify the fight against crime and to establish law and order in society.

Proposals have been prepared to form a mechanism of state regulation of the standard and quality of life and the population's income, including compensation with due regard for the dynamics of consumer prices, the cost of living, and the purchasing power of the ruble.

The center of gravity should be shifted to practical work. It is important to arrange close collaboration with the republics, since it is they that possess all the rights in resolving questions of labor and social development. I must also emphasize the special significance of the agreement which we intend to adopt with the All-Union Trade Union Confederation.

I am profoundly convinced that in the present complex situation it is necessary to establish firm order, so that decisions on raising the population's living standards are adopted only on the basis of a policy agreed between the center and the republics to achieve the country's financial recovery and to strengthen money circulation. Otherwise we will mess up the system and be unable to stabilize the financial position.

To prevent a slide toward catastrophe, the Union government and republican governments must consistently and unswervingly implement the measures for stabilizing the economy which have already been outlined and agreed. In this every step must be weighed and thought through.

In addition to realizing today's urgent tasks, we must right now also define our strategy of further economic development. It would be a most dire mistake to wait for the final stabilization and formation of the market and only then begin resolving strategic problems. That way we would only lose time.

Can we follow in the steps of other countries in this, constantly looking "over the fence" and copying their experience? For such an approach would all the time place us in the disadvantageous position of someone who is trying to catch up.

I do not deny the significance of foreign experience, and we have already utilized much that has been useful. But we must find our own way to carry out the economy's structural perestroyka and to advance it to forward lines. We have both the raw material and the production

potential for this and, most importantly, the intellectual potential. We must work actively precisely in the foundations of the economy, in the sphere of physical production.

We have also elaborated methods for the rational resolution of the tasks facing us. They have been disseminated widely abroad, but in our country their potential has been far from fully realized. I mean the targeted comprehensive programs.

At this stage it is important to define the specific range of programs with due regard for our actual potential, so as not to dissipate our resources and balk at the matter. Let there be few programs. They must be ranked in order of level, since many of them can be realized in the republics and regions independently or with the support of the center. It is also necessary to alter the methods of funding the programs, utilizing all the sources that exist in the national economy—budget assets, stabilization funds, enterprises' assets, and also foreign investments.

Corresponding economic agreements concluded on each major union republic program can be a fundamentally new form of cooperation between the center and the republics in this area. We already have experience whereby a unified all-union program to eliminate the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, an all-Union program for the conversion of military production, and a Union-republic program to remedy the ecological situation and improve living conditions for the population around the Aral Sea have been drawn up according to a unified plan approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviets of several republics, and are being implemented as of this year. These and other programs and agreements are taking their first, yet quite confident steps.

I believe that such a method of resolving problems can also be justified in implementing a policy of state support for the nonproduction sphere. It will be underpinned by all-Union programs for the development of health care, education, culture, and sport. The difficult labor of working people in this sphere, particularly people of creative labor, will be backed up in every possible way, and this support will grow constantly as the country's financial position stabilizes.

It is now necessary to form a team as quickly as possible and to determine and approve the government's personnel. We cannot yet submit specific candidacies for your consideration because, under the USSR Constitution, they must be discussed preliminarily in the Council of the Federation, and such a discussion has not yet taken place. So we will return to this question with you in the very near future.

In conclusion I wish to repeat: The most important point now is to ensure progress and to develop efficient work over the whole front, proceeding from the USSR Government's main aim—creation. I ask the Supreme Soviet to support our proposals.

Pavlov Questioned on Prices, Social Protection

LD2102224291 Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian 1900 GMT 19 Feb 91

["Excerpts" of question-and-answer session with Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov at the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin in Moscow on 19 February—recorded; Pavlov reads the deputies' questions]

[Text] What will be the mechanism for monitoring the use of fixed state and ceiling prices? What will be the distribution of the resources obtained from the rise in prices between the budgets of the various levels? Will the 60-ruble [R] compensation be taxable when it is included in wages? Is the price structure going to be changed as a result of the revision? Will they approach world prices?

Well today we can answer this question as follows. We have created—by a decision of the Supreme Soviet, moreover—a system of price control bodies at the center and in the localities that consists of more than 6,000 inspectors. One of the main tasks of this system, therefore, is to monitor the correct application of state fixed and ceiling prices, although one can say frankly here today that at present the system is not working satisfactorily. The main problem is the arbitrary use of contractual prices instead of confirmed state prices. There are large numbers of such cases everywhere and in all republics and industries, although the control bodies for 1990, say, took away excessive profits that had been obtained in that way to a value of more than R350 million. For purposes of comparison one can say that in 1988 R61 million were removed, and in 1989 R211 million. But I believe that this is only the tip of the iceberg. In actual fact the violations are far greater in number and in scale.

As regards the second question, I have to say today that as a result of the review, the structure of all types of prices will be changed substantially, although these changes are not identical for the various industries and types of prices. If I am to talk about output for production purposes, turnover tax and the loss-making nature of the production are going to be reduced considerably: in principle subsidies will remain only in the coal industry and for a number of goods of social importance as I reported to you yesterday. At this stage we cannot say today with sufficient accuracy just how the resources obtained from increasing prices will be distributed among the budgets at different levels, because that will require work together with the republics, and correspondingly in the republics with the krays and oblasts. From above, therefore, today we can only say on an overall scale how the resources will be distributed between the Union and the republics. As far as distribution to the kray, oblast, city, and rayon is concerned we do not have such data at this stage, although we can say in advance that it will indeed be necesary to redistribute resources. The income which will be realized mainly according to the place where the final output is produced

does not correspond territorially with the need for compensation on account of the production structure and the population distribution by place of residence.

The third question was about the R60. Yes, it is proposed that the compensation be included as part of wages, just like all other payments to the population. But to prevent their being deducted in tax we intend to review the income tax tables, raising the tax-free minimum to R160, lowering the progression, so to speak, correspondingly and spreading it out according to the level of pay. We have now prepared such a draft with the intention of amplifying the law of taxes. Before it is introduced we consider it essential to use a temporary procedure for freeing compensation sums from tax liability.

Changing the price structure and bringing prices closer to the level of world prices was one of the tasks of the reform of wholesale prices. As far as the level of retail prices is concerned, therefore, we have striven here, too, toward bringing the structure of our prices closer to the level of world prices. But I believe that we can say without hesitation that the structure will not coincide completely, just as there will be no coincidence of price levels, precisely because we have very great differences, primarily in labor productivity, and production organization, and as a result of this in our costs. But this is a normal state of affairs and we are going to have to combat nonproductive expenditure on the one hand, and on the other make use of the international division of labor and cooperation.

Here is a question from Deputy (Morozov). You have just talked about the main principles of price reform and the social protection of the population. However, do you have guarantees that as a result of the adopted measures goods and products will appear on the shelves, and in what way will this happen?

In general, the question is principal in nature and naturally there can be various ways here. True, one of the ways is the well- known variant of shock therapy, when one can create full shelves, at the same time making the goods inaccessible to the population or in any case to a significant section of it. Nevertheless, we have chosen a different way. It is a complext set of measures which makes it possible to conduct the process in a controlled way, that is, correlating the dynamics of the changes in prices with the measures to increase production.

In our view, therefore, the proposed variant for the reform of retail prices creates the right economic base for resolving this most important problem. But we also expect from the reform certain so to speak effects in the form of fast returns, since it will resolve vitally important problems for enterprises today by making the production of consumer goods profitable, that is, bringing in line the correlation between retail, wholesale and purchase prices.

Apart from that one needs to bear in mind that we are conducting intensive talks on the reform of retail prices, with the understanding behind this that there will be a rise in retail prices, and not just for the first year. Therefore, everybody knows about the existence of panic-buying demand and the shifting of stocks from the trade network to the home. Therefore we expect that after the adoption of the decision on changes to the level of retail prices this panic-buying demand, this buying for the sake of laying in stocks, so to speak... [changes thought] excuse me, this stock creation will be stopped. Therefore, for a certain period of time demand will fall even lower than the normal level because people will start using their accumulated reserves. I do not think that I am revealing a secret when I say that foodstuffs deteriorate, whatever kind they might be—excluding perhaps sugar and vegetable oil, although the later also as a rule deteriorates. Therefore, in this sense, people are so to speak somehow renewing their own reserves today, but they are renewing them to an increased extent. Well, I am scared of giving you an estimate here today from this rostrum as to how much stock amounts to today, because in any case, in my view, any expert appraisals lead in this sense to a calculation in tens of billions.

Here is another question: When is it planned to increase tariffs for the transportation of passengers by rail, air, and bus and to what extent? As far as tariffs are concerned, I think that, well, air and sea tariffs, new tariffs are envisioned at a higher level. [sentence as heard] We are talking about 70 percent on average for railway tariffs, 80 percent for air tariffs, and 140 percent for maritime tariffs.

As for motor vehicle, river, and urban transportation, then this relates to the competence of Union republics, and they themselves will be making decisions on these types of transport, or, on their instructions, city, oblast, and kray soviets of people's deputies, although I have to say that we envision an entire system of protective measures connected with the peculiarities of transportation services for a whole series of categories of the population—first and foremost for those who work in the north, in the far east, where the only type of transport, let us say, is the local aviation; where there are questions connected with people's vacation trips and questions connected also with city transportation. A special protection system is especially envisioned here. I have to say that we have included all price increases in tariffs for transportation in our calculations for 100-percent compensation.

Materials purchased at contract prices are used when output is fixed at prices over and at list prices. How will the increased cost be compensated? Repeat your proposition on the base fund for wages. What are the figures there? That question was from Lisitskiy.

In drawing up the list of fixed prices we tried in general to trace the links in the production chain from raw materials to the most important types of the end product, including machinery and equipment. But, naturally, production links are always more complicated than any diagram, and, of course, the enterprises which

are today marketing output according to fixed prices are experiencing pretty strong pressure from the suppliers of components and individual types of materials, where contract prices have been permitted in one form or another.

We are getting a number of requests for enterprises and even whole industries to be given the right in their turn to move over to the marketing of output according to contract prices. So it may be said that we have been dealing quite a bit, and we are currently continuing to deal with these situations. In principle, the transitions to contract prices is the long-term objective inasmuch as the whole reform is directed toward switching to supply and demand prices. But we cannot do this because—as I told you—of the very great monopolism in our economy. Therefore, we are still trying to keep this process under control and to regulate it, although we are regulating it at the moment by means of using coefficients—in fairly justified instances—or by supplements to prices where this has really been caused by price increases for reasons beyond our control; or by means of influencing the suppliers from the point of view of containing an undue increase in contract prices.

Well, apart from this, I can say that we will, of course, have in principle to speed up the drafting of an entire set of laws on regulating economic activity in conditions of market relations. I personally include among these the draft bases of legislation on price-fixing, on antimonopoly activity, and on protecting the rights of the consumer, and so on, which have been presented by the government for our examination.

As regards comrade Lisitskiy's last question in connection with the proposal to increase the minimal wage by R60 as a result of our revision of the compensation measures, of course it is also necessary to increase the limits, or the size of the wages fund per worker attributed to production costs.

You know that in accordance with the law on the taxation of profits the size of this today has been set at R400. If the decision to raise wage rates and salaries as a result of the retail prices change is made as we suggest it will be made, then of course it is also going to be necessary to provide for an increase of the maximum amount attributable to production costs for the purpose of making this deductable from profits tax. We suggest this figure to be R460-480.

In the event of a price reform will the prices of food—meat, milk, cream, butter—retailed to the population in the cities by the state trading organizations and in the rural areas by the consumer cooperative societies be equal? Today in the cities the foodstuffs are being retailed from the state stocks at low prices which causes disagreements between the urban and rural populations.

[Signed] Comrade Danilov

In general, this is a sore question. We are saying that, of course, some leveling of the state and cooperative retail prices will undoubtedly take place according to our estimates. Generally, today approximately 27-28 percent of all goods are sold through the consumer cooperative societies. Today until, let us say, this year, according to the last reports beef was R3.80 in the consumer cooperative societies and approximately R1.76-1.80 in the state retail. In other words, the prices are approximately twice as high there. But these are the prices of the goods purchased from the population, and so a redistribution of income among separate groups of the population is taking place. The state is not affected by this.

Nevertheless, out of the general volume of the goods being retailed today to the population at least 70 percent are state resources, you understand. Therefore the price rises for this part of the trade turnover will undoubtedly cause the prices of the consumer cooperative societies to rise, but to a significantly smaller extent than in state retailing. So we estimate that the prices of the consumer cooperative societies and the state retailing prices will be approximately on the same level. Well, in the different regions it may be slightly different. In our compensations consideration is given to both population groups.

Here is a question from Deputy (Krasilnikov). What will be the composition of the consumer basket when it is legalized?

Well, there are approximately 300 items of goods and services in the composition of the minimal consumer budget. All of them are grouped in three enlarged consumer baskets—for foodstuffs, nonfood goods, and services. In particular, the consumer basket for food includes meat and meat products, milk and milk products, eggs, fish and fish products, potatoes, vegetables and melons, fruit and berries, bread products, vegetable oil and margarine, sugar and confectionery products.

The minimal consumer budget, as we understand it, is still the most important elementelement in the system of the social protection of the population. Therefore it is envisaged at this stage to legalize its structure, composition, and principles of its use in economic practice with the help of the presidential decree on the general principles of determining the minimal consumer budget which we have preapred in the Cabinet of Ministers and in principle have agreed upon at the Federation Council today. If no objections to this matter are submitted in the coming days I believe that the presidents will sign this decree. We mean that the minimal consumer budget should be developed for the country as a whole and for the Union republics, for the different social and demographic groups of the population, as an average per capita and per member of a family of various composition.

I believe that the use of the minimal consumer budget will enable us to carry out the specifically addressed social policy which will be directed toward supporting the least protected groups of the population and toward establishing the minimal income of the citizens—!

mean, the minimal wages, pensions, grants, allowances—with reference to the level of the minimal living standard.

Deputies Kalshnikova and Panchenko are asking why salaries will be increased by only R60 and the compensation will cover only 80 percent of the retail prices rises. Well, this a very broad question in this respect. I mean that today we have here in the national economy the average salary of somewhere like R270 and not R300 as the deputies write, and the average increase of the prices depends on the consumer basket according to consumption levels for the families of worker, kolkhoznik or official. That is why we are also taking account of the fact that we have an average salary which is very differentiated according to the branches of industry, among other things. Well, we have approximately R347 in water transport, R324 in the construction indusry, and say R177 in health, and R155 in culture.

The consumer basket is changing accordingly. That is why we believe that we should calculate the losses in principle not for each separate working man but for the family. And the average per capita income per member of a family here, according to the data for 1990, was R160; with about R50, or approximately one-third of a family's expenditure, going on food, calculated on the basis of the statistical average mouth, so to speak. Now , if we take as an example, as we have calculated for oursevles, an ordinary family: Father and mother, two childlren, and one of the old people—a grandmother or grandfather. We calculated the compensation like this: The father will receive R60—perhaps more but not less, regardless of the salary which he receives. If he works in education or health care, the supplement will be slightly more than in other spheres. The mother, if she is looking after a child up to one-and-a-half years old, will receive a benefit of R110 for the first [child] and for the second [child] up to the age of five, she will get R80.

Moreover, according to our calculations, we reckon that it will be necessary to pay that family special-purpose compensation in connection with the rise in the price of children's food, footwear, and other goods. We have planned to allocate a total of R19 billion for this purpose. In other words, the family will receive approximately R33-35 a month, or R400 a year, in special-purpose subsidies for those two children; and we intend to make these payments once a quarter or once every six months, in order not to split these amounts up. There should be an additional pension of R65 for one of the parents. In all, according to our calculations, that family will receive an extra R250 a month, while that statistical average family currently spends R140-150 a month on food.

So, as you can see, we can argue whether the correlation is more or less, but the increase in payable compensations to this family with children will clearly outweigh the losses incurred through price increases, if the two things are compared. In other words, this is in principle our policy which we have laid down here in the correlation of prices and compensation, to consciously give priority to the more unprotected sections [of the population]. Therefore, we believed that the workers should not only be given compensation but, at the same time, they should be given the opportunity of earning a living. And it is these categories of people to whom we should in every case give guaranteed protection. That is why we built...[changes thought] that was the reason for our approach to compensation.

But still, why, nevertheless is it 85 percent? Well, I told you yesterday that, in the first place, it is a question of a more general amount of funds in relation to forecasting the volume of price increases. Here, both free and unregulated prices are taken into account, and besides this we also have here both separate types of commodities on which, clearly, we are considering a price increase but we are not intending to offset them. We have in mind here delicacies, articles of precious metal, and certain other articles of what we call a prestigious nature. Taking such an approach into account, it seems that we are obliged to compensate approximately 85 percent of the overall cost of the price increase.

Deputy Babchenko asks: You pointed out that the question of wages at an enterprise should be regulated by collective agreements, but at the present time there is no law on collective agreements. What is the way out of this situation?

Well, in the first place, a draft law on collective agreements has been prepared, and as far as we are aware today, you are due to be reviewing it at this session. But at the same time I would like to emphasize that on the bases of the labor legislation which is currently in operation, an obligatory examination of the question of wages in collective agreements is now being provided for. But if you take, for example, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Labor Code, then its Article 8 says that a collective agreement must contain the main points on questions of labor and wages. Therefore, we also do not see any serious legal obstacles in the way of conducting talks at specific enterprises this year.

There was one other question from Comrade Babchenko, and that is that many light industrial enterprises have been shut down because of a lack of raw materials, and the same situation applies in the everyday services sphere. What is being done on this question?

Well, what can I tell you? There really is such a question, this question is linked, first and foremost, with our currency matters. As you know, our light industry and everything linked with it has become very strongly dependent on import supplies, and it is becoming more and more difficult today for us to cover this. That is why, if you are talking about our own country's raw materials, then light industry and everyday services have been fully provided for in the plan calculations.

But here, insofar as this proceeds according to horizontal means of communication, the calculations have started to go wrong, first and foremost—and I must tell you

frankly—because of the differences between the republics on prices and questions linked with this of budget revenues at a time when you and I rejected a single state budget and the redistribution of funds between the Union republics, and when each republic began today to uphold its right to revenues which are realized on their own territory. This, as you recall, immediately gave rise to the question that the supply of many types of raw materials, including raw materials for the light industry, on existing prices, do not reflect the real cost- value efforts of the population in a given republic, and therefore a whole number of republics, for a part or for the whole of their output, have started demanding increased prices from the consumers, above those prices which were provided for in the calculations of the plan and price lists.

The same problem also arose with cotton, wool, and hides. So we have the raw materials but in order to supply it we always have to hold diplomatic talks. For example, the latest diplomatic talks in Ivanovo oblast on cotton were held this week. As far as I know, it seems the talks were a success. But how they came to an understanding, I still do not exactly know.

As far as import purchases are concerned, the imports question failed to be resolved for a very long time because of the fact that there was no hard currency. A decision to purchase imported raw materials was adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers on 30 January 1991. Thus, there were no advance purchases and deliveries of raw materials. In connection with this, in January and the end... er, [hesitates] beginning of February, signs that light industry was coming to a halt began to be clearly discernible. We adopted this decision to buy raw materials worth R2.2 billion, no less, on 30 January. Of this amount, R1.7 billion is required in freely convertible currency, as far as we understand. Judge for yourselves how dependent our light industry is on foreign suppliers. As you will realize, our light industry is not earning this money and is not in a condition to earn it. Aside from that, we are at present repaying debts for 1990. Given that the 1990 debts have not yet been repaid, no one has of course signed any contracts with us nor do they intend to despatch goods to us, despite the fact that we have adopted a decision here.

As from 15 February this year, we still owed R326 million in hard currency. Now deliveries are underway, and above all wool and chemical industry ingredients, and by and large the conclusion of contracts for raw materials deliveries under the quotas for the current year is being completed.

We have adopted a decision to pay for a total of more than R400 million worth of imported raw and semiprocessed materials out of current account receipts, and it has been decided to purchase another R250 million worth from credits which have been made available to us. Given that there has been this trouble, this collapse has of course persisted. Evidently we have to expect realistically that raw materials will start to arrive at enterprises somewhere in mid-March. Individual batches will arrive before then, but I am talking about a more or less real normalization of the situation.

A question from Deputy Opolinskiy: How will compensation be provided for pensioners who retire on pension in a year's time or later?

We think that the salary calculation for increments to pensions should be based on the average amount of workers' pay that will emerge taking into account the R60 increase in salaries and pay rates in the last years of their employment, that is, quite simply, taking into account the compensation.

A question from Deputy Sapegin: Does the government plan to increase the pay of railway transport workers?

Well, we are naturally working on this question, as well as the question of pay for other industries, above all basic industries, and this applies to the social sphere as well. We believe that the decision that enterprises themselves will independently be setting pay rates and salaries for blue collar and white collar workers taking due account of guaranteed minimums, in the context of the laws on enterprises, taxation, and the union budget will enable the railway workers to sort out their pay fairly. At the same time I would like to draw your attention to the following circumstance: last year, as you will know, the government urgently brought in higher new tariffs for transportation. Admittedly, this was far from applauded, as you will remember, and there was a very great deal of all sorts of talk about this, if I can put it that way, and there were calls for the government to resign, and for the prices and tariffs to be dropped. All kinds of things were said! But all the same, the tariffs held. They produced their result. Our railway transportation system functioned throughout the past year without interruptions and without a single strike, and, while maintaining all types of transportation services, it managed to sort out its social processes. The average pay in the railway transportation system went up by 14 percent in our country last year. We believe that this accelerated increase in pay compared with all other industries reflects the government's concern for the pay level of railway workers.

If you can, could you reply to the question of where the grain, flour, macaroni, and vermicelli have gone? The limits set on their monthly allocations look like an insult given that there was a good grain harvest in 1990. [signed] [name indistinct]

What can I say? In 1990 we did, of course, have one of the most bumper harvests: 237 million tonnes in bunker weight and 218 million tonnes in warehouse weight.

This was really one of our best harvests. At the same time, 67.8 billion tonnes of grain reached the state's resources last year. This was 18 million tonnes less than the state order and 28 million tonnes less than we procured in 1978 when we had exactly the same sort of harvest.

So, the question and answer to this are, in my opinion, clear. What happened to the grain? The grain has been left with those who produced it and the state is left with the problem of supplying the population. Therefore, the cause—well, the costs of the period of transition, as they say—lies with the extremely low discipline of deliveries. Today, grain has been turned into hard currency. Grain is being used as a means of pressure and trade. We as a government have now adopted a decision to remove from where we have been able to, including from market allocations, those material- technical resources which agriculture is asking for, including cars—a great many people feel aggrieved that for many years they have been unable to get vehicles, and so on. Well, we have a shortage of all cars, there is a shortage of equipment, too, but even with these shortages we have still decided to remove all these resources, even those which have been allocated for 1991, and hand over to agriculture everything they have asked us for—this mainly concerns the three Union republics of Russia, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine—in order to obtain grain in exchange for these resources.

The Union government has never agreed and does not agree with the question of introducing [ration] coupons. I am not even speaking about the need to provide, first and foremost, guarantees that they can be traded for goods. We have always proceeded from the fact that it is easy to get into a coupon system but extremely difficult to get out of it. Incidentally, it is no secret that where coupons have been introduced, speculation in them has also begun. Basically, coupons are being turned into a parallel currency. In other words, as well as speculating in food, people are also speculating in coupons. That is why the way out, from our point of view, does not lie in coupons but in increasing the produciton of commodities while observing the disciplines of supply and procurement. As is known, they are being broken everywhere in our country.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that it is mainly inner-republican deliveries which are being disrupted, Deputy (Rybkov) asks. Whom should the government be most concerned about? Undoubtedly children and old people. However, vital goods for them have virtually disappeared from the shelves of shops, especially for old people. The question arises: surely war and labor veterans, for example, from Siberia and the Far East, should not have to go to Belorussia to buy these goods? Today only Belorussia has made the production of goods for veterans into a state order. What does the new Cabinet of Ministers think should be done on this very topical question, Comrade Angapov asks?

Well, you know, this is generally speaking not a new problem, and we have long since come to the conclusion that until such time as goods for old people and children—in other words, for people of advanced years and children—do not pay the producers, no matter how much we tackle it we shall not solve this problem. And, in this connection, we proceeded from the fact that a system providing equal benefits for the production of all consumer goods should be created when working out retail-price and pricing reform, including supplying them on the same lines not only as other light industry goods but even providing for a certain priority for these goods from the point of view of more preferential approaches to taxation and other questions.

At the same time, therefore, as I told you, it was not by chance that we pursued a policy of specific compensation for retail price increases, in particular for children—as I told you just now in answering a question—we have provided for a special specific compensation, and at the same time clearly it will be necessary to take advantage of the experience of other countries, say, with money orders and other forms of specific subsidies.

We even have such, well let us say, expert appraisals which say that in Moscow, for example, approximately 40 percent of children's goods are bought not for children. There is always this period of transition; today our children grow up so quickly and they wear shoes and clothes which go beyond the [children's] size range. There is always a problem in this situation. But this is just a detail and therefore we are just bearing in mind that it will be necessary somehow to solve it not only with the help of prices and compensation. But, in principle, in the pricing reform we are introducing an equal or even priority mechanism as an incentive for the production of goods for the elderly and for children.

From what sources will be compensation for price increases be carried out for workers in public organizations, trade unions, and so on?

We have in mind that compensation will have to be included in wages, and the sources of it will be those funds which are being used to cover expenditure entailed in carrying out statutory activities.

It follows from your report that the only source for increasing salaries and wages at enterprises is a reduction in profit tax. As you know, the overall figure for taxes coming into the budget - what sum will this 10 percent represent anyhow much will this be in rubles for a worker in the sphere of material production? Will it be enough for this?

No, a tax on profits alone may not be sufficient. This reduction of 10 percent compensates an increase in outlay of R53 billion. Evidently we will also have to give individual enterprises support from the stabilization fund or from the distribution fund which is being set up additionally and also use other taxes, except for the tax on profit which today is being paid by enterprises. It is possible that for a certain period of time we will have to agree to support [enterprises] through a sales tax or a turnover tax.

[Announcer] Questions, questions! They kept coming from the parliamentarians even though the prime minister sought to supply information fleshed out with factual data on many problems. But even sharper clashes of views took place when discussing whether or not to

open a debate on the concept and the approaches to resolving the prices policy which were set out the day before in the report by Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov and which he tried to define concretely in today's numerous replies to questions.

Nevertheless, this did not satisfy deputies Sobchak, Kuzmin, or Sukhov. And the prime minister again took the stand.

[Pavlov] Esteemed comrade deputies. The question is a particularly fundamental one. Without this decision it will be altogether impossible to do anything. Even though I have to report to you today that this is a most fundamental question which is causing differences, differences which have led to a split of the republics and which are at the basis of all other differences regarding compensation.

The Russian Federation, above all, is objecting—something which Comrade Sobchak is perfectly aware of, even though he has never attended the Council of the Federation when this question was discussed. The Russian Federation is proposing, on the whole—so that you should know—a compensation not of R60 but of R40, and that only food and children's goods should be compensated and not anything else. Here I must report also another matter: That the Russian Federation proceeds from the fact, as a republic exporting consumer goods, that all that money must be left with it, at its disposal, even though the work of all republics has been invested in the production of these goods, including also of those supplying the raw materials. That is why, unless this fundamental decision to redistribute the revenues from increasing retail prices among all those participating in the production of these goods, including also among those producing the raw materials is adopted, it will be impossible to carry out a price reform. [murmuring among the deputies]

That is why the republics, above all the Russian Federation, object to a common approach toward compensations. Our point of departure has been that each child, wherever it was born, is equally entitled to state support, whatever his nationality. Our point of departure has been that a student should receive the same grant whether he attends Tashkent University or Sverdlovsk Polytechnical Institute. Our point of departure has been that pensioners should receive the same pension in accordance with the work.

Because we are perfectly well aware that mainly miners from the Donbass and Belorussia are working in the north of the Russian Federation; because we are perfectly aware that Azerbaijani oilmen are working in Tyumen oblast—they work for 10, 15, or 20 years and they leave to receive their pension at home. That is why we have raised the issue of this redistribution. But we are being told: No! Do not interfere! We, within the framework of our revenues, will resolve this compensation, this issue, oursleves. Forgive me, this is not friendship among peoples. That is not how it will come to pass. [hubbub among deputies] that is why [applause begins] we insist on a common approach. There cannot be a single economic space in the country if some in our country set prices while compensation is decided by everyone who has received something. It is not possible to do it this way. There cannot be different pay for equal work while talking of a single economic space.

It is from here...[changes thought] our point of departure is that we must set identical minimum compensation throughout the country and identical maximum prices throughout the country within the framework of regional markets, within the framework of cost divergences connected precisely with the territorial distribution of labor. Each republic is entitled to have lower prices and this is logical: One cannot sell tomatoes in Astrakhan for R1 each during the harvest period. That is our approach. That is why we have said that we are setting the upper level of prices. Lower? You are welcome!

But we are setting at the same time, given this level of prices, the minimum compensation, too. Higher? Please go ahead! Among other things, you are also permitted to set pensions at a higher level. You can also set grants and wages at a higher level if you can earn them, but earn them with your own work and not through appropriating the work of others.

[Announcer] At the end of a stormy discussion the deputies voted for a resolution in which the Supreme Soviet took cognizance of the report by the head of the Cabinet of Ministers and instructed the government, while implementing the reform of retail prices, to support it as much as possible with measures for the social protection of the population.

No Vote on Proposal To Stop Television Relays

PM2102170191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by legislative correspondents Captain 1st Class V. Urban and Lieutenant Colonel S. Pashayev: "Simply Four Months Or Only Four..?"]

[Excerpt] Whenever the USSR Supreme Soviet (or any other parliament) is criticized, the deputies usually take offense. If there is good reason, then it is perfectly OK. In yesterday's report we said that the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet began in an uncommonly businesslike manner. But one cannot say the same about Tuesday morning's sitting. Of course the best proof of our words as far as readers are concerned would have been if they had seen these few hours relayed, uncut, on television.

So it is high time to talk about the relay. Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev, a deputy, wrote to A.I. Lukyanov with the following suggestion: "As soon as we stop showing Supreme Soviet sittings on television, I am sure that they become calmer and more businesslike, and deputies start paying more attention to one another. There is less politicking and posturing." Incidentally, no one has disputed this. But a voter's letter was attached to

the appeal. And many deputies said that it contained an insult against B.N. Yeltsin. It was decided to forward the "case" to the Commission on Deputies' Ethics. On the issue raised in S.F. Akhromeyev's proposal, one heard neither a "for" nor an "against." [passage omitted]

RSFSR Blocking Union Financing Criticized

PM2102132591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by S. Karkhanin under the "Debates in the Kremlin" rubric: "Mode of Operation"]

[Excerpts] The country's Supreme Soviet is a kind of tuning-fork that responds sensitively to all important political events in the country and the world. The two days of work of the fifth session have reaffirmed that. The relevant decisions have already been made. At the request of your SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA political observer, USSR people's deputies comment on the work of the session. [passage omitted]

A. Orlov, deputy chairman of the Soviet of the Union planning and budget and finance commission:

Why, when the agenda for our present session was being discussed on Tuesday, did I insist that it be supplemented by the question of the problems of the Union budget for 1991? The answer is in these telegrams. The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of Finance, the Russian Central Bank, and Ministry of Trade have ordered throughout the republic to close all channels for funds to supplement the Union budget, although 70 percent of them would return to the RSFSR. It must be said that in January the Union budget should have swelled by 22 billion rubles [R] but we received only R9.8 billion and not a single ruble apart from the residue for the past year came in from the enterprises and organizations situated in the RSFSR. The picture is the same with regard to the USSR stabilization fund.

The covert struggle that has appeared in the form of the war of laws, sovereignties, and banks has reached its next stage—the overt stage. Specific actions have begun against the Union as the economic center and national and social community. It is difficult otherwise to explain the fact that the parliaments of Russia and a number of other republics are repealing USSR laws and ignoring the president's Decrees.

This situation is aggravated by the one-sided, biased orientation of the so-called "free and democratic" mass media. They openly call for M.S. Gorbachev's removal from the post of president, for the replacement of the Cabinet of Ministers, and the dissolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet and in this they are unfortunately supported by some of our colleagues who are USSR people's deputies. There are calls for a "quiet coup." It seems to me that some organs of power of the RSFSR are acting as its political tool—they have assumed the initiative for replacing the USSR with a union of republics headed by Russia.

Here are the facts. On 22 January the RSFSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on the procedure for transferring enterprises of union subordination to the republic's jurisdiction. It turns out that it is enough for the labor collective council to vote to transfer to Russia's subordination for all-union state ownership to be abolished. As though it had been created only by those who work at the plant now, as though a new Union treaty were not being prepared providing for the procedure for sharing out property. Why do the Russian leaders need this haste? It is clear that they are seeking to rapidly destroy the Union's material and financial base.

It is unclear to my why our USSR Supreme Soviet is not reacting to these and other destructive actions, why it is displaying passivity and waiting for the president to begin to take his steps? Should we not put an end to the war of banks, to the country's slide toward capitalism under the slogan of transition to the market? Surely we have the powers to defend the interests of the people who elected us? And I think it would be right to discuss the question of the responsibility of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the republic's government for the political and economic situation in the country. [passage omitted]

Political & Social

Gorbachev 22 Feb News Conference Cancelled

AU2202130891 Paris AFP in English 1257 GMT 22 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, Feb 22 (AFP)—A scheduled press conference by President Mikhail Gorbachev was cancelled on Friday [22 February], the Foreign Ministry announced.

No reason was given for the sudden change of plan, though it was earlier announced Mr. Gorbachev was to hold another meeting Friday afternoon with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz following more than two hours of talks he had with him Thursday night.

Mr. Gorbachev's spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko was to brief correspondents on the current state of negotiations between Moscow and Baghdad on the Gulf war peace plan.

Moiseyev Discusses Moscow Rally, Military Role

LD1902123491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1150 GMT 19 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 19 Feb [TASS]—Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, categorically rejected conjectures that the

Moscow rally planned for 23 February will be used as "a warning on the part of the military to those who are whipping up anti-Army sentiments." The rally is to celebrate the 73rd anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy.

In an interview with TASS correspondents, Moiseyev recalled that the rally was initiated by labor collectives of a number of enterprises in the capital, and by war veterans. The military also joined in the planning. General Moiseyev believes that the rally will take place to support the policies of President Mikhail Gorbachev.

"I think there will be a discussion about the need for the Union treaty and the consolidation of all the forces of perestroyka," the general stressed.

There was a news conference today devoted to the forthcoming rally. Colonel Vladimir Kozlov, member of the organizing committee and representative of the USSR Ministry of Defense, expects up to 300,000 people to participate.

The organizing committee representative drew attention to the fact that the opposition press had quickly launched a campaign to discredit the rally. It is being alleged, for example, that servicemen have been ordered to participate in it.

"These assertions are absolutely unsubstantiated. The officers and men will take part in it only voluntarily," declared Vladimir Kozlov, stressing that there are no orders from the USSR Ministry of Defense on this issue.

GLASNOST Cited on Military's Rally Plans

PM2102165791

[Editorial Report] Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian on 20 February 1991 carries on page 1 under the headline "To the Rally, Quick March!" a feature on the controversy surrounding the rally planned for 23 February in Moscow's Manege Square to mark Soviet Army and Navy Day. The feature opens with the following report by A. Binev, deputy editor of an ARGUMENTY I FAKTY department, under the subhead "What We Were Told by the Weekly ARGUMENTY I FAKTY...":

"Last week a small notice in the country's biggest weekly—ARGUMENTY I FAKTY—had the effect of a bombshell. So, what will happen on the capital's Manege Square 23 February?

"Right after the issue appeared—it reported a conference with Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff, with regard to the upcoming servicemen's rally—the ARGUMENTY I FAKTY editorial office began receiving numerous calls from officers and their wives.

"According to two subscribers, after the party conferences meetings were held at the General Staff Academy and in a USSR Ministry of Defense unit under central jurisdiction at which it was emphasized that 'appropriate conclusions' would be drawn if officers shunned the measure. It was reported to the editorial office that 'a definite scenario has been drawn up, according to which servicemen are to be bussed to the rally from certain academies.'

"An officer at one Moscow military commissariat reported the schedule of allocations for these establishments—25-30 servicemen in civilian clothes. A briefing took place 17 February. Officers were told that those wishing to participate in the rally must report to the Moscow military commissar.

"According to another officer at the Frunze Academy, a ceiling of 1,500 people has been set. The officer reported that the only one among all those present at the conference (or meeting) to express bewilderment was supposedly a colonel. He was at once told that, since he had served long enough, he would be discharged from the Soviet Army within a year.

"One of the callers—a colonel and secretary of a party bureau—believes that the measure is being organized not so much by the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense as by party bodies. Another interlocutor cites the words of his commanding officer (a general who attended the 11 February conference) that a representative of the 'Soyuz' parliamentary group was also there. The same general supposedly explained that the order was sent not only to educational institutions but also to regular units. One of the callers told us that the parade teams will be in uniform, and the rest in civilian clothes.

"Almost all the callers declared that, if the editorial board is accused of disinformation, they are prepared to personally attest to the said facts."

This is followed by an A. Khokhlov report under the subhead "...By the USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center...":

"Lieutenant Colonel I. Yesyutin, chief of a group at the USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center, told the editorial office that no one in the Defense Ministry leadership issued any order to hold the rally 23 February. The initiative to hold it came from the labor collective council of the Khrunichev Plant, the 'Soyuz' and 'Moscow' deputies groups, and a number of other public and political organizations. The initiators also included the Moscow Garrison command.

"There can be no question of any 'schedule' for allocating personnel to participate in the rally. No one is going to drive any servicemen there with a 'whip.' The dress of officers who decide to go to Manege Square 23 February is at their discretion. In the main, I believe, the rally will be attended by civilians, by representatives of the people.

"Servicemen of units and military educational institutions of the capital's garrison will only support. I am

sure, the desire of many Muscovites to worthily greet the next anniversary of the birth of the Soviet Armed Forces."

The next item in the feature is a comment by the editorial board:

"Soviet Army and Navy Day is undoubtedly a big nationwide festival, primarily for servicemen. And they have a right to conduct it the way they deem necessary: whether seated at a festive table or on Manege Square. Moreover, if anyone has something to say out loud to the whole country, it is servicemen. The Army's problems are multiplying but, despite all decrees and assurances, there are no solutions to them.

"And yet... It is one thing to go to a rally of your own free will, and another to turn up on the square on the orders of a higher chief, expressing what you are ordered to. Let us recall another recent order to units and subunits: to express approval and support for the new line of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, to send telegrams, to report fulfillment...

"We are convinced that the people and the Army are united. But only when political intriguers do not stand between them."

The final item in the feature reproduces "Order No. 84" dated Moscow, 13 February, signed by Col. Gen. Yu.I. Plotnikov, chief of the F.E. Dzerzhinskiy Military Academy, and entitled "On the Participation of Academy Personnel in Measures Devoted to the 73d Anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy":

"For the purposes of ensuring the measures devoted to the 73d anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy and holding them in an organized manner, I order:

"1. For participation in the Manege Square rally 23 February 1991, chiefs of faculties, general academic departments, sections, and services are to:

"...1.4. Ensure that officers not included in the parade team and workers and employees come to the rally. Allow family members of servicemen and academy employees to participate in the rally.

"The form of dress for servicemen is at their personal discretion (semidress uniform, out-of-ranks service uniform, or civilian dress)...

"...4. With a view to preventing possible provocations and strengthening the academy's protection:

"4.1. The academy's chief engineer is to check the preparedness for issuing weapons and ammunition. Measures making it possible to reduce the time taken to issue them are to be determined and fulfilled...

"4.4. Lt. Col. I.N. Sumets is to form a 30-man special hand-to-hand combat group and organize duty in accordance with instructions issued by me. Weapons and improvised means are to be used in exceptional cases to protect servicemen and civilians against life-threatening attack...

"5. This order is to be announced to all academy personnel."

Militia Gagged Over Grenade Man Arrest

PM2102154191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Feb 91 Union Edition p 8

["Details For IZVESTIYA" by S. Mostovshchikov: "Former Commissar Caught With Grenades in His Possession"]

[Text] The other day the INTERFAX agency reported that a certain S. Sakhanevich, a former serviceman, had been arrested in Kalinininskiy Rayon in Moscow. He was found to be in possession of 19 live grenades as well as usable fuze assemblies. When we asked the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee Main Internal Affairs Administration to comment we came across a very unusual situation.

Reliable informed sources on this occasion categorically refused even to tell IZVESTIYA the surname of the man with the grenades, despite the fact that it had already been published by INTERFAX. Officials at the Main Internal Affairs Administration gave to understand that it was not just a matter of confiscating munitions from a civilian, but of the law-enforcement organs' lighting on a channel for the illegal supply of weapons to the black market, which had been operating perfectly.

It was also discovered that the army was involved. At least, at the Kalininskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Administration in Moscow, where we tried to clarify certain details, we found Naro-Fominskiy Garrison military prosecutor's office investigator Yuriy Valentinovich, whose authority extended only to giving his name and patronymic. Citing his leadership's instructions, he would not discuss with the newspaper the details of the case under investigation.

Nonetheless, we obtained confidential information on what had happened. Reserve Senior Lieutenant Sergey Sakhanevich was arrested by Kalininskiy Rayon militia forces and specialists from 38 Petrovka Street [Moscow Main Internal Affairs Administration building] at 1720 hours on 14 February 1991. He is a former political officer, discharged from the Army, he claims, for family reasons.

However, the depoliticized commissar did not lose contact with his personnel. There are four active servicemen involved in the case; and 40 grenades, 7.62-caliber cartridges, as well as machinegun ammunition were confiscated from one of them—a company commander. Judging by Sakhanevich's testimony, he was selling grenades in Moscow at 60 rubles [R] a time. Experts believe that the price most likely can be explained by the fact that a large quantity of munitions had to be sold quickly.

The normal price of grenades in Moscow is R300-R500 (the cheapest is the RGD, more expensive is the "lemon" ["limonka"], which has a range of up to 200 meters).

We also managed to obtain explanations why the investigation is being conducted in secret. Apparently, the militia was asked not to inform journalists of the details of the case of the former commissar in order not to give the press an excuse for discrediting the Army on the eve of 23 February.

AFP Reports Yeltsin Comments on 'Old System'

AU2102193091 Paris AFP in English 1902 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, Feb 21 (AFP)—Russian Federation leader Boris Yeltsin on Thursday denied he was locked in a power struggle with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, saying he was fighting "the old system", the independent INTERFAX news agency reported.

"Yeltsin is not fighting Gorbachev, he is fighting the old system that will not accept defeat," he said.

Mr. Yeltsin came under fierce attack from deputies in both the federal and Russian parliaments after his resignation call to Mr. Gorbachev on Tuesday.

The Russian leader said his dispute with federal authorities stemmed from the Russian Federation's refusal to pay what Moscow demanded into the national budget.

"Moscow can't reconcile itself to the fact that Russia channels only 20 billion rubles to the national budget instead of 70 billion as before," he said during a visit to Yaroslav, some 250 kilometres (156 miles) northwest of Moscow.

"The conflict with the national authorities stems not from personal ambition. We simply have no desire to support the gigantic bureaucratic apparatus of the central government, and that's why it has declared war on us," he told INTERFAX.

"We have inherited Russia in terrible shape. All these years the republic has been mercilessly plundered, and no one today wants to take responsibility for that," he said.

The president of the Russian parliament also defended himself from the charge of seeking to replace Mr. Gorbachev, saying: "I don't need any power in the national government. The post of leader of the Russian Federation more than keeps my hands full".

A number of Russian deputies Thursday called for an extraordinary meeting of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies in a bid to vote Mr. Yeltsin out of office.

Meanwhile, the radical Leningrad city council voted to back Mr. Yeltsin. Conservatives on the city council staged a walk-out in protest at the move, INTERFAX also reported.

Yeltsin Remarks Termed 'Mistake'

PM2202131991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 91 Union Edition p 1

["From the Editorial Office" article under general heading: "Confrontation Is Foolhardy; B.N. Yeltsin's Interview on Central Television"]

[Text] In his television interview, B. Yeltsin cited a series of mistakes made by the Supreme Soviet, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Government, and himself personally. In his address on Central Television yesterday the head of the Russian legislature extended this series by yet another mistake which could have dangerous consequences not only for Russia but for the entire country. The call for M. Gorbachev's resignation was essentially yet another step toward the exacerbation of a political confrontation that is already extremely tense. The severe crisis which our society is going through is seriously complicated by the prolonged confrontation between two political leaders. And now this new challenge.

The facts that time was lost in implementing radical economic reforms and that the impending price reform is merely another administrative price rise are points on which it is hard to disagree with B. Yeltsin. The Russian leader's vigorous reluctance to express solidarity with an unpopular act initiated by the Union Government is also understandable. However, B. Yeltsin cannot fail to recognize that price reform is necessary and will be implemented come what may—that is the tough demand by life. That is why the speech by the head of the Russian legislature can in no way hinder the progress of the intended transformations, whether we like them or not. So why did B. Yeltsin ask for these 40-odd minutes of live coverage? Probably to restate his position and repair his political ratings, which have noticeably dropped over the past few months.

Has there been any positive result from this television meeting? Hardly. Its only positive result is probably the public awareness of how dangerous political extremes are in a situation when the country is teetering on the brink of civil war and does not want to go beyond that fateful point.

Talks on Union Treaty Resume

LD2102194391 Moscow TASS in English 1651 GMT 21 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Zharkov]

[Text] Moscow February 21 TASS—Representatives of Soviet republics resumed talks on a draft union treaty here today after a one-week break.

Azerbaijan sent its representatives to this round of talks, held at the Morozovka rest home near Moscow.

Armenia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia and Estonia are not taking part.

Participants in the talks will discuss parts of the draft containing general provisions and the structure of the union.

Despite reassuring statements by most participants that major problems in separating the powers of the union and republics have been settled, many key issues remain undecided.

Deputy chairman of the Uzbekistan parliament committee on ecology and rational use of natural resources said Irakhman Mirzaev Bluntly opposed the participation by former autonomous republics in the union treaty if they remain within the Russian federation.

The representation of 18 autonomous republics in union governing bodies would lead to a Russian dictate, because Russia will enjoy the majority of votes, he said.

Former autonomous republics should choose either complete sovereignty, including secession from the republic, or no sovereignty, he said.

Nevertheless, many participants remain optimistic. Soviet parliament Council of Nationalities Chairman Rafik Nishanov said at a plenary session this morning that he hopes other republics would join work on the document.

"Despite difficulties in the country, a confrontation of political forces, the signing of the treaty of the union would be one of the major factors which will ensure genuine sovereignty for republics," he said.

The current round of talks is expected to last ten days. The full agreed text of the treaty is expected to be published before March 17.

Nishanov, Abdulatipov on Union Treaty

LD2102235191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 21 Feb 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] What should the Union be like? Here are the viewpoints of the experts who are working out a draft treaty.

[Begin Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities, recording] Today in Morozovka, near Moscow, the designated representatives of nine union and 18 autonomous republics were full of enthusiasm when they met. At the first stage—in mid-February—they essentially agreed on the delimitations of the powers and the structure of the Union. This was the most difficult part. Now a preamble for the first and third sections is being agreed, and proceeding from the statements by the representatives of the delegations, we are now convinced that the work will be finished by early March. It is an exceptionally interesting document that is now under development. It gives equal rights and sovereignty to all parties of the federation, while preserving the Union. Priority importance is being given to individual and to human rights. We are convinced that the republics that have not yet taken part in working out the treaty, will eventually take part. And I, on behalf of all the participants of the meeting, would like to invite representatives of Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to send their delegations, and to help elaborate documents which would be acceptable for those republics. [end recording]

[Begin Abdulatipov, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities chairman, recording] Some of our repubican leaders say that the document has allegedly been sent from above. For some reason, people have lately been constantly deceived. Yet people let themselves be deceived. For example, I know there have been dozens of consultations with our republics. We met the experts dozens of times. Every point is being checked out and literally put to this vote. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Journalist Publish Statement on 22 Feb Rally

LD2202042391 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 22 Feb 91

[Text] Many Muscovites know that a demonstration [manifestatsiya] in defense of glasnost is planned today. It should demand that guarantees be given against political censorship and that the Second Program be handed over to the television of Russia.

In connection with this, a group of television journalists of the "Vzglyad" program made a statement which is published today by MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS. The journalists note that now that the country is on the threshold of total degradation, now that the living standard of millions of people is collapsing, now that we are spending the national gold reserve on food, glasnost is not the end in itself of the democratic movement, but the means for the dissemination of ideas which may move society toward national accord and a worthy existence. The "Vzglyad" program expresses hope that today's demonstration will serve to work out these ideas.

Official on Referendum; Predicts 'Yes' Vote

91UN0919A Moscow TRUD in Russian 16 Feb 91 p 1

[Interview with Yu.Kh. Kalmykov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Legislation Committee, by TRUD correspondent N. Dorofeyev; place and date not given: "Referendum"]

[Text] Moscow—**Once again we are the first. On the path of the progress of democracy this time. As specialists in constitutional law and political scientists maintain, a country's status or the fate of one territory or another are infrequently determined by referendum. And a question of such scale and significance as the fate of a great power has never been decided by referendum. Nonetheless, citizens of the USSR who are eligible to vote and who, naturally, have been wishing to avail themselves of it may in exactly a month's time make their choice, responding "yes" or**

"no" to the question: "Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which the rights and liberties of the individual of any nationality are guaranteed in full?"

It is no secret, however, that in the very wording of the question, in the techniques of organizing the referendum and in its legal consequences there is much that is unclear and which requires special explanation. It is this that is discussed in an interview with the TRUD correspondent by Yuriy Khamzatovich Kalmykov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Legislation Committee.

[Dorofeyev] On 16 January you, Yuriy Khamzatovich, at a joint session of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet presented to the Union parliament the draft decree "The Organization of and Measures in Support of the USSR Referendum on the Preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." It is known that you are one of those who took part in its elaboration and in the wording of the question itself. This is why we are asking you on behalf of TRUD readers for a more detailed description of the aims and tasks confronting the referendum.

[Kalmykov] I see the aims and tasks of the referendum as follows: to determine the attitude of the country's population toward our form of government. The attitude toward the Union in general, if you like. This needs to be done because the sovereignty declarations announced by the republics express a varying attitude toward the Union as a state, and polar opinions appear at times regarding the possibility of its preservation. And, what is more, the versions of preserving the Union also are far from unequivocal: from an economic community through a single state, of the federation or confederation type.

It was in connection with this wide range of approaches to the country's future and the position of individual republics that the president of the USSR initiated the organization of a referendum, I believe. Of course, we have to ascertain the attitude of the population of the whole country toward a question which is giving rise to many complexities. After all, the uncertainty and the varying approach to evaluations of the Union as a single state are leading to the republics having begun to adopt a varying attitude toward Union structures, in other words, toward the center and Union laws. They are being both suspended and revoked or simply ignored, with only one's own, local, laws being the guide here. And as a result there is now a real war of laws going on around the country.

Various considerations have been expressed in the republics concerning the nature of the future social system. Socialist or nonsocialist, a soviet system or not. It is the population's attitude toward all this that has to be learned....

[Dorofeyev] Let us put ourselves in the place of the voting USSR citizen at the polls on 17 March 1991. Does it not seem to you that the very wording of the question is quite difficult to comprehend? What, in fact, is being voted for?

[Kalmykov] The referendum formula is the fruit of collective work. It is not that bad, in my view. People have to make their choice in favor of a single state. Its federal arrangement. To vote for this Union being a union of soviet socialist republics. And, in addition, for the Union to guarantee the rights and liberties of any nation and national group which lives on the territory of the country.

The nucleus of this formula is constructed to ensure that the voter either supports a renewed federal united state or opposes it. And this needs to be clearly understood.

[Dorofeyev] It is no secret that there are referendums and referendums. There are those whose decisions acquire the force of law, and there are others which are advisory, which are often called polls. So, are we on 17 March to adopt all together a legislative decision or will this simply be the center consulting the people?

[Kalmykov] The decision of the referendum will be binding on the territory of our country.

[Dorofeyev] But let's be realistic, Yuriy Khamzatovich. There are reports even today that six republics have no intention of participating in the referendum. And even if for some reason or other they alter their decision, can it be expected that the population of the Baltic, say, obsessed with the idea of independence, will say "yes" to a "federation of equal sovereign republics," even if "renewed"? But will the decision of the referendum be binding on the "opponents of the Union" also?

[Kalmykov] Perhaps this will come as a surprise to some people, but, no, of course not. After all, even the approved procedure of organizing the referendum says that the results will be considered both for the Union as a whole and in respect of individual republics. The general, Union results of the voting will not be of binding significance for them. Otherwise what would be the point of counting the votes separately for each republic? This is my opinion, at least.

[Dorofeyev] But does this mean that, having said "no" to the Union, some individual republics will automatically secede from it?

[Kalmykov] No, although the question is in itself complex. If a republic has voted against the preservation of a renewed federation, the mechanism of the Procedure of Secession From the USSR Act adopted in April 1990 will come into play after this. The 17 March referendum is, I stress, to ascertain the attitude toward a renewed federation. And a negative attitude, if some people have such, is only the start of secession and by no means signifies that a republic would become independent immediately. It would have to negotiate a republic referendum, in which it would have to muster a two-thirds vote for separation, and have a five-year transitional period. In a

word, negotiate all the procedures stipulated by the Secession From the USSR Act....

[Dorofeyev] But let us return to the coming referendum. Whereas the republics have the right to determine their fate themselves, the autonomous formations which are a part of them are therein deprived of this possibility. What will happen to the autonomous entities if the republics, say, refuse to hold a referendum?

[Kalmykov] The autonomous republics could, if they so decide, conduct an independent ballot on their territory. They would form their own district electoral commissions, precinct commissions and so forth. It is their right to decide.

As far as the information about the fact that six republics are unequivocally refusing to take part in the referendum is concerned, this question has not been conclusively decided everywhere. However, it is not, in any event, a tragedy, although it is unpleasant. It is each republic's right to determine its fate itself. The more so in that, despite the result of the referendum and its participation or nonparticipation in it, the status of the republic will remain the same as before, and it will continue to be part of the Union as part of a federal state.

[Dorofeyev] Has your mechanism of organizing the referendum been adequately perfected—analysis of the results, tallying of the vote? After all, a referendum, and on such a complex issue, what is more, is something new for us.

[Kalmykov] It has been perfected on the level at which the mechanism for electing people's deputies operates. The referendum will be conducted on the same pattern.

[Dorofeyev] Could you predict the results of the referendum?

[Kalmykov] Tallying future results is very difficult. But I am sure that in the republics in which the referendum is, for all that, held, a majority will favor a renewed union. Despite the fact that the social and political situation in the country is not all that suitable for putting to people such a pointed question as preservation of the federal union. Meetings with my electorate testify to this, at least. As far as my personal position is concerned, I, as a voter, will vote for a state in which the full- fledged sovereignty of the republics is combined with the sovereignty of a strong union power.

Alksnis on 'Cold Civil War,' Salvation Committee

LD2202023991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 2220 GMT 20 Feb 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] A few days ago, People's Deputy Viktor Alksnis made a sensational statement. He is prepared to report to the Supreme Soviet information on the involvement of the country's leadership in the January events in the Baltic republics. A few hours before we came on air, a TSN [Television News Service] correspondent, Nikolay Ivanov, asked Lieutenant-Colonel Alksnis a few questions in the night news studio.

[Begin recording] [Ivanov] Viktor Imantovich, do you have materials which compromise the president, and if you do, when do you intend to publish them?

[Alksnis] I would like to avoid this wording, material which compromises the president, because this makes it criminal. I would characterize this situation somewhat differently. One of the greats spoke about secrets in which are born wars, but no less significant are secrets in which are born committees of public salvation. I am to some degree a participant in these events, and for this reason, if a parliamentary investigation is held, and this business is given an official procedure, then I have something to say on this issue. But today, unfortunately, I have nothing to add to what I said in the interview with MOSCOW NEWS.

[Ivanov] Does there exist today a Union committee of public salvation?

[Alksnis] Yes, it exists. It was founded by the Centrist Bloc of political parties and movements. Its head is Comrade Voronin. The group Soyuz is no longer part of the Centrist Bloc, but this does not mean that Deputy Alksnis is part of the committee of public salvation. Because my position is that such a committee can be created only in a constitutional way; that is, by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and no other party, group or organization has the right to form a committee of public salvation.

Since we do not have a leader in whom the people today can believe in 100 percent, and whom the people would follow, I favor forming a collegiate body for ruling the country in these extraordinary circumstances. But formed only in a constitutional way.

[Ivanov] A small politological forecast. What are we most likely going toward—civil peace or civil war?

[Alksnis] If what is happening here today continues, the situation will most likely worsen, and unfortunately we will come to civil war. Our common duty is to halt the slide into this chasm.

[Ivanov] You see your duty in this?

[Alksnis] Yes.

[Ivanov] Finally, what do you think about Yeltsin's appearance yesterday?

[Alksnis] Unfortunately, what I had in mind, civil war. The speech by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, unfortunately, brings nearer a state of civil war. A cold civil war was practically declared yesterday. Since yesterday our country is in a state of cold civil war. [end recording]

Salvation Committee Head on Political Aims

AU2102111591 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 18 Feb 91 pp 1, 11

[Interview with Vladimir Voronin, head of the USSR National Salvation Committee, by RZECZPOSPOLITA correspondent Waldemar Gontarski; place and date not given: "If Not I, Then Who?"]

[Text] The political sensation of the weekend was the conference of the center parties that together form the USSR National Salvation Committee. "The committee intends to take over power," was how television news reported the meeting. During a break in the debates, Vladimir Voronin, head of the committee, gave a short interview to RZECZPOSPOLITA:

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] In what way do you want to take over power?

[Voronin] By using constitutional means, namely, power could be transferred to us by presidential decree, or by a decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet or the People's Deputies.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] When can we expect such a decision to be made?

[Voronin] After the official meeting with the president. I think such a meeting will take place quite soon.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] Have you discussed these matters with Gorbachev?

[Voronin] I have now talked with the president about 20 times.

[RZECZPOSPOLITA] When? The Presidential Press Office has informed RZECZPOSPOLITA that the president has never met with representatives of the USSR National Salvation Committee and no such meeting is planned in the foreseeable future.

[Voronin] I repeat that I have had about 20 working meetings with Gorbachev. Some meetings were held last year and some this year. We are now hoping that an official meeting of the committee with the president will take place. [interview ends]

Voronin regrets that he did not get the opportunity to meet the team of people in Poland who were responsible for the introduction of martial law and he values his working contacts in the Polish Embassy in Moscow.

At the conference, a programmatic declaration was read out. It is identical to the manifesto that was made public by the committee. The committee wants to introduce order throughout the whole country through the introduction of a state of emergency. This would suspend the constitution. Salvation committees in every republic could then be formed.

Central TV Moving Toward 'Orwellian' Model

PM2202095791 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 3 Feb 91 p 10

[Article by Yelena Karayeva and Yelena Chekalova under the "Events and Commentaries" rubric: "The State Committee For Saving Us From the Truth; View from Inside"]

[Text] Suddenly—directly after the well-known presidential statement—Central Television stopped singing the praises of the national salvation committees. Even during scheduling for the week from 14 through 20 January, Television News Service moderator Tatyana Mitkova had her arm twisted because she was refusing to eulogize the Lithuanian national salvation committee, and on 24 January "Vremya" calmly announced to us: Well, the correspondent for the country's main news program could not find inhabitants of Vilnius who support this committee. We, of course, need no introduction to such juggling on the air. It's happened many times already... with Karabakh, and Tbilisi.

"We have just had censorship reintroduced," Tatyana Mitkova related on 17 January. Television news chief editor Olvar Kakuchaya explained at that time: "Mitkova is dramatizing this: There is no question of any kind of censorship. It's simply that now there will be no individual input, and the chief duty editors have been charged with keeping an eye on this."

What do these so grandly titled people in actual fact do? We were able to get to know the work of two of them—Dmitriy Kopytin and Nina Skalova. Both worked for many years in a similar position in radio—on the "Mayak" station. In recent years they had very likely felt almost redundant, because prebroadcast scrutiny had in effect been abolished. Then suddenly they have found a new vocation. "For the moment they are a little embarrassed," another Television News Service moderator, Dmitriy Kiselev, recounts. "They are people of retirement age and are not familiar with television." On the other hand, everything considered, they know very well what can go out over the air waves at the present moment, and what constitutes an "infringement of production rules." We went through the collected scripts for the first days—17 and 18 January. Kopytin scored out all subject matter relating to republic internal affairs: most of it concerned the Baltics...

We understand that Olvar Kakuchaya wants very much not to call such work censorship. We also understand that he wants something completely different—that we all consider the current interpretation of events on "Vremya" to be objective. However, let us return to facts. We shall not enumerate all the instances of the suppression of facts and disinformation over the past three weeks, which have already been publicized in the press (suffice it to point out that the "Vremya" program, which has been found out on more than one occasion, has not once made any refutations, as the Law on the Press demands). Let us take but one example directly

concerning MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. Central Television political correspondent Vitaliy Ilyashenko stated 19 January: "Even the foreign press has not contrived to make such harsh accusations against the President as our radical press." He quoted from a British newspaper: "The events in the Baltics are no reason to get hysterical." Having gone through all TASS dispatches for the week starting 14 January, we actually did find a reference to this newspaper. However, in the first place it turned out to be ambiguous and, in the second, it was the only one among a torrent of sharply critical pieces in literally all the Western publications. So you see how objective this was. Incidentally, a number of Western correspondents suggested that the happenings on Soviet Television's First Program were like pages from Orwell's anti-utopia come to life. Television is, regrettably, turning into a something of a committee of salvation from the truth. The best affirmation of this is the story of mishaps that befell the last issue of "Vid."

The State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting's leadership received a letter from the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Glasnost and Citizens' Rights and Appeals on 17 January. Support was expressed for the direct broadcast on the subject of Lithuania, scheduled for 18 January as part of "Vid." First Deputy Chairman Petr Reshetov at first postponed his reply to the evening, and subsequently until morning. On the Orbita networks "Vid" went out on 18 January with a recording of Renaissance wind music followed directly by footage of Vilnius' bloody Sunday. No information came in about the evening's schedule, during which it was still proposed to screen the deputies' discussion on the Lithuanian situation. Only, before "Vremya" the "Vid" team, like all of us, heard an announcement by the moderator: At the request of many viewers the concluding concert of "Song-90" was being repeated. The program's chief producer refused to answer the reasonable question as to whose decision it was the program producers were carrying out. To cut a long story short, it was a familiar scenario: The "saviors"—this time of the national—air waves again wished to remain anonymous.

Of course the names of the anonymous people are known to everyone, and they themselves do not hide the fact that they are protected by a presidential mandate. Here are just a few quotations from the shorthand report of Leonid Kravchenko's (14 January) interview with foreign and Soviet journalists:

"...every Friday is 'black.' There are six editions of "Vzglyad" a day: We start in the Far East, two hours later there is a new edition, and so on... Each time there are completely unexpected developments... I should remind you that... I have a right, which the USSR President gave me, to run the television service..." "I can say with pride, and don't think that I'm immodest, that I am carrying out the promise that television should become better and more interesting..." "Note: The film 'Isaura the Slave Girl' is artistically of no great merit, but it was an overwhelming success in our country. It was successful because people had gotten fed up with political claptrap and wanted real feelings..."

It has to be pointed out that the pressure on the Television News Service abated somewhat last week and Petr Reshetov even decided to take a look at the deputies' discussion of Lithuania recorded by the "Vzglyad" team. It's true, however, that he did not allow it to go out on the air waves on 25 January—without giving an explanation.

It looks as if the public mistrust of Central Television reported in the press does not trouble the present State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting at all. Even going back to the days of Lapinskiy it was understood here that television is by no means for the viewers. The State Committee for Television is set up this way: It is a whole system of low-, middle-, and slightly higher-ranking inspectors. People like Kopytin, Skalova, and Vitaliy Miroshnik (he took off the Television News Service edition on 16 January simply because Dmitriy Kiselev did not forgo the subject of the first OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] victims in Riga), who are capable of nothing more than keeping vigil. Just like the inspectors one rank higher. By talking pompously about higher state interests, they protect their own personal and departmental interests. They protect them so zealously that they risk breaking the very state laws. **Applying censorship, propagating falsehoods, divesting journalists of the opportunity to disseminate trustworthy information in their possession—all this is punishable under the Law on the Press and may be pursued in court.**

The "Vzglyad" team has just forwarded a petition to the Moscow Dzerzhinskiy Rayon prosecutor's office about an infringement of the Law on the Press. Despite all the assurances from the country's leadership about sticking to the policy of change, the "Vzglyad" team sees a change not only of policy concerning information but also of political direction in the actions of Leonid Kravchenko, who has been given unlimited authority to impose order in Central Television. In the words of "Vid" correspondent Yelena Sarkisyan, the Orwellian model of television has already been realized in Vilnius: An affable colonel introduces the programs...

True, another model—a loosening up—is still possible. It has already kind-of started up. Tatyana Mitkova considers it an achievement of her own. On the other hand, her colleague Yuriy Rostov has at the same moment announced his decision to quit Central Television —for the as yet unopened Russian Television. Professionals are quitting the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. They explain their reasons this way: Whether there is a loosening up or a clampdown, the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, as a system, is completely discredited. "There is no need to fret; this is the agony of a fatally ill organism. This is an objective trend," the optimist Mitkova believes.

Fight on Organized Crime Discussed

PM2102122091 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 6, 12-18 feb 91 pp 7-9

[Commentary by Lev Yelih: "Armour as a Substitute For Law"]

[Text] While the Military Procurator's Office is busy concluding the investigation of the June 1962 killings of workers in Novocherkassk; while those who gave orders to use armed force to quell a peaceful rally in Tbilisi in April 1989 are still unknown; while the two months officially set as the deadline for the investigation of the bloodbath in Baku in January 1990 are hopelessly past; while the investigation of the Vilnius tragedy is only just beginning - a de-jure decision has been taken to deploy troops in the streets of Soviet cities on a permanent basis...

The Presidential Decree "On Cooperation of the Militia and Units of the Armed Forces of the USSR with the Purpose of Enforcing Order and Combatting Crime" was issued a month after the joint order by the Minister of Defence and the Interior Minister "on organization of joint patrol service" ... The ministers' order came earlier than the decree of the President who is also the Commander-in-Chief, but perhaps there is logic in it? An onlooker gets the impression that Gorbachev's decree was a retroactive attempt to give some legal weight to the two ministers' order, that the decree is a shield protecting Ministers Yazov and Pugo from attacks by the legalists.

The words of General Rodionov, commander in the Tbilisi operation in April 1989, that the army must not be used in settling internal problems, sound like a piece of ultra-left heresy with the background of the developments in the Baltic republics and the recent decrees and orders. The two ministers' order was issued on December 29, but was not published until the end of January and first joint patrols appeared only on February 1. Thus, the events in the Baltics occured somewhere in the middle of this period and, naturally, gave rise to rumours. Many democrats believe there is a strategy to enfore order. The Baltics were no. 1 target, Russia is the next. Official statements to the effect that no additional contingents or combat vehicles have appeared in the streets of Moscow and other cities provide little comfort. Actually, "restoration of order" does not require the troops' everyday presence in the streets, but rather the possibility of deploying armoured vehicles, on a perfectly legitimate basis, at any time and in any place when the law enforcers believe they are necessary. The two ministers' order is viewed as a menace also by possible strikers and thousands-strong rallies by purely constitutional methods and without incident. Whatever official assurances may be, demonstrators will never feel safe again: everybody saw armoured vehicles dispersing rallies in Vilnius...

This reaction was not difficult to predict. If the ministers are really concerned what the reaction to their orders may be, they could have afforded not to make their order secret. The decree on the monetary reform which withdrew from circulation all 50 and 100 ruble bank notes had to be secret, of course. Otherwise the shadow economy dealers would have had enough time to convert their capital into smaller banknotes. But what could the criminals have possibly done if they had known in advance about the armoured vehicles' planned deployment?

There is one more question: How does one fight organized crime with armoured vehicles? This question puzzled the Soviet Union's Mafia-buster, Alexander Gurov, the newly appointed head of the Organized Crime Department of the USSR Interior Ministry during a question-and-answer session at the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic. Obviously, the new patrols can be effective only in fighting street crime, robberies and hooliganism and will never be able to replace a professional detective in the majority of other cases. However, according to Interior Ministry statistics, street crime, robberies and hooliganism make up only 15 percent of the total number of street crimes. In 1990 the absolute number of street crimes did increase, but the growth rate dropped by 14 times as compared with 1989. It seems that he joint venture of the army and the police is being created at the wrong time and with a purpose different from what was officially declared.

When the whole nation was busy exchanging the suddenly worthless 50 and 100 ruble bank notes, Alexander Gurov appeared on TV to inform viewers that Mafia bosses were holding urgent meetings trying to find a way to get rid of the invalid money. One wonders what the Mafia's reaction was to the decision of the Defense Ministry and the Interior Ministry to fight organized crime "...With the help of Stand-by alert units at every garrison: a company or a battalion with organic arms and ammunition."

The Field Manual tells us that the battalion can operate on a 12- kilometre front: a couple of thieves' dens may easily happen to be inside the 12-kilometre zone, of course, However, Col. Butskoi, a veteran in the war in Afghanistan and People's Deputy of the Russian Federation, believes that the anti-crime effort is nothing but a disguise.

In any case, the army's participation in the anti-crime effort is a measure that admits of different interpretations, and the version that the government decided to use all means at its disposal to combat crime at the critical moment does not sound very convincing. It would be more effective if the government heeded the telegram from the former Interior Minister, Vadim Bakatin, who said that to fight crime better, the police need more advanced equipment and policemen had to be insured against all risks involved in their profession.

If the purpose of joint patrolling is different, then what is this prupose? Is the government toying with the public opinion? But the public at large is so scared of rumours

about a coming military coup that companies and battalions in combat gear out in the streets will only be welcomed by advocates of dictatorship who make up an insignificant segment of society. Why all the fuss? According to a recent Interior Ministry report 969 grave crimes are committed in the USSR per every 100,000 of the population. The corresponding ratio in Germany is 7,359 crimes per 100,000. In other words, the situation is not as bad as we are made to believe.

Obviously, the answer is the leadership's broad political alliance with the military. Very probably, the nation's leadership views this alliance with the military and the KGB as a temporary measure necesary to check the Baltics and Russia which have gone too far in their quest for sovereignty. However, in future the leadership may find it extremely difficult to say good-bye to its allies of today. After the evenis in the Baltics, the Kremlin seems to have lost the democrats' trust for good and the very first drop of blood spilled by the military - if only as a result of a provocation—will rob Gorbachev of any room for political manoeuvre. In this sense, the risk that army patrols may clash with civilians is also a personal political risk for the President.

Gorbachev's December 26 Decree allowed officers of the Interior Ministry and the KGB to enter the "premises used by citizens for private and other forms of enterprise." This provision is a direct violation of the constitutional right to the inviolability of home (after all most private producers in this country turn ot their goods at home).

It must be recalled that last summer the Supreme Soviet of the USSR sanctioned the law-enforcing bodies to tap phone conversations if necessary for the investigation, thus blasting another constitutional guarantee - the secrecy of telephone communication. Anti-crime efforts across the world often result in restricted personal freedoms and rights, but in this country human rights violations are the opening stage of the crime-busting campaign...

Officials have voiced hope that the KGB will be more successful in restoring order in trade, because the KGB is less corrupt than the OBKHSS [the Interior Ministry department dealing with the "theft of socialist property"). It would be nice to share this hope, but the reason for corruption is not the personal qualities of the OBKHSS men as compared with the secret police, but the system itself which makes it more profitable for those engaged in trade to sell goods on the side, bribing law-enforcement officers who could upset such illegal deals. If about twenty well-paid KGB spies have changed sides and defected to foreign secret services seeking better material benefits, there is no guarantee that their rank-and-file colleagues who receive far less pay will be able to resist temptation. Actually, corruption in the KGB is only a matter of time and of the scale of the secret police's involvement in the world of trade...

Speaking of the Baltic republics, Soviet lawyers often use the term "non-legal space," meaning that the differences between the Union and the republican laws and confusion among the law-enforcement bodies, which do not know whom they must report to, generated a legal vacuum attracting crime. However, the whole country is becoming a non-legal space, in a different sense of the term, though.

Graduate lawyers are sadly enumerating the incongruities of the recent decrees and orders, each of which is either an invitation to a legal dispute or a mind-boggling problem for law students. As for those who must monitor the observance of the law and the heads of law-enforcement agencies, they do not dare to form their own opinions until the word comes from the very top.

The day Boris Pugo was appointed Interior Minister, he was asked to specify the names of the members of the Baltics' underground National Salvation Committees. Pugo called the question "improper" and refused to give a legal assessment of such committees. Nikolai Trubin, Procurator-General of the USSR, failed to answer the direct question: "Does the activity of the National Salvation Committee accord with the Constitution of the USSR?" The procurator mumbled: "You've got to know the situation... Really, I cannot say anything definite..." The KGB chief, Vladimir Kruychkov, was asked whether such committees could be viewed as subversive organizations. "This is a difficult question which requires much looking into...," was his reply.

That was before January 22, when Mikhail Gorbachev said that no public organizations, committees or fronts were allowed to appeal to the Armed Forces in Political struggle and that all political forces had to struggle for power exclusively by constitutional means. These words ended the indecision...

After the two ministers' order was abolished, the situation repeated itself. General Procurator Office refused to comment on the order, saying that it had not yet received the text. The Justice Minster Lushchikov says he "is not familiar with the problem" and has never seen the text. The Constitutional Supervision Committee politely declines having anything at all to do with the problem...

Our lawyers would have been quicker in passing their judgement, had a similar order been issued by two Lithuanian ministers and suported by Landsbergis' decree...

The figure of new laws passed by the Supreme Soviet, which Supreme Soviet Chairman Lukyanov is so often pleased to quote, must not decieve anyone; the law is not becoming the supreme force in society. Top-level leaders who are either lawyers by education themselves or have lawyers among their aides, frequently violate the law. Kronid Lyubarsky, editor-in-chief of the emigre magazine Strana i Mir calls this phenomenon the "totalitarian care": the state knows what is good for its citizens and if there is a law obstructing the way of the state's doing good, all the worse for the law...

What about the lawyers sitting on various committees and subcommittees? One would agree, of course, Soviet justice which had sanctioned mass killings, usurpation of power by one party, retroactive laws etc, cannot be expected to become a stalwart custodian of legality in such a short time.

Actually, the Constitional Supervision Committee was to submit its conclusions as to how constitutional the Yazov-Pugo order is, no later than Wednesday, February 6. Theoretically, the Committee could suspend the order, but there is every indication that it will once again opt for half-measures.

Strange things happen in the non-legal space. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the KGB are playing with the term "economic sabotage" as they would with a volleyball: neither agrees to claim the copyright or explain what exactly today's meaning of these words is, echoing the lawlessness of the past. The President was expected to explain the meaning of his decree. However, Gorbachev, confined himself to setting up a Law-Enforcement Committee under the President of the USSR "in order to radically step up the struggle against economic sabotage" and other crimes.

Let me remind the readers that not so long ago the All-Union Anti-Crime Committee was established and Anatoly Lukyanov was appointed its chairman. Even judges were instructed to cooperate with the Committee, although the judges' business is to administer justice not to hunt for criminals. Anyway, the Committee died peacefully, without having ever done or reported anything. Today a new committee is being formed, a measure which one member of the old committee called "ritual gesture intended to calm the public down." The only hope is that personal qualities of the head of the new committee will add some weight to it.

The new crime-buster is former dean of the School of Law at the Kemerovo University, Yuri Golik, 38, until very recently Chairman of the Law and Order and Anti-Crime Committee at the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The press and lawyers made lively discussion of Golik's inaugural statement to the effect that "he who fights crime in plastic gloves winds up in a plastic bag." A stanch advocate of the Union Treaty, Golik believes that "two sovereignties in one state is utter absurd." Only a watermelon contains many seeds." Commenting on the events in Vilnius, Golik said only that "the people who were crushed by the tanks had been pushed under the tanks by those standing behind them." When he speaks about law, order and anti-crime efforts, Golik is outspoken: "Any force can be crushed by a greater force." The task he put forward at the end of December sounds promising: "The main objective is to restore elementary order. We must begin with restoring order in our minds."

However, the thing to begin with is obviously the much-wanted definition of "economic sabotage." The Moscow OBKHSS chief, Shestopalov insists that so far "neither the OBKHSS nor the KGB have revealed any facts of premeditated activities designed to undermine the national economy or the constitutional system." Shestopalov believes that "the national economy is in a crisis and this situation offers broad opportunities for economic crimes." On the contrary, Golik insists that such a thing as economic sabotage "does exist. The proof of its existence is the crisis in the national economy. No sound and working economic system disintegrates without reason" (my italics - L Ye.)

However, it is doubtful that the search for reasons why the national economy which had worked so well under Brezhnev and Chemenko, started disintegrating, will lead Yuri Golik to the den of saboteurs and mafiosi...

The anti-crime drive often looks like a propaganda attack on the free market economy. In his January interview Alexander Gurov warned that "the criminal world was waiting for a free market and wanted it badly." He also insists that the setting up of free economic zones will result in an upsurge of crime. Yuri Golik echoed Gurov when he said that free market would bring more crime.

Very probably, the leadership is not worried about crime proper in the transition period, but the possible reaction of the people to the liberalized and upwardly spiralling prices and closures of non-profitable factories and plants. In this sense the joint patrols are a step to deal with possible free market troubles. On the other hand, if there is a decision that free market is something alien and that the socialist ideals are more important, it would be very useful to present galloping crime as a consquence of free market relations and to doctor the crime statistics accordingly. One must only warn the people that if the country collapses without free market, crime will be even more cruel and terrible than it is now.

On January 31 the President of the All-Union Confederation of Trade Unions of Cooperative Workers said that the decree on measures to fight economic sabotage "put the economic life of this country under the control of police and the KGB, and under the new conditions some purely economic cases may have a political colouring. Under these conditions, the KGB investigation of the activities of the cooperative association Istok headed by Artyom Tarasov touched off a wave of panic among the Soviet business community.

An economic slump may be one more consequence of the government's war against crime.

The Supreme Soviets of Georgia, Armenia and Moldova have opposed joint patrolling. The Baltics are also far from enthusiastic about it. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic agreed to a compromise when it confined itself to issuing an appeal to the Constitution Supervision Committee and the President asking them to cancel the decree as unconstitutional. Obviously, Russia's MPs did not want to add fuel to the flames after

the Kremlin's acute reaction to the talk of the possible military sovereignty of Russia and Russia's own Defence Committee...

...Meanwhile Boris Pugo was promoted and is now a three-star general like his First Deputy Gromov, who served as the Soviet Army Commander in Afghanistan.

Yazov Meets Russian Writers, Union Leaders

PM2202091191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by Colonel S. Kulichkin: "Meeting With Writers"]

[Text] On the eve of the holiday marking the 73d anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, USSR defense minister, met the Russian Writers Union Board Secretariat and the republic's writers at the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Writers Union. During a frank and unconstrained discussion, the defense minister told writers about the progress of military reform and the problems facing the Soviet Armed Forces in the context of the perestroyka processes taking place in the country's foreign and domestic policy.

Yu. Bondarev, S. Lykoshin, V. Rogov, S. Rybas, A. Salutskiy, and T. Glushkova, who spoke at the meeting, along with other writers noted the role played by the Armed Forces in consolidating all healthy patriotic forces in society.

Slower Pace in Foreign Policy Urged

PM2102143291 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No. 5 5-11 Feb 91 p 26-28

[Article by Evgeny Rusakov: "Wither Runs the Soviet Locomotive"]

[Text] In the early summer of 1956, Josip Broz Tito was expected to arrive in Moscow on an official visit. I and other first-year students of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations had a lively discussion on how the Yugoslav President, defamed by the Soviet leadership in the recent past, would meet with Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, one of the main instigators of the campaign against the "Tito clique." The Yugoslav delegation was already passing through Ukraine by train. A brilliant way out of the situation was found at that time. Stalin's associate was relieved of his post.

It is generally believed that the change of a foreign minister means a shift in the accent and style of the country's diplomacy and even in its foreign policy strategy. This is what happened in July 1985, when Eduard Shevardnadze replaced Andrey Gromyko, "Mr Niet", as he was sometimes called in the west. Not known as a diplomat before, the new foreign minister has written a bright chapter in the history of Soviet diplomacy, becoming a co-architect of new political thinking.

What can we expect from the appointment of Alexander Bessmertnykh, a career diplomat, to the post of foreign minister?

Now, almost six years after the commencement of perestroyka, it may seem that a new foreign policy appeared in April 1985 instantly, like Aphrodite coming out of the sea. In actual fact, it matured gradually, in the process of reappraising new realities and overcoming old stereotypes.

The new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, began his foreign policy by clearing the obstacles left by the period of East-West confrontation, the most acute since the Caribbean crisis.

The confrontation was aggravated by a number of fatal steps that buried the detente of the 1970s. The Soviet generals, elated by good performance data of the new SS-20 missile, insisted on the deployment of these missiles, ignoring the foreign-policy consequences of this step. The Soviet Union began to modernize its shock tank divisions stationed in the German Democratic Republic and other East European countries. Finally, in December 1979, a "limited contingent of Soviet troops" was sent to Afghanistan. The US president called for a crusade against the "evil empire," announced a long-term programme of modernization of the American strategic triad, and put forward the idea of creating a "space shield" for the United States. In November 1983, Washington and NATO began to install Pershing-2 missiles in Western Europe capable of hitting Moscow within six to eight minutes. The Soviet delegation walked out of the Geneva talks. Television showed the endless lines of tanks inspected at the war games by Defence Minister Dmitry Ustinov. Even children asked whether a war would break out.

Thanks to the bold thinking and diplomatic skill of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, international public opinion of the Soviet Union improved greatly and rather quickly and the possibility of an armed conflict between the East and the West was reduced to almost zero. The Soviet-American Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range missiles, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and the normalization of Moscow's relations with China became the main landmarks of their policy.

In my opinion, the foreign policy at the first stage of perestroyka was on the whole in keeping with the canons of the detente of the 1970s which brought about treaties on strategic arms limitation and antimissile defence and the Helsinki conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. However, Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and their associates were prepared to go further than merely achieving a relaxation in international tension. The basic principles of new political thinking gradually crystallized. They included the priority of shared human values, the right of peoples to the freedom of choice, and the joint struggle for the survival of mankind and the solution to global problems.

Any division of events into rigidly limited stages is always relative. Nevertheless, I shall venture a guess that Soviet foreign policy had exceeded the limits of detente proper in the summer of 1989. It is possible that the Soviet Union had matured enough earlier. But there was a more than half-year pause caused by the election of a new president in the United States and a reappraisal by the new administration of US policy towards the Soviet Union. In May of 1989, George Bush had at last declared his firm support for perestroyka in the USSR and in favor of going beyond the limits of a "strategy of restraint."

Recalling the information forum held in London at that time. I cannot rid myself of the feeling of unreality experienced by many of its participants. In some cases it was difficult to guess who represented Western and who Eastern countries. The Polish delegation included members of solidarity and the Hungarian delegation, members of the opposition. At that time it was unusual to hear how delegates from "fraternal" countries vividly described "the violation of human rights" by communist regimes. The Soviet delegates pretended to take no heed of criticisms against their country. The fact that there was made only one mild "rebuke", Lord Chesterfield-style (be wiser than other people, if you can, but do not tell them so), came as a complete suprise to Western delegates. It was probably the last "retro" statement of this kind before the advent of new times.

Several months later the declaration of sovereignty by one East European country after another and Moscow's stand finally convinced the West that new political thinking is not a tactical manoeuvre, not a diplomatic strategem, but a strategic line.

The policy of perestroyka in foreign policy entered its second stage. It was marked by Soviet-American agreements on a transition to a new, peaceful world order, the unification of Germany, the Soviet Union's actions taken, together with other civilized nations, against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and the Paris Charter which officially put an end to the Cold War on the continent.

Within a year and a half the Soviet Union has advanced down the path towards overcoming the confrontation between the two worlds and returning to the community of civilized nations farther than it did over the previous decades after the October Revolution. The reconcilliation between the former opponents (until the recent events in the Baltic republics) culminated in the provision of credits for perestroyka by West European countries and even by the "bastion of imperialism."

Together with the success of Soviet diplomacy at the second stage of perestroyka in foreign policy, the burden of new problems started to be felt. At the second stage the link between the home and foreign policies played an evil trick on Moscow. In the early years of perestroyka, the policy of improving the international situation fully suited the need of creating favourable external conditions for reforms in the Soviet Union. Moreover, it was conducted from the position of a relatively strong rear, at least on the surface. Diplomacy successfully played the part of a locomotive pushing the country ahead along the road of demilitarizing the economy, political pluralism and observance of human rights and freedoms.

However, the economic crisis, the break-up of the Union as a unitary state, and the aggravation of social tensions have weakened the rear of Soviet foreign policy. The virtual loss by the Soviet Union of its status as a superpower has largely determined the character of diplomacy in the second state of perestroyka in foreign policy. One even wonders in what measure the vigorous foreign policy activity is guided by a rational strategic calculation and in what measure it is simply an attempt to compensate by diplomatic successes and foreign economic benefits for internal weaknesses or the lack of levers for influencing the course of events.

Moscow's policy in Eastern Europe is indicative in this respect. Basically, it was the only correct policy. Any attempt to crush popular revolutions would not only have been immoral, it would have thrown our counry many years back not only in its internal develoment but also in its relations with the rest of the world. The tragic events in Vilnius and Riga are also fraught with such a danger.

Tanks or contemplation? Is it correct to raise a question like this in the assessment of the East European situation? The recognition of the right of East European peoples to freedom of choice does not necessarily mean renunciation of the defence of lawful interests recognized in the civilized world. Apart from tanks, there are political, economic, diplomatic and other peaceful means of protecting the country's interests. Such measures were used, but unfortunately without much success. In spite of past mistakes, Moscow should have calculated better the consequences of the hasty withdrawal of Soviet troops and have better prepared for it.

In 1989 and 1990, in a number of directions the diplomatic locomotive ran too far ahead of the rapidly weakening internal home fronts. The totalitarian economy, the inconvertible ruble and the sluggish transfer to market economy keep our country so tight that even the most brilliant diplomatic successes will not help to integrate it in the world economy. No wonder Soviet "economic diplomacy" has lately been reduced to the provision of foreign credits without which the USSR would be in an even worse situation.

The gap between foreign policy and its rear within the country was evident perhaps most clearly in the field of disarmament. The withdrawal of a more than half-million-strong army from Germany and other East European countries, combined with the dismantling of tens of thousands of tanks, armoured personnel carriers and guns is an extremely complicated matter, especially in conditions of economic dislocation and grave social and

political tension in our country. In this lies one of the explanations (but not a justification) of the generals' juggling with figures. The data presented by them seriously damaged the Soviet Union's reputation as a partner at the talks on arms reduction.

The Defence Ministry is sometimes criticized now for failing to have prepared for the withdrawal of troops in advance. But this criticism is hurled at the wrong person. Troops were sent to Hungary and Czechoslovakia by the then Soviet leaders with the loud or silent "approval" of "the Soviet people," except for those who were referred to as "renegades." We all got into a mess, and now we all have to get out of it.

The weaknesses of Soviet foreign policy at the second stage of perestroyka should not be attributed to diplomats only. They are the result of the inefficiency of the state machinery and the whole of our society.

Several major foreign policy decisions—on the German problem, the situation in the Persian Gulf and the Paris agreements—were adopted by Gorbachev after the abrogation of Article VI of the Constitution, when he seemed to have freed himself forever from the tight embrace of the Politburo. However, having regrouped, the conservatives found other ways of exerting pressure on the president. The parliament, one of reformers' achievements, is among them.

The conservatives have launched an attack by accusing the leadership of "losing Eastern Europe" and the desire to send troops to the Persian Gulf. At the 4th Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, Shevardnadze felt compelled to resign.

The second stage of perestroyka in foreign policy has come to an end. It will culminate in the February meeting between Gorbachev and Bush and the signing of a treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments.

What will the third stage bring? Gorbachev has repeatedly stated recently that the strategy of new political thinking will not change. This will apparently be so, provided the USSR does not turn from its course of perestroyka and democratic reforms in its policies and the economy. The West's tough reaction to the tragic events in Vilnius and Riga shows that the foreign policy building erected on the foundation of new political thinking is still fragile, and one or two reckless actions within the country could severely shake or destroy it.

In any case, it will apparently be necessary to concentrate on a less rapid but more thoroughly prepared movement along the road to establishing new political thinking in international relations. There are both subjective and objective reasons for such a conclusion.

The revival of conservative forces is in my opinion one of the many tides on the way from totalitarian to democratic society with a developed market economy. It shows that a huge state machinery like the one in the Soviet Union cannot be taken by assault. Incidentally, it must be reformed, not stormed. The Soviet Union differs from Poland and Czechoslovakia. The reformist psychology is penetrating into mass consciousness slowly. The subjective factor—the activity of conservative forces—will continue to influence both foreign and domestic policy for a long time.

The time has come to bring the rear forward. It will take many years to comply with agreements on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe and the forthcoming agreements on strategic offensive weapons. In the opinion of Western analysts, new negotiations will require greater readiness and scrupulousness from both parties.

The Paris Charter for a New Europe has imparted a fresh impulse to the Helsinki process. A new summit is to be held in the Finnish capital next year. Sustained efforts have to be made so that the process would not be blocked by the "damned" nationalities question which is acquiring greater importance in the third and other "baskets." In short, a common European home can hardly be built in a rush.

Soviet foreign policy in the Asian-Pacific region has good prospects. Gorbachev is to pay an official visit to Japan, the first ever by a head of the Soviet state. Relations between the Soviet Union and China and other countries of Southeast Asia are expanding, and ties with South Korea are developing rapidly. It is indicative that the new Soviet foreign minister had his first meeting with Japanese foreign minister Nakayama. There is an alluring idea of promoting the Bandung principles after the Helsinki pattern. However, one should take into account the restrained attitude of Japan and the United States to any change of the present status quo in Asia and the Pacific region.

Delicate efforts will be needed to end the war in the Persian Gulf. A new global alignment of forces in the postwar period is vague. Moscow's efforts to settle the conflict by getting the Security Council resolutions fulfilled provide a good basis for broader cooperation not only with the West, but also with developing countries, many of which especially Arab and Moslem, regard the events in the Persian Gulf as a manifestation of Washington's great-power policy. The Soviet Union has successfully abandoned the idea of building socialism in the African jungles. However, a well-grounded political and economic strategy in the Third World is only beginning to take shape.

By all indications, the president needs now in the post of foreign minister an intelligent specialist with practical experience rather than a partner in the elaboration of the Soviet Union's foreign policy strategy. It is not accidental that, proposing Alexander Bessmertnykh as a candidate to the post, Gorbchev especially noted his professionalism. For many years the newly appointed foreign minister worked in the United States and studied American problems, as well as disarmament, regional,

global and other problems. As a participant in the previous Soviet-American high-level talks, he quickly joined in his new capacity preparations for a new summit meeting by flying to Washington for consultations with James Baker.

During perestroyka, our language, foreign policy vocabulary as well, has been enriched by new words. Sometimes the desire to send glowing reports, wishful thinking and highfalutin language bury the fine ideas of new political thinking. Fewer words, more effective actions. It is important not only for our tormented policy and disintegrating economy but also for our diplomacy. "Move forward quicker, but not in a hurry." This expression would be a good motto at the new stage of foreign policy. All the trends of foreign policy should be balanced in a better way and it should be linked more tightly with the needs of the economy, internal policy and national security.

What can we expect then - "concentration" or a retreat, or acceleration after all?

One thing is clear: more difficulties and more day-to-day work lie ahead.

Economic

Poll Results on Currency Exchange Summarized

PM2102143991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article by S. Shpilko and V. Kosmarskiy, associates of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion: "What the People Think About Money Exchange"]

[Text] The exchange of 50- and 100-ruble [R] notes that has now begun has brought a storm of criticism. For various reasons, however, the general public's reaction to this government action has been far more mixed. We should first of all point out that opinion polls conducted by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion in recent years have registered quite high popularity for monetary reform involving the confiscation of unearned savings.

Support for this step appears perfectly logical against the background of the leveling mentality that is still dominant in the mass consciousness. True, the government has taken great pains to stress that there is no question of monetary reform in this particular case. The arguments of specialists are one thing, however, and the notions of ordinary people—something quite different.

The exchange of money in 1961 was also officially regarded as "changing the scale of prices," but the people have remembered it as "Khrushchev's monetary reform." Generally speaking, it is not a matter of terminology, because, as far as the ordinary citizen is concerned, the main question is not whether it is reform, exchange, or anything else.

The main question, as far as he is concerned, is: What is the purpose of this action, and is he going to suffer because of it? With regard to purpose, all postwar measures of this nature have been conducted under the slogan of combating unearned income, and defense of the "honestly earned ruble" has always been guaranteed. It is another matter that these promises have not always been kept.

This latest exchange is no exception: The same promises to protect money accumulated through honest labor, and the same objectives—to strike at the "shadow" economy, counterfeiters, and people in possession of illegally exported rubles.

There is no reason to doubt that objectives like these enjoy social support. Indeed, without even mentioning the results of earlier surveys, a poll of 1,000 residents in various Russian cities conducted after the start of the exchange showed that almost one-half of respondents approved of the idea to take this kind of action. Only one in three respondents expressed an opposite view, and one in five were "don't knows."

People's assessment of the organization of the exchange procedure is quite different. Here the picture is diametrically opposite: Only one in four respondents said that the organization of the money exchange was "satisfactory," and six out of 10 respondents said that it was "unsatisfactory."

Obviously this has a lot to do with people's doubts that one of the main objectives of the exchange has been achieved: To make life uncomfortable for the "shadow economy operators." In the opinion of 41 percent of respondents, "shadow economy operators" have not suffered at all from the exchange; almost as many believe that "they have suffered, but not much." Only one in 10 respondents believes that "shadow economy operators" have been caught out.

With regard to guarantees that honestly earned income will not be affected, Russian citizens believe that they have not been met in full. Only one in three respondents believes that honest working people have not suffered as a result of the exchange; 37 percent believe that they have suffered, but not much; and 20 percent believe that they have suffered a lot.

However, these notions could have arisen under the influence of the uproar of the first few days of the exchange on the one hand, or under the influence of the stand taken by some of the mass media on the other. You can judge this if only from the fact that a mere 12 percent of the respondents gave an affirmative answer to the question: "Have you personally or has any member of your family suffered through the exchange?" Moreover, only one in six of those who felt they had suffered had been unable to exchange their R50 and R100 notes in full. The rest complained that they had been left without any cash and that they were unable to withdraw the amount they needed from their savings account, or voiced fears that not all the money they had given in

would be exchanged. You must bear in mind, of course, that not all the respondents were totally frank when talking about personal losses.

But the train has not yet departed. The exchange has still to be completed, and it is too early to sum up the final balance of positive and negative assessments of it by the population.

The following point is also indicative. Despite repeated official statements that there are no plans to exchange R25 and R10 banknotes, only 27 percent of respondents believe this; 37 percent believe that they will nevertheless have to exchange their R25 and R10 notes; and the rest simply do not know what to expect.

A great deal will now depend on the efforts of the soviet executive committee commissions expected to decide the fate of money not yet returned to the population. A thorough investigation into various enterprises—especially trade and public catering enterprises—breaking the rules and conditions of handing in cash for exchange could have some positive results. But there is no need to blame cooperatives and joint enterprises for everything again. Attempts to make them the "scapegoats" again will hardly be taken seriously.

The following point must also be taken into account. The exchange is not likely to provoke a real outburst of public indignation—as long as no major miscalculations are made, of course. But if it is followed by more "economic recovery" measures that are really unpopular with the people, the shortcomings of the "exchange episode" will probably rebound in full against those responsible and the reaction of public opinion could be like a real avalanche.

Banking Union Offers Consultation, Arbitration

PM2202090791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Feb 91 Union Edition p 3

[Report by Ivan Zhagel: "Banking Union Strengthens Positions"]

[Text] Moscow—The annual results reported at the 15 February general meeting of the Moscow Banking Union (MBU) show that this association of commercial banks is becoming an influential component of the country's fundamentally new credit and financial system that is currently taking shape.

Having begun two years ago as a small group of enthusiasts, the union now unites more than 60 commercial banks, and its activities stretch from participation in lawmaking and the preparation of new banking laws to the development of an executive training scheme involving foreign specialists. New Soviet bankers can obtain the necessary legal and economic consultation within the MBU, and it often arbitrates in disputes between its commercial bank members.

It is interesting that a resolution at the MBU general meeting proclaimed one of its tasks to be the creation of a code of honor for bankers.

Latvian Price Reform Effects Reported

914D0154A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Feb 91 Union Edition p 4

[Article by IZVESTIYA staff correspondent I. Litvinova: "A Price Warning"]

[Text] Riga—**If there is a score on which the Baltic republics have definitely outstripped all others on the way to the market, it is price reform. Our correspondent describes how it proceeds in Latvia.**

Judging from the prices in Latvian stores, I do not live in the Soviet Union. However, since the editorial office pays me the same salary as its staff correspondents in other Union republics, I have no reason to believe that Latvia is not a part of the USSR.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the republic Ivars Godmanis stresses all the time that a price revolution in the entire Soviet Union is imminent, and that the leaders of the country welcome the resolute steps of Latvia along this path. Well, the residents of the Republic of Latvia have been walking for more than a month now. It is early to sum up the results as long as stocks in refrigerators and kitchen cupboards remain. However, it is perhaps already possible to weigh some of the "pros" and "cons" of the January price revolution in a single republic taken separately (it is also important in order to learn the lesson on the scale of the entire country).

To begin with, let us look at the primary argument of the supporters of price increases: The shelves will fill up after the increases are introduced. In the initial days after the hikes, Council of Ministers employees headed for the shops of Riga, Jurmala, Jelgava, and Ogre. There was even a note to this effect in the local press. The task of the officials was simple: To assess what had changed on the shelves after the price hikes. As a newspaper noted, the picture was not gratifying. For example, on 4 January, trade received only 237 tons of milk instead of the requested 580 tons. There was no sour cream or butter at all. The situation with meat products varied: good in some places, bad in others.

...On 3 January, I also went to a delicatessen with my family, as if for an excursion. We will never forget what we saw. A kilogram of meat cost 20 rubles [R]. A torte was R34. Despite the fact that the government was forced to cancel these record-breaking prices several days later, Ivars Godmanis, the head of the government, admitted that they would remember this R20 meat and discuss it in every way possible for a long time to come. However, other price increases that were not canceled were likewise impressive: A chicken for R6.50; a box of cookies (previously R0.38), R1.24; meat, R12.30; butter, R10; and cheese, R8. The cheapest bologna cost R9 and

some kopeks. A jar of sour cream cost R2.65 instead of R0.87. A carton of milk cost R0.65 instead of R0.24. I had to pay more than 50 kopeks for a loaf of bread at the bakery. Rye "bricks" were equally expensive.

I will quote the complaint of a retired female resident of Riga:

"I got my retirement benefit on the morning of 2 January, the new amount—R100. I went to the store the next day. I saw that they had meat dumplings. They used to cost R1.40, but now they cost R5.60. I stood there, looked at it, and went home empty-handed."

I believe that in the initial days there were a lot of those who "stood and watched," and apparently quite a few will also do so in the future.

We examined a price list together with trade employees at one of the largest self-service supermarkets, Minsk. They were puzzled: There was absolutely no logical explanation for some of the new prices. Let us look at, for example, the price metamorphoses of two brands of sausage. Children's sausage with cheese is a rare, high-quality product that buyers fought to snap up. On the other hand, "bologna bricks" always stayed on the shelves: With some justification, the people believed this product to be a mixture of meat wastes that are no longer usable for anything else, formed into some semblance of sausage in a half-decent way. Suddenly, after the increase, the price of the "brick" is on a par with "children's sausage with cheese."

Does it make sense for producers to improve quality given the several-fold growth of prices?

Of course, there was a prologue to the January "price revolution" in Latvia. As early as summer, the Latvian Association of Sociologists asked the populace: "Are price increases permissible?" Sixty-nine percent of those polled agreed to higher prices for alcohol and tobacco products; 56 percent did not object to higher bread prices. However, an absolute majority of those polled considered increasing all other prices—for meat, milk, consumer services and transportation, utensils, and clothing—impermissible. When they learned in September about an abrupt price increase in neighboring Estonia, they understood that they were in for a similar shock here as well. The government reassured them: "There will be no increase effective 1 October." A lull set in. To be sure, it was disrupted almost every week in the parliament by deputies of the Equal Rights faction who raised the issue directly:

"How justified are suppositions regarding a price reform?"

However, for reasons that are still unknown, the parliamentary majority of the People's Front set in motion the voting machine, and the issue was not placed on the agenda. The government did not play straight until the very last day. For example, they promised tentatively that prices would increase by a factor of three to 3.2; meanwhile, the prices actually soared five, seven, or even 10 times. That is, by 1,000 percent... Chairman of the Economic Commission Ojars Kehris admitted in the official newspaper DIENA that the opposition "had demanded all the time that our price policy be discussed by the parliament." However, joked the chairman, should 200 people decide whether sausage should cost R10 or R13? Only the threat of strikes in the first 10 days of January forced the faction of the People's Front to urgently place the issue of prices and compensation on the agenda.

Breaking loose after prolonged containment, the prices surged without hindrance. Given our shortage-ridden economy, they altogether went wild. The people had to pay between R5 and R8 for a lunch in employee canteens. It turned out that public catering, without much ado, immediately raised surcharges to the upper limit set by the department of prices in order to recoup expenditures and support its employees financially. Barber shops, laundries, and dry- cleaners were not far behind: The people had to fork over much more than before for services. In Jurmala, coefficients adjusting the old prices were introduced at consumer-service enterprises. For example, the coefficient for shoe repairs is 1.6. This means that you have to pay 60 percent more for repairing your shoes. The barbers raised the plank by 70 percent. Going to public baths for a wash became considerably more expensive, and so on, and so forth.

Fares of state-owned taxicabs doubled at the beginning of the year. Ordering a taxi by phone costs R1 now. Gasoline for private motorists is two times more expensive. The new telephone charge is R7.50 instead of R2.50. A kilowatt-hour of electricity costs the population six kopeks instead of four. The rate went up by one kopek in houses in which gas cooking ranges have been replaced with electric ones. Liquefied gas bottles became considerably more expensive. Rent increases are looming (they were temporarily suspended because of the dissatisfaction of some of the populace in January). It looks like almost R1 will have to be paid per square meter of dwellings instead of 6.5 kopeks. There is a danger that water rates will grow by a factor of three, and sewage rates by a factor of five. A bottle of champagne costs R15 now. Commuter train fares increased by a factor of two (reductions for those buying monthly passes were canceled). Vouchers for stays in Jurmala sanatoriums cost as much as R800 or R1,000. Movie tickets also became more expensive. It was announced that the department of prices would soon confirm new, higher cigarette prices. Day-care centers charge R100 or more now. The cost of school lunches increased several-fold.

Perhaps, this is enough. My article will turn into a price list otherwise. However, a price list may impress the people more than all other calculations.

Is anyone in Latvia arguing that the price reform is unnecessary? No. Not a single public movement or party

protested against changes in price setting. Many residents of the republic endorse the courage of the Godmanis government and the aggressive style of his decisions. It is obvious that changes are necessary. However, it makes sense to dwell on the mistakes of the Latvian reform because most regions have yet to experience soaring prices.

I have already mentioned the first mistake. It is possible that the motives of the government were good when it prepared its draft secretly, saying that the people should not get excited. However, the shock of consumers and the muteness of the legislature did not do any good. Quite logical questions were found in protest messages from labor collectives. What will the funds obtained due to the price increases be used for? When will the law on income indexation be ready that will ensure protection against arbitrary pricing? Finally, does the government have the right to pay compensation to some from the budget, that is, at the expense of all taxpayers, while making others look for reserves in the coffers of their enterprises and organizations?

At a meeting with opposition deputies, the head of the government, I. Godmanis, predicted that the standard of living in the republic would decline by 30 to 40 percent in 1991. A projection for 1991 prepared by the Council of Ministers says that the cost of living will almost double this year. Some economists consider realistic a situation in which the incomes of 78 percent of the population may turn out to be below the subsistence minimum. What about compensation?

The government envisaged compensation for children—R40 to R50, students—R45, retirees—R46, and employees of establishments financed from the budget—R66. What are the others to do? Economically accountable enterprises were ordered to secure R66 for their employees from their own funds. Actually, the enterprises will have to come up with an extra R120 per employee monthly, taking into account the turnover tax and the social tax (at present, it amounts to 37 percent of the labor remuneration fund in Latvia). Just how?

Finally, I will note that there is no abundance in the Latvian stores one month after the price transformations. There are disruptions with milk deliveries; the selection of other products is poor. There are lines and more lines everywhere, just as was the case before the increases. As I see it, the lines are shorter only at the Penguin ice-cream parlor where one portion now costs R1 instead of 60 kopeks.

Military

Moiseyev, Others Address Staff Communists

PM2102150191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Report by Colonel V. Semenov and Lieutenant Colonel I. Sas: "Firm Position; From USSR Armed Forces General Staff Party Conference"]

[Text] The country is experiencing a difficult period. The world around us is polarizing and demanding action. The social crisis, as the Political Statement of the January (1991) combined plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission notes, has reached a dangerous point beyond which destructive social upheavals are possible. The democratic process and positive transformations have been brought to the brink of breakdown.

The atmosphere of the conference of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff CPSU organization, which was held last week, as already reported, was permeated by concern at the fate of the party, perestroyka, and the united union state and by a quest for the most effective paths of military reform.

The report on the activity of the General Staff's CPSU organization to implement the decisions of the 28th party congress was delivered by Colonel General I. Larin, chairman of the organizing committee to prepare for the conference.

After comprehensively elucidating problems of reforming political organs and radically changing party structures in the Armed Forces, the speaker focused delegates' attention on party organizations' new tasks and the special features of the conditions for their implementation. The January combined plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission noted the critical state of the sociopolitical situation in the country. Its components are: the threatening nature of the internal disarray in society; the increase in the number of regions where opposition between political positions is assuming the forms of social and interethnic confrontation and the situation is often escaping the control of organs of power and resulting in manifestations of anarchy and bloodshed. The complex situation is also characterized by the emergence in the political arena and unification of forces that have chosen the aim of changing the social system in the USSR, removing supporters of the socialist choice from power, and lending an antisocialist, antipeople character to the transformations that are under way. Some republics are frankly disregarding decisions of the Congresses of USSR People's Deputies, and there are violations of the USSR Constitution and lawlessness there. In a number of republics the worst forms of national discrimination are being revived, and the formation of nationalist totalitarian regimes and a coordinated campaign against the CPSU are continuing. There are attempts by so-called democrats to shift onto the CPSU the blame for the results of their own incompetent management and their unfulfilled populist promises. The plenum opposed the attacks on the Army and security and internal affairs organs, which are most important state institutions.

The General Staff's Communists support the CPSU Central Committee Plenum's statement and would like to see them [as published] implemented via appropriate state decisions. They are sharply concerned at the prevailing situation and the damage to the country's defense

capability, which is being exacerbated by the crisis in the economy and the ill-considered conversion of defense sectors of industry. The previous perfectly reliable system of military mobilization work at local level has essentially been disorganized in the course of the economic and political reform. It was noted that these are grave conditions in which to fulfill the set tasks of ensuring the reliability of the country's defense and the corresponding demands of the defense minister's order for the current year.

Never before has the system for preparing young people for military service and manning the Armed Forces been in such disarray as at present. The reason for this situation lies in failure to fulfill the constitution and the Law on Universal Military Service Obligation and in the adoption in a number of republics of laws running counter to the all-Union law.

It has now become obvious that political forces, primarily of an antisocialist sort, are behind the anti-Army campaign and the shrill slogans about depoliticization and departyization of the Armed Forces. As a result of "departyization" they would like to remove CPSU organizations from the Armed Forces, and depoliticization would be followed by repoliticization, and then the destruction of the Armed Forces' political unity.

The creation in a number of republics of national armed formations under the command of local organs or else of various political, nationalist organizations is a new phenomenon that is dangerous to the country. Unfortunately, the speaker stressed, a certain step along this road has also been taken in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] with the creation of an RSFSR State Committee for Defense and Security as part of the Russian Government. Today a committee, tomorrow a staff. And what about the day after tomorrow..?

The president's decrees on eliminating illegal armed formations and confiscating weapons from the population have not been fulfilled, and no one has been called to account for this. Organized groups of guerrillas [boyeviki] are continuing to operate in the Transcaucasus and the Baltic republics and are being formed in oblasts of the West Ukraine. It could not be clearer that political struggle when there are illegal armed formations is no longer politicization but the disposition of forces for a possible fight.

Such are the internal conditions in which Army CPSU organizations are having to operate in the new structure that is being formed. To this should be added the sharp exacerbation of the international situation resulting from the war in the Persian Gulf region.

The problem of considerably improving the party organization's work on the ideological and political training of Communists is becoming a leading priority. Let us be blunt—there is still a lot of oversimplification and superficial educational activity. But a great deal is the consequence of the slackening of the attention paid in the CPSU as a whole to the theoretical interpretation of its policy and practice, which is placing it in the position of a party on the defensive. Moreover, from mid-1987 it was CPSU ideologists who launched an attack on Marxism-Leninism under the guise of criticism of dogmatism. But the destruction was not followed by creation, and now we are witnessing, in Lenin's words, "the results of a lack of ideological commitment and principle, which some frivolous people describe as freedom from dogma."

In these difficult conditions we must strengthen in every way the ideological unity of our party organizations. We must clearly and precisely define our position in fulfilling the task outlined in the 28th CPSU Congress resolution on military policy.

The contribution of Army party organizations to consolidating the CPSU's political leadership in the Armed Forces must lie primarily in preventing the formation of antisocialist, nationalist organizations in our troop collectives and in opposing any attempts to split the Armed Forces on political grounds.

Analyzing the sociopolitical and economic situation in the country, Army General M. Moiseyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, stressed in his speech: Perestroyka is running up against intensifying opposition from antisocialist and nationalist forces and against attempts to eliminate Soviet power and wreck the USSR. Crisis phenomena in the economy have become extremely acute, and interethnic conflicts are continuing. There is no abatement of anti-Army hysteria. It has just one aim—to destabilize the Armed Forces, sow mistrust of servicemen among the people, humiliate defenders of the homeland, and defame the glorious history and traditions of our Army as defender of the motherland. Communists must head the struggle against all negative phenomena.

Army Gen. M. Moiseyev dwelt on the most important aspects of the military-political situation in the world, particularly singling out events in the Persian Gulf zone, which are taking an increasingly disturbing and dramatic turn. Profound analysis of what is happening along with appropriate conclusions in the interests of further strengthening the country's defense capability are required.

The speaker described a range of constructive tasks in enhancing the combat and mobilization readiness of staffs, troops, and control organs. Special emphasis was placed on the complex of questions connected with the withdrawal of our forces from the East European countries, with accommodating [obustroystvo] them, and with fulfilling commitments under the Paris treaty. The importance of problems connected with elaborating proposals for the talks now being held in Geneva and

Vienna was stressed. This matter, Army Gen. M. Moiseyev stressed, requires a state approach, knowledge of legal questions, and consideration of the country's security interests.

A new task for the General Staff's Communists is to establish contacts with the various committees on defense and security questions being established in the republics. It is important here to prevent haste and rash decisions. But our position must be unshakable on one point: Our country needs a united Armed Forces. It is important to determine clearly what the center is going to do and what the republics are going to do, the speaker noted. There is food for thought for the General Staff's Communists here.

Touching on the exacerbated social problems of the Army and Navy raised by many Communists in their speeches, the chief of the General Staff said that these problems are important, vital, and very tricky. The housing problem is the main one among them. Specific measures are being taken. Thus the defense minister has adopted a decision to reorient military construction detachments exclusively toward the construction of housing. We must rely primarily on our own efforts.

Speaking of new approaches in organizing party work, Army Gen. M. Moiseyev expressed his vision of the priority areas in the activity of the General Staff party committee.

First, it must not be some kind of honorary new structure, but a working organ of Communists which is competent in everything that the General Staff directorates and departments deal with.

Second, the party committee is called upon to set the tone and organize the work of primary party organizations; to share their concerns; and to provide effective political, consultative, and financial assistance.

Third, one of the main tasks is the ideological, theoretical, and moral education of Communists; the struggle for the purity of the ranks of Lenin's party; and the enhancement of each person's individual responsibility for performing his party and official duty.

Fourth, cohesion; unity; endurance in upholding our convictions; and the ability to rebuff the calumnies, all the lies, filth, and slander poured upon the party and the Army, are today more necessary than ever. The party committee must display the qualities of organizer and political fighter.

And, fifth, Army Gen. M. Moiseyev said, the splitting off of the party committee as an autonomous party structure and the reforming of the General Staff Political Department as a military-political department certainly do not mean that these two structures should be isolated from each other. The General Staff resolves common tasks. Close organizational and intellectual collaboration is very important here.

Moreover, the party committee and party organizations must ensure the maintenance of a healthy moral and psychological climate in collectives and coordinated and harmonious work.

The report, as well as the speeches by Comrades V. Samokhvalov, I. Dedelev, A. Funtikov, and S. Pavlenko, defined priorities in the activity of party organizations and the General Staff party committee. Above all it is necessary to display principle and persistence in implementing CPSU military policy and in keeping fundamental questions of the country's defense and security within the exclusive competence of the USSR.

The conference analyzed in detail the activity of the General Staff's Communists to maintain the Armed Forces' combat readiness and combat capability during the current military reform; to strengthen military discipline; to improve cadre policy; and to elaborate draft laws on defense, universal military service obligation, and the status of servicemen. Along with the great volume of work in connection with the withdrawal of troops from the Central, Southern, and Western Groups of Forces and the preparation of accords on reducing conventional arms in Europe, a 50-percent reduction in USSR and U.S. strategic offensive arms, and verification of the fulfillment of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The content of party work fully reflects Communists' official concerns.

Critical assessments were voiced during the analysis of the treaties on reducing conventional arms in Europe. It was said that they were originally drawn up on a bloc basis, and after the Warsaw Pact essentially ceased its activity, the West gained substantial advantages.

The report and the delegates' speeches stressed the need to strengthen collaboration between the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry and other departments in studying urgent questions, bearing in mind that the priority of political means in ensuring the country's security certainly does not mean that responsibility for the country's reliable defense is shifted from the Armed Forces to diplomats.

The conference pointedly raised the topic of the social protection of servicemen in conditions of the transition to the market and the absence of guarantees of supplies of food products in conditions of essentially uncontrolled price hikes and general shortages.

Support was voiced from the platform for the idea that the Defense Ministry leadership should raise with the president and USSR Government the question of replacing food ration pay supplements for officers and warrant officers, regardless of their region of service, with food rations in kind. The conference also examined other aspects of party concern for people in uniform.

It has to be admitted that we career military men have rarely told the country's leadership of our vital needs, it was stressed from the party conference platform. Clearly,

this is why the firm opinion has become established that Soviet soldiers and officers are undemanding. The fact that they can sleep on their greatcoats, wear their greatcoats, repeatedly move by order from one region of the country to another, and steadfastly endure with their families the burdens of an unsettled daily life has begun to be regarded virtually as valor. How else can we explain the fact that in allocating newly commissioned state housing local authorities are ignoring the military, despite the well known USSR Government decision. In Moscow, for instance, this government decision was not fulfilled in 1989 and 1990. And recently the Moscow City Soviet leadership declared that it does not regard itself as obliged to fulfill the decisions adopted in preceding years.

The waiting list of many thousands of homeless officers has continued for many years in the Armed Forces. Proposals were made at the party conference—to more widely develop the construction of family hostels in garrisons. Officers must be freed of the need to reside in private apartments.

Many aspects of the life and activity of the General Staff's Communists were comprehensively analyzed at the party conference. The report, speeches, brief rejoinders, and statements clearly revealed a workmanlike vantage point which made it possible to survey the situation in the party, country, and Armed Forces and to define Communists' position. And in our view, this position is formulated in the laconic lines of the resolution: Despite the acuteness of the political and socioeconomic situation in the country, the General Staff's Communists clearly understand the sheer complexity of the current moment, have not lost their heads, have not panicked, and are continuing honestly and selflessly to serve the motherland. They remain loyal to their people and the socialist choice.

The party conference elected the secretary of the General Staff party committee. He is Colonel V. Samokhvalov. We can tell readers that Vyacheslav Rodionovich rose through the ranks from platoon commander to chief of staff of a motorized infantry division. For the last 10 years he has worked in various posts in the General Staff.

The delegates to the First All-Army Party Conference were also elected.

The following took part in the conference: Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR defense minister; O. Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; A. Soshnikov, senior official on the USSR president's staff; and Colonel General A. Ovchinnikov, first deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate.

Moiseyev Chairs Meeting on Army Day Rally

PM2102170591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by unnamed correspondent: "Organizational Matters Discussed"]

[Text] On 19 February, under the leadership of Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, there was a meeting of representatives of Moscow garrison troop units and military training establishments and also of Defense Ministry central apparatus directorates that will be participating in the 23 February rally on Manege Square, which is to be held on the initiative of a number of the capital's labor collectives, deputies' groups, and public organizations.

The meeting discussed organizational matters connected with servicemen's participation in the rally, which is being held on Soviet Army and Navy Day.

Pact General on Destruction of Iraq, NATO

AU2102114991 Berlin DER MORGEN in German 18 Feb 91 p 4

[Interview with Soviet General Valdimir Lobov, chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Forces and Supreme Soviet deputy, by Brigitta Richter in Berlin "at the end of last week": "The War Has Become a Means of Destroying Iraq"]

[Text] [Richter] General, the war in the Gulf threatens to escalate further, also as a result of the latest Iraqi statements. What do you think about U.S. policy in the Gulf?

[Lobov] Even though I come from the Army, I am against solving problems by force, that is, with military means. As you know, the UN Security Council made the decision—with the Soviet Union's agreement—that the aggressor, that is Iraq, must be forced to withdraw from Kuwait and that all means necessary to achieve that must be taken. However, what is happening at the moment goes far beyond what was decided by the United Nations. The war in the Gulf has become a means of destroying Iraq's civilian population and the economic potential.

[Richter] How should the war be ended, in your view?

[Lobov] It is now important to cease all fighting, and that Husayn withdraws from Kuwait at the same time. Then all involved and interested states must sit down at a table and find a solution to all questions in this region. It is impossible to solve the individual problems separately. This is not possible in this region. Here the problems must be solved globally. I hope that reason will prevail.

However, I warn against continuing to use the war as a testing field for new weapons, even for a new arms race. Such weapons and methods of leadership and conducting the war have never been used before. This worries us. The Americans thus get the opportunity not only to test their weapons but also to make corresponding changes in the entire technology. This, for its part, contributes to perfecting the U.S. forces and also the NATO forces. In the end, this leads to a violation of the parity between the two systems, and this harbors even greater dangers.

[Richter] But the two systems—Warsaw Pact and NATO—no longer exist in their previous form. In this respect, there is no parity any longer.

[Lobov] You are right, but the situation is all the more dangerous as a result. In a situation, in which the Warsaw Pact is in the process of dissolution and in which the other side has the opportunity to test its latest technology in the Gulf, in this situation the former party is being completely destroyed. The fact alone that the Warsaw Pact will soon disappear but NATO will remain means that there is no longer any parity.

In the past, the aim of NATO was clear, it was aimed against the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact no longer exists. Against whom is NATO aimed now? Parity is something that should be taken into consideration. And, therefore, we are for the dissolution of NATO. NATO's military expenditures alone amount to about $700 billion. The Warsaw Pact now does not have any expenditures any more. Why and against whom does NATO spend $700 billion?

[Richter] Do you not cling do the old way of thinking in terms of blocs? After the end of the Cold War, these blocs no longer exist, and NATO considers itself as a voluntary association of states for the organization of security.

[Lobov] If this is the case, the Warsaw Pact would continue to be necessary and would have to remain in existence.

[Richter] However, the other East European states no longer want this, because they see the Warsaw Pact as an instrument of the Soviet policy of hegemony.

[Lobov] I think that the public and the tax payers in the NATO states are not aware of the purpose of the money for the preservation of NATO. So far they have paid for the defense against the Warsaw Pact, but why are they continuing to pay now?

[Richter] The discussions last year proved that the majority of the states in Eastern and Western Europe do not want a dissolution of NATO. Why does the Soviet Union not simply cooperate with NATO?

[Lobov] No, we have nothing to defend together with NATO. We doe not have any enemies any more. Against whom should we defend ourselves together with NATO?

[Richter] How should security in Europe be organized in the future, in your view?

[Lobov] Instead of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, a new security system must be established. Last November, on the occasion of the CSCE summit, all participating states signed the Paris Charter. With this, they automatically accepted responsibility for security in Europe. The NATO states are also among the signatories. Thus, with their signature under the Charter, they have agreed to a new organization of security. And, whether or not this was intended, they thus expressed the fact that NATO is obsolete.

[Richter] In this connection, how did the army receive the concession by the Soviet leadership last summer to agree to the GDR's inclusion in NATO?

[Lobov] As in your country, we, too, have pluralism of opinion. This means, if there are concerns or criticism, they are expressed. However, as early as in January 1988 President Gorbachev talked about returning the Soviet troops from abroad by the end of 1996. Our concerns are now caused by the fact that NATO is not doing anything similar. There are not only Soviet troops on German territory, but also U.S., Belgian, British, and French forces. And if Germany concludes a treaty with us in which we agree to the withdrawal of all our troops, then, of course, one asks in our country, why only us and not the others?

[Richter] Do you think that Germany is a threat to the Soviet Union?

[Lobov] If this were the case, we would not withdraw our troops. On the contrary, we have a strong need to see Germany as an alliance partner—in all fields. I think that the terrible experiences that we had with each other in World War II, will not reoccur.

[Richter] But will the Soviet Union manage to tolerate psychologically cooperation with the increasingly strong economic power, Germany, while the role of the Soviet Unions is on the decline?

[Lobov] The economic weight of the Soviet Union will not decline in the long run, it will not starve. The Soviet Union will develop on the basis of new, democratic principles. We will manage to get through the transition to the market economy, and this will be a stimulus for the development of our country. On this basis, new relations with Germany and the other states will develop. I think that we will go through a development together, and we will assume the place in the world that is due to us.

Baltic Republics

Landsbergis, Norwegian Deputies Discuss Aid

LD1902125991 Vilnius International Service in English 2300 GMT 18 Feb 91

[Text] Today, head of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis received Mr. (Ingvas Dugordel), member of the Norwegian Storting, or parliament. The Norwegian member of parliament informed Mr Landsbergis about a special parliamentarian group recently set up to render wide-scale assistance to the Baltic states.

It appears that the Norwegian Parliament has already endorsed an aid project for the Lithuanian national television network whose premises continue to be occupied by Soviet military troops.

Various aid programs aimed at rendering material and financial support to the Lithuanian economy are currently being discussed in Norway, Mr. (Ingvas Dugordel) said.

Prunskiene Returns to Lithuania

LD2102174591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1607 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, 21 Feb (TASS)—Kazimiera Prunskiene, the former prime minister of Lithuania, returned home on Wednesday, IZVESTIYA reports today.

According to the words of the former republican prime minister, she went to the West with the aim of strengthening and expanding connections with the international organization "Aid to Lithuania," which was set up last year at the former's initiative.

Now, the newspaper notes, she has to join in the work of the republic's Supreme Council, and surely to withstand a new wave of criticism addressed to her.

Lithuanian Separatists 'Deluding' Selves

PM2002162491 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Report by A. Gelbakh: "As the Question Is, So the Answer Is: What the Results of the Lithuanian Poll Show"]

[Text] At first the measure was called a poll. Then the word "plebiscite" was added, apparently to ensure that foreign observers who had come to Lithuania would understand more readily. But once the voting was over, certain overzealous commentators called it a referendum.

Now the press abounds with claims that whichever way you look at it the results of the poll, or whatever you prefer to call it, represent a resounding victory. A victory for whom and over what? No doubt they are referring to the fact that the intention was to overrule the announcement by the Union Supreme Soviet and the USSR president of a referendum for 17 March this year, which local authorities deem unacceptable. Such a referendum, they explain, constitutes "direct interference by a neighboring state in Lithuania's domestic affairs."

And so public opinion has now been clarified. Around 90 percent of those who voted said "yes" to an independent and democratic republic. The overall turnout was approximately 84 percent. The result is being passed off as impressive. Frankly, I would say it was a foregone conclusion. After all, you have to agree that nobody in his right mind would say "no" to independence and democracy.

Perhaps only those sensing a catch in the question realized that a response to it will be used to justify the republic's secession from the USSR. There were many such people. For example, the poll was boycotted by 75 percent of voters in Shalchininkskiy Rayon, over 50 percent of voters in Vilnius and the Vilnius region [Vilnyusskiy Kray], and approximately 16 percent of voters in the republic as a whole. More than two percent invalidated their ballot papers—that is, struck out both "yes" and "no." A further six percent of voters came out against being "independent and democratic."

One way or another, whether by boycotting the poll, invalidating the ballot paper, or answering "no," around 25 percent of all citizens of Lithuania entitled to vote opposed the poll. In absolute terms, this represents over 600,000 people.

USSR President M.S. Gorbachev has declared the poll in Lithuania juridically unfounded, and of course he is right. Formally, the poll results prove only that the vast majority of the population of Lithuania aspires to building a democratic and independent state. But this is precisely why perestroyka, introduced in the USSR in 1985, was conceived. So there is no contradiction here. Neither is there any contradiction in an independent and democratic Lithuania forming part of a revitalized Union. In other words, the republic needs the 17 March referendum too. But...the republic's separatist leadership does not want to organize it.

There is no point in kidding ourselves. It may not have been quite 90 percent of the voters, but nevertheless a vast majority of those who went to the polling stations were undoubtedly aware that they were not voting for some imaginary democratic republic to be built at some unspecified time in the future, but rather to secede from the USSR. In Lithuania, everyone has known for a long time that the Sajudists say one thing, imply another, and then do something else altogether. Yes, they deceive the people. Yes, they caused trouble and then very effectively exploited the shock over the events of 13-14 January this year. But this does not change matters.

The Lithuanian Communist Party has always supported and continues to support the republic's unity and territorial integrity, but only if it remains part of a revitalized USSR. But when separatists direct all their efforts toward smashing the Soviet Union, then equally resolute

measures have to be taken in respect of them, all the more so as there are juridical and historical grounds for doing so.

We have to acknowledge that Landsbergis' team is resolute and consistent. It has a wealth of highly qualified advisers from various Western secret services. This team is always half a step or even a full step ahead of our unresourceful and uncertain center. But we should not overestimate the capabilities of Landsbergis and Co. The separatists are making mistakes which must be exploited in a struggle which has today become bitter to the point of irreconcilability.

For example, the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet has declared the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, its secret protocols, and the consequences of these documents illegal. However, the handing over to Lithuania of Vilno [now Vilnius], Vilno region [Vilenskiy Kray], and several Belorussian rayons in October 1939 was a direct result of the agreement between Stalin and Hitler. So logic dictates that this too must be seen as fundamentally illegal. That is how the question looks from a juridical standpoint.

There are historical and moral grounds for this argument too. Above all, for centuries Vilno and the Vilno region were populated mainly by Poles, Belorussians, Russians, and Jews. Lithuanians were always in an absolute minority in the city and surrounding regions. But the region was liberated during the war by Soviet troops, the Polish Kraj and People's Armies, and the Belorussian partisans. Vilno was restored from ruins by its native inhabitants and also by workers and specialists who came to the city from all over the Soviet Union to help. They did 6 million hours' work free of charge to rebuild the city. It was not until the late fifties and early sixties that people from central Lithuanian cities and villages began to arrive en masse. They came to comfortable apartments which had been restored and built by "migrants," "zombies," and "occupying forces." They were given prominent positions in ministries and departments and leading posts in enterprise administrations. Such was the "international" policy of the then Lithuanian leadership which, for some reason, is causing the Sajudists so much dissatisfaction now.

These historical facts can be confirmed by thousands of living witnesses and participants in the events of 30-40 years ago. But according to the nationalists, these testimonies are not worth a dime next to their idle talk about the ethnic land of the Lithuanians. But it seems to me that they are worth something. They are worth offering as food for thought to those who are debating whether or not to participate in the referendum on the question of preserving the USSR.

The question of the Klaipeda region [Klaypedskiy Kray] is also transparently clear in the event of Lithuania seceding from the USSR. In 1945, the Soviet Army liberated the German town of Memel and the surrounding German regions. Moreover, Memel and Memel Oblast had previously belonged to Germany for several centuries. Only for 15 years was it an autonomous formation within Lithuania. And far from being given to Lithuania, this region was actually given to the Soviet Union—the victor in the Great Patriotic War against fascism.

Landsbergis and company conducted this general poll (plebiscite) with a very specific aim. They got the result they wanted. Personally I would suggest that we fully recognize its validity. I would also suggest that we promptly recognize the Lithuanian Republic's independence from the Soviet Union. But only within those borders existing at the time the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was signed. Because Lithuania's borders altered as a result of this pact, and this pact was supposedly "illegal" from the very beginning.

Lithuanian separatists yearn for interstate talks with the USSR. So it follows that we should meet with them once again and grant just such a status to the talks. We must begin by going over to world prices, using only a fully convertible currency, in settling accounts with an independent Lithuania—within its August 1939 borders. The territories of the Vilno and Klaipeda (Memel) regions and the former Belorussian rayons must be seen as disputed and placed under the USSR president's jurisdiction with a view to becoming the key question at interstate talks.

Today, after the poll, many are asking those who have openly supported and continue to support the preservation of the USSR: "So what are you going to do, pack your suitcases? Go off to Siberia or the Far East?" What can you say to this? You know, Landsbergists and Sajudists believe that "zombies" and "migrants"—in fact all who believe in the principles of internationalism—should have no say or self-respect in a "free and democratic" Lithuania. But they seem to be deluding themselves. After all, this question can be answered by another question of equally malicious irony: "And when are you going to get out of Vilnius and go back to Klaipeda, Kaunas, or Kelm?" A malicious question—a malicious answer. But then people in glass houses shouldn't throw stones.

Year of Lithuanian Independence Viewed

91UN0911A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain Second Rank V. Gromak: "From a Lithuanian Notebook: What They Achieved in a Year"]

[Text] **Time is bringing us closer to 11 March. On that day a year ago the Supreme Soviet of the republic approved the Declaration of Independence. With it, the republic is approaching the anniversary of its "independence."**

The Price of Protestation and the Cost of Living

There is no denying that the heat of political passions has overshadowed economic questions. But as specialists attest, they will make themselves felt soon. As previously, the problem of prices still exists. G. Vagnorius, the new prime minister of the republic, also admitted this at a session of the legislature.

But now here is one more opinion. "The deputy minister of trade," writes the newspaper RESPUBLIKA, "explained to us that in the last week and a half the sale of some commodities has increased by a factor of 1.5 to two... For example, 120 tons of bread per day was quite enough for Vilnius, but last week 190-210 tons was needed. While the government supposed that losses in the first days of the new year for the republic would be 7 billion rubles [R], the losses have now reached R10 billion."

This is an important signal for any economist. The fact is that the increase in the demand for bread always indicates that people are buying other food products less, and are taking the cheapest ones. Is this news for the parliamentarians? I think not. As early as December, when analyzing the income and expenses of Lithuania's draft budget for 1991, individual parliamentarians warned of the situation that has now developed in the republic. It was clear at that time that this document lacked a realistic basis: What will prices be like, what will the relationship with Union and Western markets be, and how much hard currency will the enterprises bring?

At the end of December the newspaper LITVA SOVETSKAYA published a speech by Deputy V. Shved on the draft budget. He called the draft budget a draft of impoverishment of the people. In reality, the chief burden of expenditures is placed on the shoulders of citizens. Taxes have increased by 67 percent. But is it possible to increase wages proportionately as well?

I will add also that, in connection with the rise in prices, compensation was planned in the sum of R1.5 billion. However, even preliminary calculations showed that the measures being planned do not solve the problem, and that the compensation does not cover the actual expenditures of the population. A small example. With the increase in the price of meat by R8 per kilogram (which happened on 7 January), and considering the annual average consumption per person of 80 kilograms, it would be necessary to appropriate R640 rubles per person as compensation; that is, R53 per month. But a total of R33.94 is planned.

All of this naturally leads to a significant increase in the cost of living. In many ways, this is the reason for political instability.

How Is the 'New Authority' Living?

Just several years ago, while fighting for power, today's leaders of the republic were very troubled by the bureaucracy of the party apparatus, governmental officials, and the exorbitant expenditures on their wages. But this year there was an increase of 66 percent on these expenditure items.

But take the budget of the department of the kray guard. It exceeds R100 million. For additional customs—R24.4 million. There is an allocation of R1.3 million for the department of state security. This adds up to more than R126 million. In the meantime, the department of science and education is allocated only R34.3 million. You can draw your own conclusions.

But the "new authority" itself does not live too badly. There are facts which indicate that the special Repair and Construction Administration and the Combine of Communal Enterprises (KKP) under the governmental affairs administration of Lithuania appropriated several thousand rubles for themselves through machinations. Moreover, the KKP acquired and sold bricks, slabs, flooring, and mortar to the "Kaltanenai" kolkhoz in Svencenski Rayon at a reduced price. Why this generosity? It turns out that the home was being built for the son of the head of the government, K. Prunskiene, (she is now retired). The reconstruction of the farmstead of Prunskiene's mother was carried out at the same kind of prices...

There are quite a few facts like this in my notebook. New salary rates, new privileges... In practice, the changes made it possible only for the representatives of the Sajudis leadership to get set up in life. Then can this really be called a change?

What Are the 'Democrats' Here Seeking?

In recent days representatives of various democratic movements, as they refer to themselves, have been appearing in Vilnius. As a rule they do not contribute to a stabilization of the situation. What happens is just the opposite.

In the republic's legislature, USSR People's Deputy S. Sulakshin declares: "Believe me, it is not Russian tanks that were here, it is CPSU tanks that were here. This is a monstrous organization, ready to spill blood even in Russia." This opinion was seconded in a unique way by L. Kobzistyy, a representative of the Ukrainian National Party, and by K. Svetitskiy, a special correspondent of the Moscow journal STOLITSA, to whom the mass media made its pages available. One declares: "My fellow countrymen from the Central Ukraine understand me, and they promise not to shoot at my appeal to them." The second: "I am confident that after the Union falls apart to everyone's relief, the Lithuanian Communist Party will be the only one to suffer from this...

So, freedom of opinions? But why turn everything upside down? Who benefits from this?

It is significant that recently the interest of such figures in servicemen has been noted. They are trying to penetrate military barracks. That very same Kobzistyy was arrested by a detail of Internal Troops at the television

tower in an effort to conduct anti-Army propaganda. In the last few days a group of young people were noticed at the regimental command post of a northern compound where a garrison is located. I arrived there after six of them had already been arrested, and two succeeded in hiding.

A certain V. Laskin was indignant most of all over the fact of being arrested. In everyone's hearing, he declared that in his time he refused to serve in the Army, for which he was put behind bars. On learning that he was conversing with a correspondent of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, he declared on the spot: He refuses to answer the questions of "a representative of a newspaper I do not respect," and if his name is mentioned in the newspaper he will take the author to court. Indeed, I. Vlasov, a representative of the Kerch organization of the Democratic Union Party; I. Krasovskiy from Simferopol, a representative of the newspaper KRASNYY KURYER; Ye. Knyazhev, a member of the Tyumen committee of the Democratic Union; and O. Tomilin, a correspondent of DEMOCRATIC UNION-INFORM, did not leave the conversation. It became clear from their words that they came to Vilnius by a decision of a congress of their party, they came to talk with the soldiers, and they were arrested. They say, once again the arbitrary rule of soldiers. As for the detention, here, I believe that everything is proper, because they tried to conduct a conversation with a sentry at his post. Also, they did not come with empty hands: Those who were detained had Democratic Union leaflets in their hands...

Shortly after, here in Vilnius, I bought the newspaper SVOBODNOYE SLOVO—a newspaper of the Moscow Democratic Union organization. Its eighth page was devoted entirely to "the burning issues of the day" under the heading "The Military Situation: How to fight it?"

The publication states that from 13 to 17 December 1990 a founding conference was held in Warsaw of the "coordination center of anticommunist parties and organizations of the Soviet empire." The main task of the center is coordination of efforts and mutual assistance of radical anti-Soviet parties and movements "in the fight for democracy and the real independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union." Further specific recommendations are given.

For example, there is a paragraph-by-paragraph description of what has to be done to set up secret structures of organizations, conspiracy quarters, a system of secret printing presses, coded information, and the establishment of courier networks. There is advice on how to oppose the authorities. "It is already necessary today to provide for the possibility of acquiring weapons for an armed struggle," the article recommends.

I do not think any commentary is necessary.

What Is the Forecast Like?

What will happen in the future? Let us give some thought to the kind of political and economic forecast that is made by former allies—the Democratic Labor Party (the former independent Communist Party) and the Lithuanian Communist Party.

G. Kirkilas, deputy chairman of Democratic Labor Party:

"The CPSU organization in Lithuania will have to go underground. All those who attempted to carry out the January coup in the Lithuanian Republic will be brought before organs of the court of law, and the Army will be forced to leave Lithuania."

U. Ermalavicius, chief of the ideological department of the Lithuanian Communist Party:

"The operation of the Constitution of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] will be restored on the entire territory of Lithuania. The people will elect a genuine people's government and legislature, and V. Landsbergis and his clique will be tried for inciting interethnic dissension and the complete collapse of the economy."

These are the kind of contrasting views that exist. But for the time being, Prime Minister Vagnorius informed the Supreme Soviet that the first stage of the price reform should start in February. As is well known, the 7 January increase in prices resulted in a very powerful social outburst in the republic.

About the Referendum

The forecasts of the future of Lithuania cited above were made before the poll on the future of the republic which was taken last Saturday. Our readers probably noticed how some of the media appraised the findings of the voting in a very one-sided way. Headlines of the type "Lithuania Chooses Freedom" do not fully reflect the situation that exists in the republic.

A number of questions come up. Why after a year of "independence" did V. Landsbergis only now decide to conduct a poll of the population, which, by the way, was declared to be against the law by the president of the USSR? Of course, this decision was influenced by the January events in Vilnius. Especially since Sajudis was able to "squeeze" maximum dividends from the tragedy.

What is so is so.

As is known, a majority of those voting said "yes" to the question: "Are you for the Lithuanian state becoming an independent democratic republic?" The question is worded in such a way that there virtually can be no doubt of the answer. At the same time, apparently, the Unity movement did not accidentally make a protest regarding the poll. It says: At 1400 Kaunas radio transmitted data of the republic commission stating that in Kaunas 10-15 percent of the population participated in the poll, in Sneckus 10 percent, and in Salcininkai eight percent. In the remaining six hours to the end of the voting, the number of votes in these same districts, if the commission is to be believed, amounted to another 13 percent

on the whole. But, as Unity observers declared, attendance in these districts during all of these hours was extremely low. In Vilnius the voting districts were empty, which is indicated by the film material of the Unity video group. This kind of material was photographed in 10 districts, and the activity of people with portable ballot boxes who were making the rounds of citizens' apartments was observed. When queried by the observers, they refused to give an explanation.

But will the republic go through an all-Union referendum? The legislature refuses to organize it. Diverse reasons are expressed. But I think that V. Landsbergis himself, despite the success last Saturday, doubts achieving the results he needs. As is known, the referendum on the preservation of the USSR will take place in the country on 17 March.

This makes it possible to come to the conclusion that it is through the incitement of political passions that Sajudis is trying for the umpteenth time to keep its reputation and to distract people from the daily problem of living. This is what the republic will bring to the anniversary of its "independence."

Status of Vilnius Radio, TV Buildings Viewed

LD1402225391 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 0100 GMT 14 Feb 91

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] One month ago, on 13 January, airborne troops invited by the National Salvation Committee seized Lithuanian radio and television and the television tower.

Guoda Litvaitiene at the microphone: On that night, 13 peaceful people lost their lives defending the television tower and about 600 people were injured. At present, soldiers and officials of the Lithuanian Communist Party are playing masters in the Lithuanian radio and television house and on the television tower. The collaborators' television program is being broadcast from there and part of the premises have been converted into army barracks. According to Laimonas Katinas, chairman of the Board of the Lithuanian Radio and Television, the fate of these buildings is as vague as a month ago.

[Katinas] "So far it is clear who gave the orders to occupy these buildings, on what grounds they are occupied, and who is the master of these buildings. The Lithuanian Communist Party maintains they are not the master, they have no authorization, and the military are only kindly allowing them to use the equipment. The military maintain that they have occupied these buildings for protection and they regard them as a military object. To the question on why they are doing this, they start mentioning their propaganda theses that the Lithuanian radio and television had been transmitting extremist broadcasts, inciting discord, etc. However, they cannot say anything about the reasons for the seizure. Thus, at present it appears that our buildings belong to nobody. There have been rumors that we could be [words indistinct] by Moscow's central television and radio, but Kravchenko, chairman of the Soviet State Radio and Television Committee, stated during our conversation, in the presence of witnesses, that they have no juridical, property, or other claims to our television and, since the Union committee [words indistinct] and our television were being maintained from the budget, the situation is a paradox.

"Kravchenko has stated that he had talked with Gorbachev and with Interior Minister Pugo. These two gentlemen asserted that this is not in order, that this matter should be concluded. But so far no practical steps have been taken. Maybe things will be clearer when the Lithuanian-Soviet negotiations start. According to [words indistinct] Doguzhiyev has authorizations and he will state his opinion."

[Litvaitiene] According to Laimonas Katinas, there is no hope that we will soon return to work in the radio and television building. Even if the military leave this house today, one will first have to count all the losses, bring everything in order, and only then begin our work. Meanwhile, attempts are being made to find additional premises for radio and television workers and to improve their poor working conditions. Radio studios have been established in several places in Vilnius and Kaunas. Kaunas has become the Lithuanian television center. Studios in Panevezys, Siauliai, and other places are joining the national network. So far there is one television studio in Vilnius, in the parliament house. The main concern of the director of radio and television economics and technology, Juozas Neverauskas, is the condition of the equipment left in the premises.

[Neverauskas] "It is difficult to draw general conclusions because one can only imagine what is happening. From the stories of some of our officials who happened to see—I went there myself several times, on 18 January I went together with Deputy Rupeika as official representatives to inspect the equipment. We were not allowed into some premises. We were told that people are working there and we could not enter, but as far as we could see, especially in the radio section, everything was in a terrible state. Broken furniture, broken doors, telephones and other equipment destroyed. We could not see much in the new building, but [passage indistinct] lock damaged by a shot, and so on. Virtually everything that is suitable for [word indistinct] tape recorders, television sets, telephones, loudspeakers, microphones, and so on. Virtually everything has been plundered and stolen. Our officials have not been allowed into the rooms with equipment, therefore we can only draw rough conclusions from how the work is progressing, from what is being broadcast."

[Litvaitiene] The fate of the television tower is also not clear. Armored vehicles are outside, the military inside. According to Alfredas Bacevicius, the Lithuanian deputy minister of communications, the state of technical equipment in the tower has been getting worse. It has been estimated that losses inflicted to the tower are

roughly 3 million rubles. On the night of the attack, Subotin let the paratroopers into the tower through the emergency entrance and now, according to foreign journalists, for 150 German marks or $200 he gives interviews and shows people around in the tower. Vice Minister Alfredas Bacevicius:

[Bacevicius] "Last week there was hope that we would regain the tower because we told our guest from Moscow that our people will not work together with the military. Our people have refused to work in the occupied television tower. But yesterday the same guest, Dudkin, a television department head from the Union Ministry of Communications, was persuading us that the guards will be moved outside and that our people could work. We repeated yesterday that our people will not work with military guards present. We can protect ourselves and work as we used to before 13 January. The guest from Moscow went to the tower. Our former official, Subotin, and Popov, who arrived form somewhere, are playing masters there. He talked to them. They made certain demands. But the feeling is that they cannot decide anything by themselves. Dudkin promised to talk at the Ministry of Communications, to prepare a letter to the USSR Council of Ministers, and even to the Defense Ministry to return the premises to communication workers."

[Litvaitiene] According to Alfredas Bacevicius, the main property in the tower are transmitters. So far they are not operating, but the state they will be when the military return them one can only guess. There are no experts at present in the tower.

[Bacevicius] "Nobody coordinates or regulates the parameters and each day, television viewers may notice it, both the colors and the picture are getting worse. The Soviet Communications Ministry, it seems, has asked experts in the Ostankino tower, who came this week at someone's request, to help coordinate the equipment. But, of course, they cannot do everything because some changes have been made and they are known to our experts only. And our experts categorically refuse to help. There are also more economic problems. The heating system is out of order. Many articles are damaged, windows broken, as we all know. They would like our technicians and electricians to come to work but they all categorically refuse."

[Litvaitiene] Today at noon journalists and technicians assembled at the Lithuanian radio and television house. With a minute's silence they honored those who lose their lives, lit candles, laid flowers and sang Dear Lithuania. A brief meeting took place. Then people went to the television tower and laid flowers at the Antakalnis cemetery on the graves of those who lost their lives.

Danish Parliament Promises Support for Baltics

PM2102104391 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Feb 91 p 7

[Report by RITZAUS BUREAU correspondent Rasmus Vibe: "Baltic Region Wins Promise of Support—But Not of an Embassy"]

[Text] Riga—The Folketing Presidium announced in Riga yesterday that the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should not nourish hopes that the Danish Government will go it alone and establish diplomatic relations with them—regardless of the fact that a united Folketing would probably back such a decision.

It is quite simply unrealistic to imagine that the Soviet authorities would accept any Danish Embassy in the Baltic region, and therefore such an initiative would be an empty gesture, was the message.

According to Folketing President H.P. Clausen, Latvian President Anatolijs Gorbunovs had some understanding for the Danish position, despite his burning desire for diplomatic relations with Denmark.

In return the Presidium promised that Denmark would support the Baltic countries' struggle for independence in all other ways—economic and cultural cooperation, for example. H.P. Clausen, who in his speech to the Latvian parliament reminded his audience that within the EC Denmark is working to halt economic and technical aid to the Soviet Union in protest at the Soviet authorities' brutal behavior in the Baltic countries, promised that Denmark will also exert pressure in international forums such as the EC and the Nordic Council.

And the Danish parliamentarians received a disturbing and gloomy firsthand impression of the seriousness of the Balts' struggle for freedom and independence. In Latvia, too, they had to pass barricades and volunteer armed guards in order to enter the parliament building. Damage to several buildings was a reminder of the distressing shooting less than a month ago in which six Latvians lost their lives.

Life in the capital is cobred by nervousness and tension. A powerful explosion at the headquarters of the Communist Party Central Committee on Tuesday [12 February]— the day that the Folketing Presidium arrived in Riga—was an unpleasant reminder of how close one is to a catastrophe. No one was killed in the explosion, but most windows in the large building were shattered.

In Riga the Presidium also met with representatives of the communists loyal to Moscow, who have one-third of the seats in parliament. H.P. Clausen described the talks with the Communist Party representatives as a frightening experience.

"Party chairman Sergejs Dimanis clearly does not respect democratic decisions, and he claims that there

was cheating in the elections which brought the Democratic People's Front to power in Latvia a year ago," H.P. Clausen said.

In his speech to the parliament H.P Clausen expressed regrets that the optimism that the West felt for perestroyka and glasnost is unfortunately slowly disappearing and that the Kremlin is sometimes falling back into its old propagandistic rhetoric.

Savisaar Interviewed on Iceland Visit Agenda

LD2002181291 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1000 GMT 20 Feb 91

[Interview with Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar by correspondent Ain Saarna in Sweden; date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Saarna] A republic of Estonia governmental delegation led by Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar stopped over in the Kingdom of Sweden on Monday [18 February] on its way to the Republic of Iceland. [passage omitted] In just a couple of hours they will be flying to Iceland. There has been speculation since last week as to what Edgar Savissar will indeed be doing there. The Lithuanian experience exists—Iceland recognized the Republic of Lithuania officially. How should we reply to people who are asking questions before your take-off?

[Savisaar] I am carrying a joint message from the Supreme Soviet chairman and the government chairman to the president and prime minister of the Republic of Iceland on developing contacts further. It raises quite a number of issues on where these contacts should lead. However, at the moment I would not consider the issue of recognition as the most important even though it is important and in a recent interview in the RAHVA HAAL I tried to substantiate it.

For me the number one issue at present is to lead the talks between the Baltics and Moscow out of the dead end where they have been sitting for quite some time. I think that as long as the talks are bilateral—a so-called internal union matter—nothing will come of them. The only way possible is indeed to change these talks into international ones, that is, to find a mediator. In this respect the proposal Iceland made some time ago—that was before Lithuania was recognized—where it was proposed that Iceland could mediate—this caught our attention. There was talk of this with the Icelandic foreign minister who visited Estonia a while ago and now we are trying to go even further to find a constructive path of advancement from the original idea.

Estonian Deputies Seek Pay Raise

LD2002180891 Moscow TASS in English 1146 GMT 20 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn February 20 TASS—Rising living costs in Estonia make it hard even for republic's parliamentarians to make ends meet, according to Estonian Deputy Tiid Maade.

On behalf of the parliamentary commission on foreign affairs, Maade introduced a proposal to increase deputies wages from 500 to 1,200 roubles a month, tax-free.

The official subsistence wage in Estonia is 150 roubles.

Several deputies said the proposal was unethical, because it came from members of the parliament themselves.

The final decision on the proposal is expected to be taken on February 21.

Lithuanian Draft Law on Employment

914A0356A

For the text of the Lithuanian Draft Law on Employment published in the 20 and 21 November EKHO LITVY, see JPRS-UEA-91-008, pages 31-37.

Lithuanian Law on Partnerships

914A0337A

For the text of the Lithuanian Law on Partnerships published in the 13 November EKHO LITVY, see JPRS-UEA-91-008, pages 37-43.

RSFSR

Legislature Debates Yeltsin Resignation Demand

AU2202151991 Paris AFP in English 1424 GMT 22 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, Feb 22 (AFP)—Opponents of Russian President Boris Yeltsin went back on the offensive Friday [22 February] as bitter debate rocked the Russian parliament over when to convene a special session to discuss a call for his resignation.

Conservative legislators launched impeachment proceedings against Mr. Yeltsin Thursday after he demanded Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's "immediate resignation" in a televised interview Tuesday.

A total of 272 MPs demanded that the full parliament hold an extraordinary session by February 25 to formally topple Mr. Yeltsin, head of the Soviet Union's largest and most powerful republic and Mr. Gorbachev's main political rival.

Violent debates over the date broke out in parliament again Friday, with proposals ranging from March 4 to March 25, but no conclusive decision was made, INTERFAX news agency said.

Hardliners want the meeting to convene before March 17, the scheduled date for a nationwide referendum on the future of the Soviet Union as a federal state.

But Yeltsin supporters, who plan to ask voters to endorse plans for a directly elected Russian Presidency, want the congress held off until April.

If Mr. Yeltsin came under fresh attack or were forced to stand down before March 17, observers said, it would seriously threaten his chances of winning a free election.

Mr. Yeltsin, for his part, wants the session held as late as April 25, INTERFAX said.

During a visit Thursday to the town of Yaroslavl, 300 kilometers (180 miles) northeast of Moscow, Mr. Yeltsin said "dialogue and cooperation must continue if we are to remain where we find ourselves" in remarks quoted by INTERFAX.

He also indicated he would resign "if necessary", INTERFAX said.

Goryacheva Assails Policies

LD2102132291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Statement by Svetlana Goryacheva, deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet in Moscow on 21 February—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] people's deputies, esteemed members of the Supreme Soviet, Russians, and fellow countrymen! Permit me to read out a political statement to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and people's deputies.

Expressing the will of the peoples of Russia, the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies elected Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin as chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. In him they saw a person made wise by experience of life and politics, who had boldly come out against obsolete official structures, and who was capable of implementing a radical but realistic program to take Russia out of crisis. It was with him that many Russians, RSFSR people's deputies—ourselves included—linked their hopes for the rebirth of Russia, restoration of the dignity of its peoples, and economic and political sovereignty.

The time has come to say that these hopes were not justified. Authoritarianism, confrontation, and a striving to individually resolve questions concerning internal and external policy, as well as contempt for the laws and views of the constitutional bodies, has started to show more and more clearly through the initial progressive work. In promising to promote the unity of society, he brought the legislature and the republic to a bitter confrontation of political forces.

The position of the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet is extremely inconsistent and contradictory on questions of economic policy. In conditions of a growing crisis he tries to move away from unpopular decisions, to shift the burden of them to the center, to other Union republics, thereby intensifying chaos and disorganization in the economy. Moreover, attained accords and proposals of his own government and the views of members of the RSFSR Soviet of the Federation are being ignored.

What are the statements made by the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the Baltics worth? And the agreements signed there? A significant section of the deputy corps has assessed his position as one-sided, not balanced, and expressing the personal viewpoint of Boris Nikolayevich. His statement on the intention to create a Russian army, perceived by many as a threat, caused particular alarm among the people. I state with all responsibility that these political actions were undertaken without agreement with the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium.

Just as arbitrary and unpredictable are statements and actions by the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet with regard to the Union treaty. Ignoring the clearly expressed will of the Second Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, Boris Nikolayevich does not wish to notice that with such a policy he is demolishing not only the Union, but also the Russian Federation.

More and more RSFSR people's deputies and Russian citizens are expressing well-founded dissatisfaction over the work of the Supreme Soviet. The laws and decisions adopted by it are not working in full measure. The social, economic, and political situation in regions of the Russian Federation is worsening, and in these conditions large advances and numerous promises, the fulfilment of which is not guaranteed, are being given.

Mistakes and errors are to a great extent explained by the fact that the chairman of the Supreme Soviet is striving to lean on a narrow circle of retainers, on parallel structures being created in the Supreme Soviet without any kind of advice and agreement with him. Regular financial discipline is being violated, as is the competence of state bodies and the lawful order for the procedure of affairs. All of this disorganizes work and creates grounds for erroneous decisions and abuses that discredit the Russian legislature.

The authority of the deputy corps is falling catastrophically against that background. Attempts at friendly conversation, just like criticism at the Congress of People's Deputies, from the rostrum of the Supreme Soviet, have not taken effect. They do not want to listen to us. We have decided to come out with a genuine statement having exhausted, or almost exhausted, all means to return the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet to the road of realism. Literally, in the last few days in the Supreme Soviet a new acute political conflict has come to a head.

Swiftly losing authority and support in the deputy corps, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet has undertaken an attempt to lean on a Russian referendum set with numerous infringements. They are trying to draw the peoples of the republic into the latest political campaign, new rounds of confrontation, and a struggle for power.

In the statement on Central Television on 19 February, Boris Nikolayevich once again demonstrated that he is not capable of returning the work of the Supreme Soviet to the path of consolidation and constructive work. The people are tired of promises and games, of the endless settling of accounts with the center. In the end such a struggle turns into a struggle against Russia and Russians. They are waiting for a steady and viable government that will put an end to the disintegration of the economy and will stop the acceleration in crime. Irrespective of political convictions and party membership, we all need to show the greatest responsibility for the fate of the peoples of Russia. They truly deserve a better fate.

Proceeding from a sense of duty, and striving to halt a further slide into disintegration and chaos, we consider the question of urgently convening a special Congress of People's Deputies with the agenda being an account of the work of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, a question that is ripe.

The political statement is signed by: Goryacheva, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet; Isayev, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet; Abdulatipov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities; Isakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Republic of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet; Vishnyakov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Republic; and Syrovatko, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities.

Permit me to hand over a photocopy of this statement to the Supreme Soviet Presidium. We are sending the first copy to the mass news media. Thank you for your attention.

Statement on Extraordinary Congress

91UM0934A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

["Statement of 274 RSFSR People's Deputies: We Demand an Extraordinary Congress"—SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA headline]

[Text]

Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]

The economic and sociopolitical situation in the country and the republic has recently been sharply aggravated.

Economic ties have been violated, industrial and agricultural enterprises and construction organizations are not being provided with the necessary volume of raw and processed materials and equipment. The supply of food and industrial goods to the population is in a grave condition. The level of their production continues to drop.

All this means a great deal of concern for the fate of the peoples of Russia.

In this connection, on the basis of Article 106 of the RSFSR Constitution, we demand that an extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies be convened no later than 25 February 1991 with a report from the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

RSFSR people's deputies: Abaydulin, Z.Z.—T. [Territorial District] 277 Abramov, I.A.—T. 475 Alayev, Ye.I.—T. 424 Ananyev, A.M.—T. 693 Anipkin, A.M.—N.T. [National Territorial District] 30 Anishchev, V.P.—N.T. 34 Anoshkin, B.P.—T. 262 Antonov, Yu.Ya.—T.579 Arsanov, A.V.—N.T. 140 Atlasov, V.G.—T. 334 Akhmetkhanov, R.M.—T. 885 Akhmetkhanov, S.M.—T. 861 Akhunov, R.M.—T. 791 Ayushiyev, B.V.—N.T. 159 Babayev, B.D.—T. 374 Babichev, V.S.—N.T. 103 Bakiyev, R.S.—T. 796 Baranov, V.N.—T.873 Baranov, Ye.I.—T. 340 Barsukov, A.I.—T. 792 Barybin, M.A.—N.T. 21 Bakhtiyarova, L.Kh.—N.T. 88 Belonogov, A.N.—T. 263 Bereznikov, G.A.—T. 491 Berestovoy, V.I.—T. 283 Bogatyrev, B.B.—T. 884 Bogachev, Ye.B.—T. 858 Bok, V.F.—T. 679 Bokov, V.A.—N.T. 58 Bolotov, I.A.—T. 494 Bondarev, V.P.—T. 231 Boriskin, O.A.—T. 496 Borodin, P.P.—T. 895 Bocharov, B.I.—T. 431 Bochkarev, B.K.—T. 566 Bratishchev, I.M.—T. 599 Bulygin, V.B.—T. 288 Buslov, N.G.—T. 502 Bystrov, S.N.—T. 232 Bytsyora, N.P.—T. 238 Varshavskiy, M.N.—T. 244 Vasilyev, V.P.—T. 866 Volkov, S.P.—N.T. 118 Volodin, N.A.—T. 562 Volyntsev, A.A.—T. 223 Voronin, A.I.—T. 251 Voronin, Yu.M.—T.862 Vorontsov, V.A.—T. 548 Vyucheyskiy, V.A.—N.T. 162 Gabitov, I.A.—T. 794 Gabrus, V.A.—T. 721 Galazov, A.Kh.—T. 845 Galushko, I.Ye.—T. 261 Garkusha, V.F.—T. 236 Golishnikov, A.M.—T. 872 Golubkin, V.P.—T. 414 Gorbunov, G.A.—T. 280 Gorbunov, P.N.—T. 689 Gorchakov, G.M.—T. 542 Goryachev, Yu.F.—N.T. 80 Grankin, V.T.—T. 282 Grachev, V.A.—T. 568 Gritsenko, N.P.—T. 165 Grishin, N.P.—T. 843 Gubskiy, V.M.—T. 611 Guzhvin, A.P.—T. 279 Gulyashko, V.A.—N.T. 48 Guskov, V.V.—T. 627 Gushchin, V.A.—T. 528 Donskikh, B.V.—T. 500 Dordzhiyev, V.P.—N.T. 104 Dorofeyev, B.M.—T. 778 Drozhdin, B.I.—T. 446 Yevdokimov, A.G.—T. 739 Yevdokimov, L.P.—T. 591 Yegorov, Ye.V.—T. 60 Yermolayev, B.Y.—T. 333 Yesaulov, V.N.—T. 445 Zhigaylo, V.N.—T. 651 Zhiganov, V.I.—T. 233 Zhochkin, N.M.—T. 841 Zhukov, M.M.—T. 838 Zavgayev, D.G.—T. 883 Zaveryukha, A.Kh.—T. 556 Zarubin, V.I.—T. 345 Zakharov, V.S.—T. 77 Zakharov, M.M.—T. 684 Zelepukhin, A.G.—T. 550 Zerin, P.I.—T. 492 Zilit, M.N.—T. 549 Zubkov, B.F.—T. 570 Ivanov, N.P.—T. 881 Ivanov, P.S.—T. 898 Ivanov, S.I.—T. 594 Ivanova, T.G.—N.T. 119 Ivanchenko, L.A.—N.T. 66 Ivlev, I.A.—T. 339 Ivlev, N.I.—T. 499

Ilenkov, A.I.—N.T. 42 Kadochnikov, V.D.—T. 659 Kadyrov, R.Z.—T. 588 Kadyshev, V.D.—T. 732

Kazarov, O.V.—T. 740 Kalashnikov, B.V.—T. 631 Kalyuzhnyy, G.I.—T. 256 Karachurin, R.A.—T. 860 Karev, M.M.—T. 253 Kaufman, M.M.—N.T. 154 Kashin, N.P.—T. 278 Kibirev, B.G.—T. 178 Kitov, Yu.B.—T. 634 Kovalev, N.A.—T. 205 Kovlyagin, A.F.—T. 573 Kovtunov, A.V.—T. 806 Kozhin, A.S.—T. 644 Kozayev, G.S.—N.T. 121 Kolganov, A.V.—T. 618 Konev, V.S.—T. 840 Konstantinov, G.Ye.—T. 774 Korepanov, Yu.I.—N.T. 136 Kostin, A.M.—T. 554 Kotlyarenko, F.M.—T. 604 Kravchenko, N.P.—T. 616 Krasnov, Yu.M.—T. 409 Kropotov, I.Ye.—T. 531 Kryazhevskikh, N.F.—T. 187 Kuznetsov, Yu.N.—T. 622 Kuzmin, V.G.—T. 449 Kuzin, A.V.—T. 737 Kulasha, V.A.—T. 788 Kuts, G.A.—N.T. 108 Kushnarev, A.L.—T. 410 Kushnarev, L.N.—T. 413 Kushnarenko, N.I.—N.T. 67 Lavrushin, N.I.—T. 738 Lazchenko, K.N.—T. 606 Laptev, M.N.—T. 509 Laptev, P.D.—T. 754 Leontyev, A.P.—T. 545 Likhachev, V.I.—T. 551 Loginov, V.P.—T. 327 Loptev, V.P.—T. 455 Luzyanin, G.S.—T. 642 Luppov, A.M.—T. 544 Lyubimov, V.K—N.T. 58 Makarkin, N.P.—T. 839 Makeyev, A.I.—T. 756 Makin, N.I.—T. 177 Malkov, N.I.—N.T. 83 Maltsev, N.S.—T. 480 Mamkhegov, M.Sh.—T. 820 Mastafov, V.Zh.—T. 817 Medvedev, A.S.—N.T. 38 Medvedev, N.G.—T. 474 Melnichenko, A.K.—T. 260 Meremyanin, K.G.—T. 170 Mikov, P.G.—T. 208 Miller, Yu.E.—T. 716 Mikhaylov, B.Ch.—N.T. 101 Mikhaylov, V.V.—T. 429 Mongush, V.S.—N.T. 131 Moor, P.S.—T. 789 Moskvitin, A.M.—T. 348 Mosychenko, V.I.—T. 478 Muranin, K.P.—T. 641 Mukha, Y.P.—T. 533 Myasnyaikin, A.S.—T. 490 Nazmetdinova, M.M.—T. 781 Nikitenko, N.I.—T. 285 Nikitin, Yu.I.—T. 234 Nikiforov, V.S.—T. 661 Nunuyev, S.-Kh.M.—T. 886 Ozerova, V.K.—T. 560 Oykina, E.N.—N.T. 70 Ondar, Ch.-D.B.—T. 871 Oorzhak, Sh.D.—T. 870 Osminin, S.A.—T. 453 Ostrenkov, L.G.—T. 411 Pallo, V.T.—T. 220 Pankov, A.A.—T. 687 Parshukov, V.D.—T. 432 Pakhtanov, B.A.—T. 770 Pashenko, V.N.—T. 276 Pekedov, B.I.—T. 228 Petrik, A.G.—T. 171 Petrishchev, S.S.—T. 504 Petrov, V.A.—T. 536 Petrov, G.S.—T. 837 Polyantsev, P.M.—T. 450 Ponomarev, A.A.—T. 690 Ponomarev, K.P.—T. 540 Popov, N.I.—T. 416 Posazhennikov, B.G.—T. 540 Prilukov, B.M.—N.T. 7 Prokhorov, V.Ya.—T. 630 Rakov, P.P.—T. 733 Rebinskiy, S.G.—T. 423

Rozhdestvenskiy, B.I.—T. 878 Rozbitova, L.N.—T. 246 Romanov, N.I.—T. 647 Romanov, F.F.—T. 628 Rudenko, A.K.—T. 777 Rybkin, I.P.—T. 312 Sabirov, M.G.—T. 869 Savitskiy, O.V.—T. 473 Savchenko, I.S.—T. 508 Sadykov, Yu.V.—T. 793 Sayenko, G.V.—T. 493 Salnikov, S.B.—T. 629 Sanayev, V.I.—T. 844 Sarayev, B.A.—T. 736 Safonov, A.Ye.—T. 209 Sevostyanov, Yu.V.—T. 476 Seleznev, V.N.—T. 543 Semukov, Yu.I.—N.T. 112 Seryakov, V.S.—T. 678 Slobodin, Yu.M.—T. 96 Smolskiy, G.L.—T. 408 Sokolov, A.S.—T. 94 Sokolov, V.S.—T. 206 Solovyev, V.D.—T. 776 Solodyakova, N.I.—N.T. 161 Spasov, M.A.—T. 803 Stepanov, V.N.—N.T. 106 Struchkov, V.V.—T. 741 Suturin, P.G.—T. 766 Tarasov, B.V.—N.T. 49 Temirov, U.Ye.—T. 155 Tikhomirov, V.K.—T. 382 Tikhonov, V.I.—T. 361 Tkachev, A.A.—T. 284 Toporkov, V.F.—T. 498 Toropov, V.I.—T. 458 Travov, V.P.—N.T. 22 Turyanov, A.Kh.—N.T. 87 Tushnolobov, G.P.—T. 580 Uvachan, B.V.—N.T. 167 Fadeyev, Yu.P.—T. 470 Filyuk, A.L.—T. 286 Firyulin, I.I.—T. 569 Fomin, V.S.—T. 572 Fomin, Yu.V.—T. 203 Frukalov, V.V.—T. 603 Khabriyev, R.U.—N.T. 126 Kharitonov, I.M.—T. 530 Kharlov, A.I.—T. 786 Khetagurov, S.V.—N.T. 123 Khlebnikov, I.G.—N.T. 116 Tsapayev, V.N.—T. 435 Tsoy, V.—T. 249 Chaykovskiy, A.F.—N.T. 41 Chaykovskiy, B.M.—T. 201 Chapkovskiy, Yu.K.—T. 264 Chausskiy, N.A.—T. 900 Cherepkov, N.A.—T. 761 Chernukhin, I.A.—718 Chernyshev, A.A.—T. 557 Chetin, I.V.—N.T. 160 Chmarov, N.I.—T. 681 Churikov, A.A.—T. 237 Shapochkin, V.V.—T. 514 Shashviashvili, I.A. T. 433 Shevstsov, A.Ye.—T. 686 Shevtsov, B.V.—T. 344 Shipovalova, L.S.—T. 831 Shishkin, V.A.—T. 769 Shulyatyev, G.F.—T. 454 Shumskiy, A.A.—T. 241 Ettyryntyna, M.I.—N.T. 165 Yuganov, Ye.V.—T. 593 Yusnikov, N.S.—T. 541 Yasenkov, L.Ye.—T. 383

Among the people's deputies who signed the statement, 55 are members of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

Silayev Warns of Economic Difficulties

LD2202140891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1325 GMT 22 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, 22 Feb [TASS]—The extremely complicated economic situation in the Russian Federation was sketched today at the session of the Republic's Supreme Soviet by the head of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Government, Ivan Silayev.

According to Ivan Silayev's data, the difficulties in Russia's present financial and economic situation have been brought about by the sharp slump in the level of import purchases in the first quarter of 1991 as compared with the same period of last year. Purchased for Russia were: raw materials—0.67 percent of the previous level; grain—17 percent; plant oil—1.7 percent; sugar—5.6 percent.

Describing the conditions under which the government he heads has to operate, Ivan Silayev said that Russia's Council of Ministers "is literally tied hand and foot," deprived of a legal base for normal work. He criticized the republican legislature, which so far has not adopted a number of major legislative acts that are so necessary for the effective work of the executive power—in particular, a law on local government.

"We cannot continue working in such a situation," Ivan Silayev stated, having called upon parliamentarians to assist the government in the present extremely grave economic situation in Russia.

Leningrad Soviet Supports Yeltsin

LD2102214691 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 20 Feb 91

[Text] [Soskov] Another event very actively discussed today is yesterday's appearance on television by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. The USSR Supreme Soviet has stated that his call contradicts the USSR Constitution and creates an extraordinary situation in the country. The deputies of the Leningrad City Soviet of People's Deputies have a completely different opinion. On the phone is Igor Kucherenko, deputy chairman of the Leningrad Soviet. Igor Mikhaylovich, can you hear me?

[Kucherenko] I can hear you. Good evening.

[Soskov] Good evening. Igor Mikhaylovich, please tell us about the Leningrad Soviet's decision.

[Kucherenko] If I may, I will not simply tell you about it but will read out a statement.

[Soskov] Fine.

[Kucherenko] Today the session of the Leningrad Soviet was forced to interrupt its agenda to express its opinion on the political statement by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. By a majority of votes the following statement was adopted:

In connection with Boris Nikolayevich's appearance on Central Television on 19 February 1991 and the usual campaign to discredit the Supreme Soviet chairman, which began after this in the USSR Supreme Soviet and in some of the central mass media, the Leningrad City Soviet of People's Deputies considers it necessary to state the following:

We subscribe to the evaluation given by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin of the activities of USSR President Gorbachev. The justice of this evaluation is particularly obvious if one bears in mind today the events of recent months and the switch to the offensive by all political reaction. By his actions or eloquent inaction, the president has in fact taken the side of the opponents of democratic transformation. The blocking of the 500 days program and other most important steps of the Russian leadership aimed at stabilizing the economic situation and the stage-by-stage transfer to market relations agreed with all the republics; the failure to take measures to ensure an objective investigation into the circumstances of the use of armed force against the peaceful citizens of Lithuania; the increase in the information blockade of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] legal bodies of authority—all these are links in one chain.

From this it follows that the main factors obstructing the formation of a community of sovereign republic are those Union bodies of authority which were formed under conditions of a pseudo-democratic election law. For this reason the speech by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin is, according to our conviction, correct when he proposes to transfer the totality of powers within the present authority of the USSR president to the Federation Council, which is made up of the democratically elected leaders of the Union republics.

We draw the attention of the USSR people's deputies to the violation by the union's president of his oath, in his failure to adopt measures to defend the rights of the peoples of the sovereign republics. We ask labor collectives and enterprises to support through their statements, letters, and telegrams the Russian leadership and Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. We turn to people's deputies at all levels with an appeal to support the Russian leadership in its efforts to lay the basis for a community of sovereign republics by concluding bilateral and multilateral interrepublican agreements.

In conclusion allow me to say a few words of my own.

[Soskov] Yes, of course. Igor Mikhaylovich, just tell me the degree of unity by which this very important document was adopted.

[Kucherenko] Of 250 deputies present at that time at the session, 203 voted in favor, and 30 people, representing the Leningrad Renaissance faction—that is, communists—left the hall. They did not want to vote. But this was sufficient, because for the adoption of any decision we need 190 votes as a minimum. There were 209. [as heard]

We understood that as a result of this step the economic pressure on the city will increase even more. But we consider that Leningrad is part of Russia, and we could not act otherwise.

Supreme Soviet Discusses Yeltsin Performance

LD2102193691 Moscow TASS in English 1802 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow February 21 TASS—The Russian parliament devoted much of its plenary session today to discussing the performance of Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

In the beginning, Deputy President of the Russian parliament Svetlana Goryacheva read out a political statement, signed by six members of the parliament's presidium.

The statement denounced Yeltsin's actions and called for an urgent meeting of the congress of people's deputies.

Practically no one opposed the idea to hold an emergency congress during the debate that followed. Deputies proposed that Boris Yeltsin should make a report on his work at the congress.

Representatives of various groups of deputies and fractions failed to agree on the date of the congress. Finally,

three dates were put to the vote—March 4, March 25 and April 25. However, none of the proposals received the necessary half of the votes.

The parliament is expected to take up the issue again on Friday.

In the final hour of its session, the parliament returned to the first issue on the agenda. It passed the first reading of a bill on employment and social security.

This is one of the key bills in a package on market reforms.

Poll Reveals Level of Yeltsin Popularity

LD2202123791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1108 GMT 22 Feb 91

[Text] The Moscow section of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion has carried out a street poll of 2,650 Muscovites, in the course of which participants were invited to evaluate Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin's performance in the post of chairman of the Russian Federation's Supreme Soviet. Sixty-five percent of those who answered thought he was performing well, while 15 percent had a negative assessment of his performance. One-fifth of those polled were unable to define their attitude. It is noteworthy that in a January poll of Muscovites, in which 1,985 people took part, 59 percent of those questioned positively assessed Yeltsin's performance as head of the Russian parliament, 6 percent fewer than in February; and 19 percent gave a negative assessment, 4 percent more than now.

Reportage on Yeltsin Visit to Yaroslavl Oblast

Meets Workers, Citizens, Deputies

LD2102221191 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1900 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] Now over to (Lyudmila Vakhmyanina), a Yaroslavl radio correspondent. She will tell us about today's program of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, who is paying a visit to the ancient town of Yaroslavl. Lyudmila, we are listening to you.

[Vakhmyanina] Good evening. I will briefly recall today's program of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. He met employees of the Yaroslavl tire plant and engine plant. He was not just interested in purely production issues. He was also interested in the everyday life of Yaroslavl inhabitants. There was vast interest in the arrival of the chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet. Among numerous questions put forward to him was the following: Will Russia hold a referendum too? Yes, it will, Boris Nikolayevich replied. We included two questions in it: Do you support united Russia, and do we need to hold nationwide elections of its president? And workers gave positive replies to the both questions. You know, such meetings do not take place very often, that is why there were so many questions put forward to Boris Nikolayevich. It ought to be noted in his favour that none of them was left unanswered.

Boris Nikolayevich met Yaroslavl inhabitants on the Yubileynaya Square. He also met oblast deputies corps, electors, and representatives of the public in the palace of culture and technology of the Yaroslavl engine plant at 1600. But I would say that the whole oblast was present at this two-hour meeting, because the meeting in the palace of culture and technology was broadcast. Many problems were discussed. You know, of course, Boris Nikolayevich cannot tackle them on his own, even if they only concern our kray. He was also saying that Yaroslavl inhabitants should also participate in tackling them.

Boris Nikolayevich was convincing heads of oblast enterprises and working people to work within the framework of Russian laws, and the more so as they are more progressive than Union laws, which reflect interests of the administrative command system.

I will also say that a charming person, who is taking keen interest in everything and who understands people's needs, appeared before Yaroslavl inhabitants. Apart from that, we could see for ourselves that he profoundly understands the essence of economic, political, and social processes. He sincerely wants Russia to become an advanced republic as opposed to being a backward one. By the way, it was advanced 70 years ago.

Meetings with Yeltsin will be remembered by Yaroslavl inhabitants for a long time. They make one think about the fate of Russia. It is up to us to decide what it should be and its future also depends on us. And I cannot but add this: saying goodbye to Boris Nikolayevich, those who met him wished him firmness, courage and health.

[Announcer] Lyudmila, thank you. I would like to remind you that this was a live report from Yaroslavl, where Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was meeting the public and working people today.

Yeltsin Favors Gorbachev Cooperation

LD2102180591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1734 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] Yaroslavl, 21 Feb—Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, is in Yaroslavl Oblast. Today he visited tire and motor factories, and met people's deputies and voters.

During his conversations, the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet explained the decisions of the Russian legislature and his own position. Talk revolved around strengthening the economic independence of enterprises, their rights, and on using their own resources. Particularly acute political questions were voiced concerning the instability of the situation and the confrontation within the higher echelons of power. Concern and alarm

were clearly heard at a meeting with people's deputies and voters. Is cooperation between the USSR president and the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet possible? Is the head of the Russian legislature for the Union? Yeltsin replied to both questions in the affirmative.

Yeltsin Arrives in Novgorod for Visit

LD2202131891 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 22 Feb 91

[Text] Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, who is touring the republic, has arrived in Novgorod. The program for his stay includes meetings with the oblast's leaders, and the collectives of industrial and agricultural enterprises. The head of the RSFSR parliament will also meet with deputies of the oblast and town soviets of people's deputies, and representatives of various parties and public organizations active in Novgorod.

Moscow Army Day Rally Planned as 'Festival'

PM2102161991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Feb 91 Union Edition p 1

[Item in roundup of IZVESTIYA, TASS, REUTER, and UPI reports: "To Gather for the Rally Without Weapons"]

[Text] Yu. Luzhkov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee, had a meeting at the Moscow City Soviet 21 February with members of the organizing committee to hold the 23 February rally in Manezhnaya Square. In Yu. Luzhkov's opinion, the facts of the specific preparations for the rally are worrying. He referred specifically to the order by the chief of the F.E. Dzerzhinskiy Military Academy, which gives instructions to "check the preparedness for issuing weapons and ammunition" with a view to preventing possible provocations and strengthening the academy's protection.

Members of the rally organizing committee—N. Andreyanova, secretary of Moscow City CPSU Committee, and Colonel V. Kozlov, representative of the Moscow Military District Political Directorate—explained that the rally does not pursue the aim of attracting armed servicemen to the event. On the contrary, the organizing committee is doing everything to make the rally a festival for its participants, TASS correspondents V. Gondusov and S. Ostanin report.

Soyuz Leader on Rally

LD1802224391

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 2050 GMT on 18 February carries a four-minute interview with "Soyuz" group leader Colonel Petrushenko.

Opening the report, the announcer says: "I have already said during our daytime bulletins that I get scared when meetings are held by military men. Not at all because they proceed, as a rule, to a single scenario. It's just that there still remains a certain fear in us of other similar games by men with weapons, even if they are dressed in civvies. Tomorrow there will be a press conference by the deputies' group Soyuz, devoted to the forthcoming demonstration on 23 February. Our correspondent Yevgeniy Shcherbenkov interviewed one of the leaders of this organization, Col. Petrushenko."

Petrushenko says he has come to Moscow for the meeting, and that he is a member of the organizational committee for holding the meeting. He goes on: "The application was submitted to the Moscow Soviet within the time set by the law, the organizational work is under way, and we have no doubt that the Moscow Soviet, which proclaims its democratism to such an extent, will not dare prohibit the holding of this meeting. But I would like to make a correction. This is not a meeting of the military; it is a meeting of all patriotic forces." He says the application has been made to hold the meeting on Manezh Square, and has been supported by the Moscow City Party Committee.

Replying to a question about attendance of troops at the meeting, he says: "In our country, the manual of garrison and guard duties is in force, in accordance with which troops attending garrision events proceed in formation, to the sounds of the regimental band. I see nothing reprehensible in two or three hundred officers, soldiers, NCO's, warrant officers, and generals proceeding, to the sounds of a military band, along Kalinin Prospect and arriving at Manezh Square. I am sure that they will meet with the same stormy applause as was the case previously, when our army was still called the Russian Army."

He says that Col. Alksnis will speak at the meeting, that Nevzorov (Leningrad journalist famous for recent pro-Army coverage of Vilnius killings) is expected to attend, and that there are a number of patriotic movements and associations which have sent an invitation to Gen. Makashov (right-wing commander of Urals & Volga Military District).

Finally, the correspondent asks: "Let's suppose that the Moscow Soviet doesn't permit your meeting to be held on Manezh Square?" Petrushenko replies: "I think that it will be it's political death. I think it simply won't risk it. We are a real political force, which the Moscow Soviet must reckon with."

RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Meets 18 Feb

LD1902104891 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Text] The latest sitting of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium took place on 18 February in the RSFSR House of Soviets. It was chaired by Yeltsin, chairman of the republican Supreme Soviet, and Khasbulatov, first

deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. The presidium agreed with the proposal by the RSFSR Council of Ministers to appoint Kamenev to the post of deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers. The idea of setting up a national council [natsionalnyy sovet] of the Russian Federation for issues of invalids was supported, and the formation of a preparatory committee was envisaged for this purpose.

A range of issues was examined in connection with the USSR and RSFSR referendums of 17 March 1991 and with their expenses. A decision was adopted to submit a draft law on investment activities in the RSFSR to committees and commissions of the republican Supreme Soviet and to the republican Council of Ministers for discussion. Other issues of the republics' state life were examined.

RSFSR Resolution on Ossetian Situation

PM1902172991 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Resolution issued by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities in Moscow on 14 February "On the Results of the Visit by a Group of RSFSR People's Deputies to Georgia in Connection With Events in South Ossetia"]

[Text] Having listened to the report by G.N. Sorokin, leader of the group of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet expresses its concern over the development of events in this region and declares its condemnation of attempts to resolve political and ethnic problems with the aid of anticonstitutional acts and the use of military force, from whichever quarter these attempts may emanate.

The Soviet of Nationalities resolves:

1. To take cognizance of Comrade G.N. Sorokin's information on the results of the visit by RSFSR People's Deputies Comrades V.V. Antonov, N.M. Arzhannikov, and V.A. Shuykov to Georgia in connection with events in South Ossetia.

2. To appeal to Georgia's legislature and government to take the necessary steps to supply the population of South Ossetia with food, heating, water, and medicines.

3. That the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium speed up the start of direct talks with the Georgian leadership aimed at an immediate peaceful settlement of the situation that has arisen in South Ossetia.

4. To propose to USSR President Comrade M.S. Gorbachev the adoption of urgent measures ensuring the stabilization of the situation in the said region of Georgia.

5. That the RSFSR Council of Ministers brief deputies at the 20 February 1991 Soviet of Nationalities sitting on the fulfillment of RSFSR Supreme Soviet Resolution No. 590-1 of 8 February 1991 on rendering essential economic and humanitarian aid to the population of North Ossetia in connection with events in South Ossetia.

V.G. Syrovatko, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities
RSFSR House of Soviets, Moscow
14 February 1991

Poptsov Rejects Charges Radio Rossii 'Hostile'

PM2002162391 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 6, 10-17 Feb 91 (signed to press 6 Feb 91)

[Interview with "President of the Russian TV and Radio Broadcasting Company" Oleg Poptsov by Lyudmila Telen; place and date not given; "Radio Russia Is Considered Hostile"—first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting has stopped Radio Russia from broadcasting over the channels of the national Radio 1 and Mayak (Radio 2). As a result, over a third of the Russian Federation's population is now practically beyond the reach of the first Republican radio. Lyudmila Telen of MN [MOSCOW NEWS] met with the President of the Russian TV and Radio Broadcasting Company, Oleg Poptsov, People's Deputy of the Russian Federation. "The State Committee didn't even bother to warn us in advance about their decision," complained Oleg Poptsov. "My colleagues from Mayak phoned me and broke the news. I contacted Leonid Kravchenko, the Committee's head, by telephone the following day when the situation became clear. He told me that the initiative came from the country's supreme authorities."

[Telen] You mean President?

[Poptsov] I think so. Thus, one person deprived the nation's largest Republic of a Republic-wide broadcast. In fact, that was an infringement of a sovereign state's right for information.

[Telen] What was Kravchenko's explanation for that decision?

[Poptsov] He said that the position taken by Radio Russia was at variance with the position of the USSR (he apparently meant the supreme authorities of the USSR). During our telephone conversation last Saturday, three times, he called Radio Russia a hostile station. He said that he simply couldn't think of a radio station with a more vile attitude.

[Telen] I don't believe that the central authorities' dissatisfaction could be anything new for you.

[Poptsov] True, the central authorities have constantly demonstrated their negative attitude towards not only the Russian Republic's having its own radio station, but also Russia's state bodies, members of Russia's parliament, and Chairman of the Republic's Supreme Soviet. I

wish to remind your readers that Radio Russia started when the Republic's new authorities had practically no access to the mass media. The conservative press and the national television either ignored what was happening in Russia's government and the parliament or tried to discredit the latter. Under this situation, Radio Russia couldn't sit on the fence. Instead, it did its best to promote Russia's state sovereignty. This was precisely the chief reason underlying the step taken by the State Committee.

[Telen] What about Russia's television?

[Poptsov] It is still virtually non-existent, despite the President's promise to give us time on TV Channel 2. As a matter of fact, we can go on the air only three and a half hours a week. Besides, we are controlled by the State Committee with its very strict censorship. The arguments against Russia's own television being offered by Leonid Kravchenko and his second in command, Petr Reshetov, are ludicrous. They claim that the TV audience wants more entertaining programmes on Channel 2. But we take upon ourselves all responsibility for the national television and are prepared to air sports, film classics as well as children's programmes. They say that other Republics want to use Channel 2 for their own programmes. But we are prepared to give them three hours a day. We are also ready to give three and a half hours each week to Kravchenko's national broadcast.

[Telen] I noticed that all criticism of Radio Russia (especially in the CPSU press) was stepped up in the days preceding the aforementioned decision.

[Poptsov] It is not a matter of criticism as such: we are perfectly aware that our radio is only setting out on its long road.

Filshin Discusses Resignation, USSR Situation

AU2002185991 Berlin DER MORGEN in German 16-17 Feb 91 p 3

[Interview with former Russian Deputy Prime Minister Gennadiy Filshin by Henrietta Bilawer; place and date not given: "Our Country Is Deteriorating at a Breakneck Speed"]

[Text] [Bilawer] Mr. Filshin, why did you choose a time for your resignation when the conservatives are gaining ground in the country? All the hopes of the reformers are, after all, placed in particular in the Russian Government under Boris Yeltsin.

[Filshin] My resignation is a gesture of protest against this country's deterioration at a breakneck speed in the political, economic, and social sense.

[Bilawer] Without an office you can do even less against the deterioration.

[Filshin] But my resignation was my duty as a citizen. Our programs for consolidating the economy are fundamentally blocked by a flood of presidential decrees and by the measures of the central government. Thus, there is a gap between our responsibility toward the population and our real possibilities of action. I, too, felt this more and more intensely: In my office the telephone is ringing constantly—people from the entire republic are complaining about deficiencies in their region. But my hands are tied—I cannot react.

[Bilawer] What is hindering you?

[Filshin] We were not left with any economic leeway. Most recently we were deprived even of the last bit of independence. Up to now we have been permitted to sell 10 percent of the goods produced in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] in line with our own contracts, which gave us a bit of financial independence. Now even this has been forbidden. However, as deputy prime minister, I cannot simply sit around and pretend that everything is fine.

[Bilawer] Yeltsin's government has concluded bilateral contracts with many Union republics—its own version of the Union treaty. Do these agreements only exist on paper now?

[Filshin] The treaties are practically in force and are being gradually fleshed out. We continue to work and we see our task in training enterprises and regions, which are used to orders from above, in independence. But this takes time. However, we fear that the political course of the central government will bring the individual republics not to cooperation but to confrontation. We live in a state of siege: The center not only has an ideological monopoly, the constant decrees are hindering any possibility for political influence.

[Bilawer] Does this mean that the struggle for power between the RSFSR and the center has been lost by Russia?

[Filshin] I think that we suffered serious losses—to continue in this vein—and that happened last autumn. When I assumed my office last June, I tried to work pragmatically and to come to an understanding with all central state organs in order to cooperate closely during a transitional period. Some projects succeeded: contracts between banks, ministries, and the state supply authority.

But then the Russian legislature was weakened because many experts left, who are now working on site. At the same time, the power in the center was shifted to the Presidential Council and then completely to Mikhail Gorbachev. The Council of Ministers discredited itself. At that time I, as a deputy, voted against the president's special powers. In my view, only a few people recognized the danger of such omnipotence at that time. Unfortunately, I was not able to prevail. This would have been the last chance. We missed it, and afterwards the political deterioration started: The conservative forces consolidated themselves, party structures were revived, the democratic movement was massively discredited, and

provocations were carried out repeatedly. This was the beginning of my political end, and others will follow me.

[Bilawer] Was your resignation a symbolic step, an effort to wipe the political slate clean, or do you hope that it will have a concrete political effect?

[Filshin] Once I had the illusion that one could find some sort of arrangement with the center—but this proved to be a mistake. The present course of the center, which wants to get out of the crisis by returning to the old command system, is a tragedy.

[Bilawer] What is the condition of the democratic forces in the USSR and what will they be facing in the future?

[Filshin] The situation is very difficult for them now. Even though the CPSU and the Russian Communist Party suffered a heavy loss of trust, they managed to save a very powerful organizational structure. While the democrats are in a crisis, the conservatives can rely on this organizational structure and discredit the democrats with all their strength. They even blame us for the disastrous harvest. The democrats, on the other hand, have not yet managed to organize themselves on a broad basis.

[Bilawer] Gorbachev's prime minister, Valentin Pavlov, stated that, in contrast to what Yeltsin has demanded, there will not be any private ownership of land and producer goods and the transition to the market economy will be made very slowly. Can the RSFSR just bow to the center or what remains for it to do?

[Filshin] I think that the prime minister's statements are a way of insinuating himself into the favor of certain circles of society. We all—rightists and leftists—misjudged the situation: Our enterprises are not able to adjust quickly and 70 years of education as servants has produced a deficit in the people's capability to act. It is simply not enough to draw up a few new laws in order to revitalize the state. But I think that only those who are patient enough to live through a transitional stage, even the most critical one, are truly progressive. We have this patience and we will be more persistent than Pavlov's plans.

[Bilawer] But the situation is escalating....

[Filshin] Yes, logically, it is becoming worse and worse. Supplies are running out, promised loans have not been paid. In individual industrial centers a situation might arise that comes close to famine. But no one wants what could happen then, not even the most pig-headed conservatives.

[Bilawer] Is this an optimistic or a pessimistic assessment?

[Filshin] I am an incurable optimist.

[Bilawer] You said that "certain organs" are hunting the RSFSR Government. Whom did you mean in detail?

[Filshin] The KGB and others.

[Bilawer] State or party organs?

[Filshin] It is difficult to separate them nowadays; I mean the all-Union organs. My entire official correspondence was monitored. Documents from the safe found their way not only into the Central Committee building but also turned up in the press. I also think that we are bugged. I have not dealt with this issue in detail, but the assumption is obvious. In addition, we have absolutely no access to the press—we are quite muzzled.

[Bilawer] Can you predict when Boris Yeltsin will no longer be able to rule?

[Filshin] This is very difficult. I could say who will be the next one to leave his post—but one does not say something like that aloud.

[Bilawer] Do you mean RSFSR Prime Minister Ivan Silayev?

[Filshin] I will not play the oracle...in particular not since we are bugged. (laughs)

[Bilawer] Is Boris Yeltsin himself in danger?

[Filshin] Yes, of course. If you have observed the most recent intrigues, you can probably imagine what is going on against Yeltsin.

'Insignificant' Leak Shuts Down Kola Reactor

PM2202132991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 91 Second Edition p 1

[Report by A. Khramtsov: "Normal Regime"]

[Text] A spokesman for the management of the Kola Nuclear Electric Power Station has reported that the third reactor unit at the station was not working for 48 hours. The reason for the stoppage was an insignificant leak of radioactive water in one of the control and measuring instruments of the nuclear reactor's first loop.

This happened because of a crack in the welded seam of one of the assemblies. The leak posed no threat to the health or life of personnel servicing the reactor unit—it happened in a hermetically sealed zone. A special commission is ascertaining the reasons why the seam on a metal tube failed. After repair to the damage and a preventive inspection of the instrument, the reactor was started up and brought up to normal work regime.

During the same days an accident occurred at a nuclear electric power station in Japan. But the degree of danger there was higher, and so the reactor's automatic protection functioned.

RSFSR Law on Ownership Published

914A0305A

For the text of the RSFSR Law on Ownership published in the 10 January First Edition of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, see JPRS-UEA-91-007, pages 13-21.

RSFSR Law on Enterprises Published

914A0326A

For the text of the RSFSR Law on Enterprises published in the 12 January First Edition of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, see JPRS-UEA-91-008, pages 16-26.

Western Republics

Ukraine, Kazakhstan Sign Cooperation Treaty

LD2102110991 Kiev International Service in English 1000 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] Today [20 February], in the city of Alma-Ata, Nursultan Nazarbayev, president of Kazakhstan, and Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, signed a long-term treaty on multilateral cooperation between the two republics. The document gives grounds for equal and mutually beneficial relations between Ukraine and the biggest union republic in the Soviet Central Asia. In its political aspect the treaty recognizes the status quo of the declarations on state sovereignty proclaimed by these republics. The document also indicates that both sides take upon themselves all the responsibility and guarantees as to mutual respect of the national interest, as well as support of the communities of Ukrainians and Kazakhs living on the territories of the respective republics. As for business contacts, they will be maintained proceeding from the bilateral government agreements and direct ties among the enterprises. Priority in this field will be given to equivalent exchanges of goods, with due regard to the market economy laws. Coordination of all questions of economic nature will be within the competence of the republican governments, which will solve these questions by means of a joint coordinating body which has already got down to work.

Belorussian Supreme Soviet Approves Changes

LD2102155191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] The Belorussian Supreme Soviet has approved changes within the republican government. This was connected primarily with the need to create flexible structures for managing the Belorussian economy in conditions of transition to the market.

A number of changes have been mapped out, following which the numerical strength of the republican government will be reduced by 30 percent. The majority of industrial departments will be eliminated, and the filling of most important administrative vacancies will be carried out through competition.

Molodovan President Explains Resignation

LD2102140291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1225 GMT 21 Feb 91

[By correspondents Valeriy Demidetskiy and Fedor Angeli]

[Text] Kishinev, 21 Feb (TASS)—Today, at the legislative session, Moldova President Mircha Snegur resigned. In his declaration he asked the deputies to give him an opportunity to carry on with the duties until a new president of the republic is elected by means of public voting.

Mircha Snegur expressed the reasons that prompted him to take such a step. "Lately," he noted in particular, "attacks on me in the media by the Communist Party of Moldova have grown stronger, especially after Grigoriy Yeremey became its leader. I am accused of not defending the property of the Communist Party."

The president believes that "a behind-the-scenes struggle" against him is being carried out in the legislature, "I supported the activities of the government," Mircha Snegur continued, "although it was making mistakes, in particular in export-import operations. It is very difficult to work with Prime Minister Mircha Druk. He is hot-tempered and resorts to shouting in response to every criticism. Sometimes we cannot finish our conversation."

The speaker confirmed his adherence to the statements "on sovereignty, against diktat by the center, and against referendum." "A president," he said, "can feel confident only when he has the support of the people. The republic is in crisis, and the legislature should share this responsibility. It is necessary to adopt a law on electing a president publicly and then to move on to the organization of elections by universal suffrage."

Snegur Resignation Rejected

LD2102155191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1527 GMT 21 Feb 91

[By correspondent V. Demidetskiy]

[Text] Kishinev, 21 Feb (TASS)—The resignation of Moldovan President Mircha Snegur has not been accepted by the republic's legislature. A legislative commission has been set up to work out proposals on reform of executive powers in the republic. A final decision, as stated by Aleksandr Moshanu, chairman of Moldova's Supreme Soviet, should be made today.

Deputies Left With 'No Choice' in Referendum Vote

PM2202135791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Feb 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Referendum Rejected"]

[Text] Kishinev, 19 Feb—The Moldovan legislature today rejected the USSR Law "On the Nationwide Vote (USSR Referendum)." Last Friday, after a debate lasting many hours, the majority of deputies' clubs had arrived at a compromise decision on the need to hold the referendum with the inclusion of another question of a republican nature in addition to the question contained in the Law on the Referendum.

However, deputies have been worked on over the past few days. This morning's session was addressed by the republic's leaders—M. Snegur, A. Moshanu, and M. Druk. Their speeches were rather of the nature of an ultimatum, leaving no choice other than to vote against the referendum. In violation of the temporary standing orders governing the Supreme Soviet's work, its leaders placed deputies in a humiliating position. Every deputy had to stand up and declare: "yes" or "no."

Moldovan Law on Enterprise Taxation

914A0311A

For the Moldovan Law on Enterprise Taxation published in SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA on 23 October 1990, see the JPRS Report Soviet Union: Economic Affairs, JPRS-UEA-91-008, pages 43-53.

Moldovan Draft Law on Employment

914A0353A

For the Moldovan draft law on Employment published in SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA on 14 November 1990, see the JPRS Report Soviet Union: Economic Affairs, JPRS-UEA-91-008, pages 53-58.

Ukraine CP Plenum Appeal on Economic Situation

PM2102132191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
19 Feb 91 Second Edition p 5

[Appeal by the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the country's government, Communist Party Central Committees, and Union republic supreme soviets, adopted at the 15 February 1991 Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum: "Preventing An Economic Collapse and A Deterioration in People's Lives"]

[Text] We participants in this Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum consider it our duty to express our extreme concern at the rapidly increasing signs of an economic collapse and a deterioration in people's living conditions.

This can be seen today in the shutting down of production of virtually all kinds of output—above all, food and industrial consumer goods, the complete or partial closure of a growing number of enterprises and shops owing to shortages of raw and other materials, and the disorderly and uncontrolled growth of prices. Economic ties built up over decades are being broken, the level of contractual discipline has fallen sharply, and labor collectives have no clear view on questions of their current activities and prospects. Group and regional economic egoism is becoming more and more tangible. Cooperation agreements concluded between republics have not been backed up by well-considered specific tasks, nor is anyone responsible for their implementation. Consequently, they remain mere declarations of intent and are having no real impact on the state of affairs.

Ultimately, thousands of people are being deprived of what they need most—they face the threat of unemployment and being without the means of existence. There is a growing sense of doom, disbelief, and hopelessness in society.

On behalf of the Ukrainian Communist Party, which has declared itself to be the party of social protection for working people and the broad strata of the population, we state that we can no longer tolerate this situation. We are particularly concerned that, along with the galvanization of anticommunist and separatist forces provoking centrifugal processes, dangerous phenomena and trends are being compounded by the practical inactivity shown by the central organizations of state power and administration.

We cannot understand this passivity, timidity, and inconsistency in a situation when the time limit for solving these urgent and literally blatant socioeconomic problems has expired. The Ukraine's Communists and working people resolutely object to and refuse to accept the protracted confrontation between the USSR president and the chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, the conflict between the Union and Russian legislatures and governments, the struggle between political ambitions which is continuing in certain republics, and the general "war of laws." These are not only stoking the already explosive atmosphere in society, but are above all hampering work, delaying the resolution of issues which brook no delay, and are, moreover, making resolution of those issues impossible.

At this critical time we have no choice but to pool our efforts in the face of the looming danger. We can have no priority other than to prevent an economic collapse with all our might and main.

It is time to put a stop to stomach-churning theorizing and endless "market" overtures and promises. It is time to stop pinning our hope on foreign aid. Finally, we ourselves should directly and honestly explain to people what we will have to go through and why. Furthermore, that we will need, above all, hard work, discipline, and

organization to overcome all our present difficulties and problems; otherwise, all the peoples' plans, hopes, and aspirations will lose all meaning and simply be dashed.

Let us turn this recognition into specific deeds, meaningful practical work, and coordinated efforts to save the country's national economic complex that has been created through the hard work, effort, and selflessness of all generations of Soviet people. Let us remember that our multinational fatherland has rich and glorious traditions of brotherhood, friendship, and selfless aid from the peoples when facing the most severe trials. These traditions need to be revived today and used for the common good. Future generations will not forgive us if we allow the great power that we have inherited to be destroyed.

We are firmly convinced that the exceptional nature of the economic situation requires equally exceptional measures to stabilize it and to resolutely restore order in the state in general. At the same time, it requires supreme responsibility for this on the part of all of us jointly and severally—starting with the president.

This is not a demand for a "clampdown" or an "iron hand." It is a call for us to perform our duty to the people, the country, and future generations. We believe it will be heeded and understood.

New Committee Favors 'No' Vote on Referendum

LD2102160291 Kiev International Service in English 0000 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] A committee called "Referendum - Sovereign Ukraine" has been set up by various political parties and public organizations of the Republic. The Communist Party is not represented in this committee, which calls upon all the citizens of the Republic, regardless of their nationality, to say "no" to the question formulated in the main provision of the referendum; that is, to refuse from supporting the idea of the USSR federalism. The committee members believe that human rights and freedoms can be guaranteed in the independent and democratic Ukraine alone, which will live in a union with other sovereign republics.

Ukraine Law on Village, Agricultural Complex

914A0352A

For the Ukrainian Soviet Socialiat Republic Law on Village, Agricultural Complex published in PRAVDA UKRAINY on 25 October 1990, see the JPRS Report Soviet Union: Economic Affairs, JPRS-UEA-91-008, pages 26-30.

Caucasus

Armed Group Clashes With Georgian Militia

AU2202120091 Tbilisi Domestic Service in Georgian 0500 GMT 22 Feb 91

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The operations to disarm [the Mkhedrioni illegal armed formations] have been implemented almost everywhere without any confrontations occurring. However, in Sagaredzho, it was not possible to avoid confrontation in spite of the fact that police workers held a preliminary meeting with the leader of the Kakheti Mkhedrioni (?Givi) Goderdzishvili and ordered that they should peacefully surrender their weapons and that the organization should be disbanded.

However, on 20 February, at 1730 [1430 GMT], members of the Kakheti Mkhedrioni led by (?Givi) Goderdzishvili opened fire on a vehicle carrying workers of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Sagaredzho department of internal affairs [words indistinct]. Following gunfire from both sides, some militia and also Mkhedrioni members were wounded. Those wounded on the militia side were Shota Burashvilii, militia captain and chief inspector of the Sagaredzho regional State Automobile Inspectorate, and Nodar Dzhavakhishvili, militia captain in the regional department of internal affairs. Those wounded on the Mkhedrioni side were (?Givi) Goderdzishvili, the leader of the Kakheti Mkhedrioni who is now lying in [words indistinct] hospital No. 1 in Tbilisi and [word indistinct] Chiaureli who has also been placed in the same hospital. However, David Upliashvili, who was very seriously wounded, has so far been kept in the Sageredzho regional hospital which is under reinforced militia guard. [passage omitted]

Protesters Call For Release of Leader

AU2202115991 Tbilisi Domestic Service in Georgian 0500 GMT 22 Feb 91

[Text] Yesterday, a meeting was held outside the Zakaria Paliashvili National Ballet and Opera Theater which was organized by representatives of the Mkhedrioni [illegal armed formation] and the National Congress. The purpose of the meeting was expressed on the banners: Free Dzhaba Ioseliani [leader of the Georgian Mkhedrioni] and the other Mkhedrioni members. Those taking part in the meeting later moved to the front of the government building.

Rallies React to Mkhedrioni Actions

PM2202141591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Feb 91 Union Edition p 3

[Besik Urigashvili report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Shooting in Tbilisi"]

[Text] Tbilisi—The military have captured Shavnabada, a settlement in the Tbilisi suburbs, where the paramilitary formation "Mkhedrioni" had a base.

As the military reported, a subunit returning from exercises came under attack near that settlement and two servicemen were wounded. In reply they stormed the settlement where, in their words, illegally seized equipment and weapons were being stored. As a result of this action two civilians were hurt [postradavshiy], one wounded. The settlement suffered considerable material damage. The Military Prosecutor's Office has arrested 20 people.

Two large rallies were held in Tbilisi. The rally organized by the Georgian legislature condemned "Mkhedrioni's" actions. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who addressed the rally, described them as provocative and called "Mkhedrioni" leader Professor Dzhaba Ioseliani an agent of the Kremlin. At the same time the rally heard condemnation of the Army's actions.

But at the other rally, organized in support of "Mkhedrioni," the organization's leader Dzhaba Ioseliani stated that this action, which was directed against "Mkhedrioni," is backed by the leadership of the republic's Supreme Soviet. He said that "Mkhedrioni" is the only real force capable of preventing the approaching dictatorship and of defending the National Congress which is opposed to the Supreme Soviet.

"Mkhedrioni" is a clearly anticommunist and anti-Soviet organization which at the same time opposes the present leaders of the Georgian legislature.

The legislature has published two appeals. The first appeals to members of "Mkhedrioni" to think, not to be a blind weapon in the hands of the center, and not to perform the role of a national salvation committee. The second appeal, addressed to USSR President Gorbachev and Defense Minister Yazov, protests the Army's actions on the territory of a sovereign state.

Yesterday, however, there was another noteworthy event. Avtandil Margiani, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, and German Patsatsiya, secretary of the Central Committee, resigned. They gave the complete discrediting of the Communist Party as the reason for their resignation.

Arms, Material Confiscated in Georgia

LD2102194291 Moscow TASS in English 1630 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow February 21 TASS—Georgian Interior Ministry forces detained about 50 leaders and activists of illegal armed units in nine regions of the republic over the past few days.

They confiscated many weapons, including machine-guns, pistols, some 100 stolen cars and trucks, radio transmitters, signal rockets and explosives, according to Soviet Interior Ministry spokesman Aleksandr Rostovtsev.

An armoured personnel carrier was seized in Samtredia. Confiscated weapons included those taken by militants in attacks on Interior Ministry forces, he said.

On Wednesday, militants fired machine guns at police officers, wounding two. The attackers were detained.

Georgia Introduces Prefects in Towns, Regions

LD1602002191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1130 GMT 15 Feb 91

[By SAKINFORM-TASS correspondent Eduard Ediberidze]

[Text] Tbilisi, 15 Feb (SAKINFORM-TASS)—The formation of new local bodies of state power and management has begun in Georgia. In accordance with a law recently adopted by this republic in the Transcaucasus "On Local Management in the Transition Period," prefects are to be appointed in the towns and regions in place of the executive committees of the local soviets. They are to be entrusted with the management of state, economic, and sociocultural organization.

"In the current situation," Vakhtang Khmaladze, a member of the constitutional commission of the Georgian Supreme Soviet, says," when the economy of our republic is in ruins, the authorities in the localities virtually do not exist, and the old structures are compromised, we cannot manage without the institution of the prefectorate. After all, during the period of transition on the path toward an independent and genuinely sovereign state, economic relations and the principles of management must change radically. The land issue and the issue of privatization need to be resolved, as do other vitally important problems. For all of these reforms to be carried out, strong authority is required to carry out a single set of state policies. Someone who has rights and on whom demands will be made must be responsible for everything."

Vakhtang Khmaladze answered a question on whether the prefect would not be a personal ruler. Such a danger exists since we are not yet used to democracy. However, a certain guarantee is encompassed in the fact that the prefect is monitored by what is now a multiparty Georgian legislature. The prefect's term of authority is four years. In addition, the same individual may not be appointed prefect more for than two terms in a row.

Local bodies of power—the assemblies [sobraniya]—elections for which are planned for 31 March, are called upon to be the supports for the prefects.

Abkhaz Groups Protest Decision

LD1902112991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Video report by Sukhumi Television correspondent O. Lakrba; from the "Television News Service" program—recorded]

[Text] [Lakrba] The situation in Abkhaziya is getting strained again. It was sparked off by a resolution of the Georgian Supreme Soviet on the appointment of a prefect in Gali Rayon in Abkhaziya. It has been said both during the meetings that have been held and in a statement by the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet that the appointment of a prefect in effect removes Gali Rayon from the jurisdiction of the supreme organs of power of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and is a breach of the territorial integrity of the Abkhaz Republic.

[Adleyba] This is an act that is directed at bringing into conflict our peoples that live here on the territory of Abkhaziya, in particular the Georgians and the Abkhaz.

[Lakrba] In a joint statement by the People's Forum, the Democratic Party of Abakhaziya, and the Greek-, Armenian-, and Russian-speaking public, this step is assessed as a further attempt to destabilize the situation in Abkhaziya on the eve of the Union-wide referendum.

Georgian Communists Name New First Secretary

91P50102

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian of 21 February 1991 First Edition carries on page 3 a 200-word correspondent report from Tbilisi titled "The Leader of Mkhedrioni Has Been Arrested." Commenting on "other events taking place in the republic," the correspondent notes that on 20 February 1991 a plenum of the Central Committee of the Independent Communist Party of Georgia accepted the resignation of Central Committee First Secretary A. Margiani and elected D. Mikeladze to that post.

New Georgian Law on Elections Published

LD1602100591 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0130 GMT 16 Feb 91

[Text] The new law on the election of new authorities and assemblies in place of the former people's deputies was published in Georgia's republican newspaper yesterday. Citizens of Georgia, who have come of age and have lived permanently in the republic for no less than 10 years can be elected as deputies. According to the new law, individuals serving in military and militarized formations that are not subordinate to the state authorities of Georgia do not have the franchise. The elections of the republic's local bodies of power have been scheduled for 31 March this year.

'Armenian Bandits' Explode Bomb Near Shusha

NC2202040691 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 20 Feb 91

[Excerpt] The Armenian bandits committed a new crime on a motorway near Shusha this morning. An explosion occurred near a Kamaz vehicle. An Azerbaijani was killed and another was wounded in the incident. The wounded Azerbaijani was taken to a hospital in Shusha. The members of the operations and investigation group of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the representatives of the Committee for State Security are investigating the incident. [passage omitted]

Armenian Committee Calls on Deserters To Return

NC1902154891 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0600 GMT 19 Feb 91

[From the review of HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN]

[Text] On its front page, the paper publishes an appeal to our republic's population from the Committee for the Coordination of the the Activities of the Military Departments.

The appeal specifically states: In line with the declaration on the independence of the Armenian Republic, the republic's Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers are exerting enormous efforts to ensure the inviolability of our borders. The Armenian Supreme Soviet has adopted a decision allowing the draftees to serve their active military term in the army units stationed on the territory of the republic. The military-construction (?units) in the disaster zone are also being taken up by the Armenian draftees.

In order to resolve this and other similar problems, the Council of Ministers created a Committee for the Coordination of the Activities of the Military Departments. However, the attitude of some [words indistinct] soldiers makes difficult our work to ensure that the draftees serve their military term on the territory of the republic. By deserting their units stationed on the territory of Armenia, these disobedient soldiers are endangering the solution of the problem, gambling with the fate of thousands of draftees, and are thus creating distrust in the collective image of the Armenian soldier.

We appeal to all draftees and servicemen who deserted their units stationed on the territory of the republic to return to their army units. In line with the [word indistinct] legislation, criminal charges will be instituted by the law enforcement authorities against all those who do not return to their units by (?1100) on 22 February.

Armenian Premier Receives Iranian Delegation

NC2102042391 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Text] Vazgen Manukyan, chairman of the Armenian Republic's Council of Ministers, on 19 February received an Iranian delegation which is visiting Armenia at the invitation of the republic's Chamber of Trade and Industry.

During the businesslike conversation, note was taken of the need to strengthen Armenia's relations with the neighboring country and to develop cooperation in various fields by also utilizing the potential of the Armenian community in Iran.

The delegation of the Iranian Islamic Republic's public organization for assistance to the poor and those who suffered from the war, headed by the organization's vice president, Fariborz Sha'banian, has been in our republic for the last few days.

The guests had a businesslike meeting at Yerevan city soviet executive committee where an agreement was drafted to repair the capital's 17th century Persian architectural edifice, the Blue Mosque. In keeping with the agreement, Iran will send renovation specialists to Yerevan and will provide the necessary amount of construction material. Plans are to complete the renovation work before 1995.

The Iranian delegation also met with the directors of various institutes and enterprises in Yerevan with the intent of future cooperation. It also visited the ancient manuscripts depository.

During the meeting with the [Armenian] Compassion Charity Organization, assistance to those who suffered the disaster was discussed.

The students of the capital's Persian-language-oriented school created a pleasant atmosphere for the Iranian guests with their knowledge of Persian. The delegation donated 5 million rials to the school.

Yerevan Marks Artsakh Movement Anniversary

LD2102082291 Moscow TASS in English 0724 GMT 21 Feb 91

[By ARMENPRESS-TASS correspondent Marianna Yeremyants]

[Text] Yerevan February 21 TASS—Several dozen thousands of Yerevan residents, braving a downpour, gathered in the Svoboda Square on Wednesday to mark the third anniversary of the Artsakh movement for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh region problem.

The leaders of the movement called on the Armenian people and all democratic forces in the republic to strengthen unity and expressed their solidarity with the Artsakh (Karabakh) people.

Kafarova Rejects Presidential Rule in NKAO

NC1802091191 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 16 Feb 91

[Text] Today the republic press published the telegram El'mira Kafarova, chairwoman of the Republic of Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet, sent to the USSR justice minister in connection with the views he expressed while being interviewed by IZVESTIYA. The telegram said:

It would have been better if the high-ranking officials of the country, in their statements to the press, maintained a considerate approach, displayed a [words indistinct], and observed conscientious principles, such as refraining from attacking [words indistinct]. Your suggestion that the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] be placed under presidential rule indicates that you are unaware of the true situation in our republic.

The people of Azerbaijan have been defending their constitutional rights within their homeland, which has its own territorial integrity, for many years now. They have lost many of their best sons and daughters for that reason. They have been searching for practical ways to maintain interethnic peace. Irrespective of the outside interference and regardless of the ferocious behavior of the armed Armenians, the people of Azerbaijan have been trying to normalize the situation in the NKAO for the sake of [words indistinct].

Regardless of this state of affairs, you have suggested that the NKAO be placed under presidential rule. It seems that you [words indistinct] and repeated the demand the nationalist circles in Armenia and the separatist elements in the NKAO have persistently put forward.

(?These forces) have fabricated the NKAO problem for the sake of their malicious political objectives. Consequently, they have [words indistinct] the people of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

I regret to say that when you made your suggestion, you failed to consider the fact that even talking about the possibility of adopting a decision about presidential rule would disrupt the social and political situation in Azerbaijan in a way which would be even more dangerous than [words indistinct] and create even more serious results for the central authority. In fact, it would inflict irreparable damage on our position in the effort made to maintain the alliance of the Soviet Union.

Azerbaijan Officials Meet Turkish Health Minister

TA2102220091 Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish 1800 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] Health Minister Halil Sivgin, who is in the USSR, has been received by Azerbaijan President Ayaz Niyaz ogly Mutalibov in Baku. Also present were Prime Minister Gasan Aziz ogly Gasanov, and deputy speaker of the assembly, (Tel'man Khalil ogly Orudzhev).

They discussed fields of cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan. They also exchanged views on the implementation of the cooperation protocol signed between the health ministries of the two countries in Ankara last year.

Central Asia

Kazakhstan KGB Official on Foreign Ties

LD2002205291 Moscow World Service in English 0610 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Text] In Alma-Ata, the capital of the Soviet eastern republic of Kazakhstan, the deputy chief of the republic's KGB has said that the growing diplomatic, economic and cultural cooperation of the republic with foreign

countries is also having some negative consequences, namely widening intelligence activities and economic espionage by some countries. General Sapar Abdrakhmanov, deputy KGB chief in Kazakhstan, was addressing a meeting of the local communist party officials. He said that the KGB has cut short the intelligence activities of 25 foreign agents on the territory of the republic in the past year.

Our reporter Leonid Zhukov, just back from that part of the country, has these details:

Kazakhstan is expanding its traditional contacts with its neighbors, China and Mongolia. These Asian countries are at the top of the list of its cultural, economic and trade cooperation partners. In Mongolia alone there are over 120,000 Kazakhs living at the moment and their wish to cooperate with their compatriots in the Soviet Union is quite natural. Thus in Ulaanbaatar, the Mongolian capital, a Kazakh solidarity movement has been founded. Two-hundred delegates of the Kazakh communities in Mongolia met recently to discuss broadening the movement to embrace Kazakhs living in Mongolia, China, Korea, and some other Asian countries. As for China, its contacts with Kazakhstan are traditionally viewed in the broader context of Soviet-Chinese cooperation. The basic principles of this cooperation were reaffirmed by the two sides in a communique signed in 1989. Now more from General Abdrakhmanov: Since the communique was signed in 1989, the efforts of the two sides to develop diplomatic, cultural and economic contacts are becoming more fruitful. Trade between the two countries last year amounted to R5 billion, double the 1988 figures. The republic of Kazakhstan and the Soviet Central Asian republics account for one-fifth of that trade. The improvement of traditional ties between Kazakhstan and the Soviet Union on the one hand and China on the other would enable them to cooperate in easing tensions in some parts of Asia. They could also set up a peace zone on the 7,500 km of the Soviet-Chinese borders.

Two-thirds of Soviet imports from China are food and other prime necessities, to be paid for in hard currency starting this year. New prospects have also emerged for mutually beneficial investment policies. The Soviet Central Asian repubics and Kazakhstan are gradually extending their border trade with China. Abdrakhmanov explains: We see immediate results from this border trade through the border post at (Khargost) and some new posts set along the border. Those are positive results. Among the negative ones I would mention smuggling which has greatly increased in the past year. The customs authorities in (Khargost) last year initiated 270 criminal cases of smuggling. The KGB in Kazakhstan confiscated and returned to the state smuggled goods worth R1.5 billion. There have been attempts to smuggle strategic raw materials abroad to the tune of R3 million.

There were also 20 reports in the past year of attempts at economic espionage in Kazakhstan. Several intelligence agents were uncovered by the republic's KGB among foreign diplomats visiting Kazakhstan. According to Gen Abdrakhmanov; the intelligence services of the countries involved were also interested in the political situation in the republic and the opposition to the republic's government.

Kazakh KGB Gives Figures on Stalin Victims

PM2202092191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Feb 91 p 4

[AZIYA-PRESS report: "KGB With a Human Face"]

[Text] At a meeting with Alma-Ata war and labor veterans held at the Kazakh KGB, the number of victims of the Stalinist repressions of the thirties through the fifties was made public for the first time. Just under 101,000 Kazakh people were ground in the millstones of the gulag, and more than 20,000 were shot. The veterans expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the search for the burial places of the dead is being carried out feebly. They also greeted equivocally the statement by the committee leadership that it is ready to meet halfway the public's requests that the KGB building on Dzerzhinskiy Street be handed over for use as a memorial to the victims of Stalinism. It turns out that the Chekists have long been dissatisfied with the old building, and would willingly move to a newer and more earthquake-proof building.

Kazakh Association Signs Contracts With PRC

LD2102163691 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 1500 GMT 20 Feb 91

[Summary] The Taraz regional foreign economic association recently established in Dzhambul has begun its active work. Having joined common strivings and final aims of different enterprises, mostly chemical ones, the association signed an agreement worth 25 million rubles of hard currency. Mutually beneficial contracts have been signed with a number of Western and Asian countries, but more than half of the contracts were signed with its neighbor, the PRC. In return for mineral fertilizers, the association will supply the Dzhambul producers with technology and equipment. It is planned to open a medical enterprise jointly with Chinese experts. In the near future it is expected to open joint minor enterprises for the production of butter, building materials, and consumer goods.

Kazakh Legislature Urges Union Treaty Conclusion

PM1202165391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Feb 91 Second Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent G. Dildyayev: "Kazakhstan: 'Union Treaty Must Be Signed Without Delay'"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—At the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session yesterday, the deputies postponed discussion of planning questions in order to address the most important question—the Union treaty.

"We are at an extreme," Kazakhstan's President N.A. Nazarbayev said, "beyond which the total disintegration of the USSR could ensue. Under conditions when extraordinary measures are needed to stabilize the situation, the central leadership organs are displaying inadmissible tardiness and are losing the initiative, enabling destructive forces to lay more and more new mines under the already shaken foundations of our Union.

"Every day, every hour is valuable now. We must not lose the opportunity to preserve the country's unity—an opportunity which is slipping away. Our children would not forgive us. We must not wait for all the republics without exception to define their attitude to the Union and to choose a stand acceptable to them. We must without delay sit around the negotiating table with those who have already made their choice and unequivocally support the idea of a renewed union state. Belorussia, Russia, the Ukraine, and all the Central Asian republics agree with us on this. In other words, subjects of the federation representing more than 90 percent of the country's industrial potential are ready to sign the Union treaty. Is this really little?! After all, the doors to the Union will never be closed to those who want to join us in the future.

"It is precisely the time factor that makes us take decisive measures to accelerate the process of shaping the renewed Union. I sincerely hope for understanding of this step on the part of M.S. Gorbachev, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the central government.

"The sovereign republics, which have a vital interest in preserving unity," the speaker said, "have the right to do all in their power to defend their common interests. And this must in no way be viewed as disregard for the existing state power or as an attempt to create a 'parallel center.' On the contrary, we want to end the 'war of laws' once and for all and to achieve total concord between the subjects of the federation and the central power in order to at last tackle the resolution of difficult economic and social questions in a calm political atmosphere."

The deputies supported N.A. Nazarbayev and gave him the go-ahead to take specific steps to organize a constructive dialogue with the leaders of those republics which share such an assessment of the situation prevailing in the country. The Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet adopted an appeal to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR's republics.

"We people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR, voicing the alarm and the aspirations of the multinational republic's peoples and guided by the vital interests of the millions of our voters and by the voice of our own reason and conscience, appeal to the Supreme Soviets of all the USSR's fraternal republics during these critical days for the country's destiny to display political wisdom, restraint, and farsightedness and to do everything possible to avert the coming catastrophe—the disintegration of our great union state.

"We must not close our eyes to the reality of such a tragic outcome of events under conditions when destructive forces, to the benefit of personal or group ambitions and narrow mercenary interests, are exploiting the idea of the peoples' free national development and subjecting interethnic friendship, which has been sealed by the sweat and blood of many generations, to very grave trials.

"In our joint history there are undoubtedly serious reasons for mutual grievances, disappointments, and doubts. They have been occasioned by decades of supremacy of the administrative edict system, which usurped power in our common home and appropriated the right to speak and act in the name of the peoples. We can put an end to the totalitarian past only together, only by pooling efforts.

"The Kazakh people and all the republic's peoples cannot conceive of themselves outside our unified homeland, whose preservation accords with both the political and the economic interests of multinational Kazakhstan. The disintegration of the Union will inevitably entail the total collapse of the republics' economies and a sharp deterioration in the lives of millions of people, thrust us all back by whole decades, and do irreparable harm to cooperation with the countries of the world community. We have no alternative but to renew the Union on the basis of concluding the Union treaty between sovereign, equitable republics.

"While firmly adhering to this position, at the same time we are clearly aware that we cannot build the new federation while rejecting the healthy statewide foundations and ignoring the constitutional power, which operates in accordance with the expression of the entire Soviet people's will. It is dangerous to turn the contradictions between the republics and the center, which are natural in the process of perestroyka, into a 'war of laws' fraught with an unpredictable civic confrontation, and it is still more dangerous to try and create a 'parallel center'—which will inevitably lead to the destabilization of the political situation in the country.

"A reliable barrier must be erected against destructive centrifugal forces. We believe that a special mission in this matter belongs to Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic people's deputies, since it is precisely the peoples of Russia, who have felt in full measure the yoke of the administrative edict system, that can and must play an important constructive role in shaping the renewed Union.

"The exacerbated political situation does not allow us to wait for all the republics to define their attitude to the Union treaty. It is necessary to begin a dialogue without delay with those who favor the preservation of the country's unity, leaving the other republics with the right

to join in at any time that they make the final choice. Basing ourselves on the adopted declarations of state sovereignty, we are obliged to give clear answers to the fundamental questions—what our Union is to be like, and what the new center is to be like. This is especially important now that central departments have shown a clear desire to ignore the republics' sovereign rights.

"The people of Kazakhstan, who staunchly defended Moscow in grim 1941, gave the motherland a lot of grain, and provided the launch site for the breakthrough into space, are not indifferent to the homeland's fate. We advocate the sovereign republics' strong unity and the further deepening of the democratization and humanization of society, ensuring everyone's political, social, and economic freedoms and guarantees, regardless of nationality. We want to be part of the renewed Union together with all the other republics of our multinational country."

Kirghiz President Reiterates Union Membership

LD1502215991 Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 15 Feb 91

[Text] If republics are unable to overcome the crisis without each other within the framework of the Union national confrontation within the framework of a republic will lead us to a catastrophe. [sentence as heard]. This has been stated by President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan [Kirghizia] at a meeting with representatives of national and cultural associations and public and political organizations of that republic. He described the ethnic issue as a major one today. He said that there was no way of getting out of the social and economic crisis in this country without settling the ethnic conflicts and reaching national accord. Askar Akayev reiterated his republic's firm intention to be part of a renewed union.

Land Reform Decree Published in Kirghizia

LD1902132791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0737 GMT 19 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Boris Maynayev]

[Text] Bishkek, 19 Feb (TASS)—A decree was published here today from the President of Kyrgyzstan (Soviet Central Asian republic) on measures to carry out land reform in the republic, in accordance with which land use will become mixed. Leaseholders and cooperatives will operate alongside collective and state farms.

In accordance with this resolution, it has been decided to privatize only lands under irrational utilization, allocated to a special fund of local soviets. At the same time, the decree proposes that the Cabinet of Ministers of the republic should define possible ways and forms of transforming inefficient collective and state farms into associations of peasant farms and cooperatives. Apart from that, according to the wishes of the workers, these lands could be handed over to leaseholders. Taking into account local conditions, the resolution provides for a step by step enactment of the reform, and forbids forcible dissolution of collective and state farms.

Tajikistan Adopts Privatization Law

LD2102125691 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 21 Feb 91

[Text] The Tajikistan Supreme Soviet today adopted a law on privatization of property. The document describes exactly which items are not liable to destatization. They include land, water, electric power stations, air and rail transport, and also defense enterprises.

Afghanistan Upgrades Consulate in Dushanbe

LD1502213191 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 0005 GMT 15 Feb 91

[Text] Kayumov, foreign affairs minister of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], has received Osman, head of the consulate of the Republic of Afghanistan in Dushanbe, at Osman's request. During the meeting, issues concerning the further development of direct relations between the Tajik SSR and the Republic of Afghanistan were discussed. Osman reported that the Government of Afghanistan has decided to upgrade the status of the consulate of the Republic of Afghanistan in the capital of Tajikistan. It has become an independent consulate mission.

Discussions were also held on issues connected with the provision of favorable conditions for the activities of the staff the of the consulate of the Republic of Afghanistan. The staff is to be increased.

Murder Trial of Fergana Riot Participants Ends

PM1302124991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Feb 91 Union Edition p 1

[INTERFAX report from column of agency reports: "The Long Echo of Fergana 89"]

[Text] In Fergana [Uzbekistan] the 183d and last case hearing connected with the June 1989 mass disorders has begun. There are 12 people in the dock. They stand charged with murdering eight people and attempting to murder two others, of stealing property, and of taking away a taxi. A total of 386 people have been brought to trial in the "Fergana cases," 194 have been sentenced—two to the death penalty, by firing squad, and 90 to imprisonment for various terms—and 40 have received suspended sentences, while 38 have been sentenced to correctional labor, INTERFAX reports.